Western Imaginings. Rohan Davis
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system of men like Osama Bin Laden and the September 11 hijackers.50
DeLong-Bas is not a Muslim, suggesting she is not likely to be motivated or inspired by Islamic religious beliefs in the same way authors like Haneef James Oliver are.51 DeLong-Bas’s representation of Wahhabism is not first and foremost a defense of Saudi interests as authors like Glick and Schwartz would have you believe. Instead, it rests on a certain claim to truth. DeLong-Bas believes she offers a truthful interpretation of Wahhabi doctrine primarily based on the writings of its founder Abd al-Wahhab. Her claims to truth rest on what she believes to be an objective interpretation of sacred Wahhabi Islamic texts, involving comparing and contrasting these Wahhabi Islamic texts and the beliefs and doctrines of modern Islamic terrorists. This is not the only major issue with her representation. Her case also depends on an appeal to the legitimacy of her translation and interpretation of Wahhabi texts from the eighteenth century and on her capacity to compare these to what she understands to be the beliefs of the modern Wahhabi movement.
There is of course a major problem here: much of this exercise depends on an assumption that we are doing something meaningful when we compare and interpret the original texts of a new belief system with much later or contemporary expressions of that belief system. It is highly doubtful that the modern nature of what we understand to be Wahhabism can be established in this way, and we use the term ‘genetic fallacy’ to describe authors who make this kind of error in reasoning. To commit a genetic fallacy is to make conclusions about a movement based on its origins as opposed to considering the contemporary expression of ideas and beliefs and doing so on their own merits and in their current context. DeLong-Bas’s interpretation fails to fully appreciate the constantly evolving nature of the Wahhabi movement. She fails to understand that Wahhabism in the twenty-first century is not an exact replica of how it appeared during eighteenth-century Arabia. We live in a different time and in a vastly different political context.
Next I want to consider the contribution made by Haneef James Oliver in his book The Wahhabi Myth: Dispelling Prevalent Fallacies and the Fictitious Link with Bin Laden.52 I have included Oliver’s book because of its unique approach. Oliver seeks to defend his faith by providing what he believes is an objective understanding of sacred Islamic texts. Oliver is a self-proclaimed Salafi (he rejects the use of the term Wahhabism, labeling it a misnomer) inspired by what he believes to be God’s word and a desire to convince people that terrorists like Bin Laden are not Salafists or true Muslims. He makes his intentions very clear from the outset:
My objective in doing so is not to deceitfully defend anyone or anything unworthy of a defence, as Islaam commands that a Muslim speak a word of truth, even if it be against him or herself, or followers of the same faith. Rather, it is my objective to deal only with those issues which have been unjustly brought against Islaam and Salaiyyah (Salafism) in particular, as opposed to defending the actions of the contemporary “Islaamic” groups and movements, which have only aided those who wish to harm the Islaamic Nation.
. . . [I]t is my objective to give the reader another perspective on some of these issues which they might never have been exposed to before. I have made every effort to avoid producing another book which is filled with opinion while lacking in textual proofs. Instead I have tried to produce a book in which Muslims and non-Muslims alike will be able to reflect upon the directives of the Qur’aan and the narrations (ahaadeetha) of the Prophet Muhammad for themselves.53 [emphasis added]
As we can see, Oliver believes his role is to “speak a word of truth” which he believes can be supported by “textual proofs.” There are a number of issues with these claims. One is that the legitimacy of his claims rests on our accepting that his interpretation of Salafism/Wahhabism provides the one big story about human history. Two, like some of the other scholarship I have dealt with earlier, Oliver’s representation of Wahhabism relies on his interpretation of Qur’anic texts originally written in Arabic and translated into English.54 To briefly reiterate the important point I made earlier, it is impossible for an author to achieve equivalence and we can understand the translator’s role as a subjective act influenced by their prejudices. Oliver’s book is self-published and it is very easy to see why, as it lacks the intellectual rigor typically demanded by reputable publishing organizations.
Oliver’s work is indicative of an author who lacks nuance when seeking to understand the Wahhabi movement. I have, however, come across one study in which the author does treat the phenomenon of Wahhabism with the kind of scholarly regard we should expect of those working in higher education and policy organizations. Quintan Wiktorowicz seeks to make sense of what he also terms the Salafi movement, and like Oliver he prefers this term rather than ‘Wahhabi,’ which he also calls a misnomer.55 Wiktorowicz claims we can distinguish between different groups within the wider Salafi tradition according to how they interpret Islamic religious texts. Pertinent is his example regarding the differences in reasoning on the use of weapons of mass destruction. Wiktorowicz writes that many jihadists today cite the Prophet Muhammad’s sanctioning the use of a catapult during war as providing religious justification for their own use of weapons of mass destruction:
In drawing analogies, jihadis argue that the catapult was the WMD of the Prophet’s lifetime and that his example legitimates the use of WMD today. This conclusion is not rooted in an objective reading of the religious sources: it is entirely dependent on whether one views the catapult as the historical equivalent of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Human reasoning thus plays a critical role.56 [emphasis added]
Wiktorowicz makes a very important point that very few scholars representing Wahhabism acknowledge, that “human reasoning . . . plays a critical role” when it comes to making sense of things in the social world like religious texts and different events. Hans-Georg Gadamer and Hannah Arendt have both emphasized the crucial roles human reasoning and prejudice play in how we make sense of the world.57 The works of Gadamer and Arendt remind us that translating is a not an exact science with an objective outcome, but is instead a subjective and political act. It is clear that Oliver’s translation of Arabic religious texts into English is influenced by, among other things, a desire to defend his understanding of the Islamic faith.
This contest to make sense of Wahhabism occurring between the different scholars I have drawn on in this chapter is a microcosm of a much wider debate occurring between intellectuals relying on very different analytical and theoretical frameworks and influenced by different interests, commitments, and what scholars like Gadamer have called prejudices.58 My cursory review of some of the scholarly literature dedicated to making sense of Wahhabism helps highlight a number of important issues warranting and legitimating this research. My review helps show that a scholar’s interests and truth claims have major implications for how they make sense of and represent Wahhabism. I have shown how an intellectual’s desire to promote the interests of a particular group or intellectual tradition can result in very different representations of Wahhabism, ranging from Wahhabism as responsible for promoting and inspiring modern Islamic terrorism to Wahhabism as a religious belief system that promotes peace, harmony, and tolerance. In the next two chapters I want to take a closer look at some of the issues I have raised during this chapter, specifically the role and responsibilities of the intellectual, making sense of truth, and the crucial role prejudice plays in influencing how we make sense of the social world.
On Intellectuals, Prejudice, and Understanding the Social World
Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?
—Juvenal, Satires
Socrates often wandered through the marketplace in Athens asking people whether they had any knowledge to reveal to him. His practice of the Socratic dialogue and use of Socratic irony (elencthia) implied that few of his fellow-citizens knew what they were talking about.1 Soon after he had been condemned to death by his fellow Athenian citizens, he told them, in what has since become