The Principles of Moral and Christian Philosophy. George Turnbull
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nature, and of the order of the world. And by this research I quickly found, that they had a very firm persuasion of an infinitely wise and good administration, actually prevailing at present throughout the whole of nature, and therefore very likely to prevail for ever, founded, partly, upon what they were able to comprehend in general of order in the government of the sensible world; but chiefly (for they had made no very great advances in what is now commonly called Natural Philosophy) upon the great insight<iv> they had acquired into the moral constitution of man, by applying themselves to moral enquiries. They were able to discern clearly from thence, that man is very well fitted and qualified for attaining to a very high degree of moral perfection even here; and being satisfied, that such care is taken of virtue, and such provision made for her in this life, as is most proper and best suited to her first state of formation and discipline, they could not entertain any doubts of the kind concern of Heaven about her to be carried on, as may best serve the purpose of general good, by proper steps, for ever.
And accordingly what I now publish, is an attempt (in consequence of such observations as I have been able to make, or have been led to by others) to vindicate human nature, and the ways of GOD to man, by reducing the more remarkable appearances in the human system to excellent general laws: i.e. to powers and laws of powers, admirably adapted to produce a very noble species of being in the rising scale of life and perfection.
And what I think I have proved, by thus endeavouring to account for moral as for natural things, amounts briefly to this, “That order is kept in man, as well as in the other parts of nature within our observation, constituting the same system: And that from what we clearly see of perfectly wise and good government in all present things, in that part chiefly where virtue is concerned, there is sufficient reason to infer the universal, never-ceasing superintendency of a divine providence, and a future state of complete happiness to the virtuous; or the continuance of perfectly wise and good order in all<v> things, and, which is chief, of due concern about virtue, in all its different stages, for ever and ever.”
In order to conclude a providence, (in the belief of which the chief happiness of thinking persons is absolutely bound up) it is plain, we must first have acurately considered the condition of virtue and vice with respect to this life merely, so as to be able to determine, when, and how far, or in what degrees, and how circumstantiated the one or the other is our present greater good or ill. Now it is only by strictly examining the structure and fabrick of the mind, the frame and connexion of all its powers and affections, and the manner of their operation, that we can ascertain the end and purpose of our being; find out how our moral part either improves or suffers; know what its force is when naturally preserved and maintained in its sound state, and what happens to it in proportion as it is neglected or prostituted, abused or corrupted. Thus, alone, can we with any degree of certainty and assurance say, what is the natural force and tendency of virtue, on the one hand, or the natural influence and result of vice, on the other; or in what manner either of these may work toward our happiness or misery.
But if we set about such an enquiry in the fair impartial way of experiment, and of reasoning from experiment alone, we shall plainly perceive, that as many as the hardships and difficulties are, which virtue has to encounter, struggle with, and surmount in this state; far however, from being quite abandon’d, she is not left without great support and comfort: Nay, that in reality, she is only exposed so far as various trial necessary to her culture and improvement requires; and has a real happiness belonging to her exercises, sufficient to<vi> render her the best and wisest choice even at present, in the opinion of all who make a fair and complete estimate of human life: just so much as leaves room for further hopes in her behalf, by clearly shewing providence to be already most seriously concerned about her, and thoroughly interested on her side in her first probationary state. And therefore the argument for a future life in this treatise, runs in this channel, “There is such provision made for virtue, there is such happiness, such advantages belonging to her, even here in her first state, or at her first setting out in life, as render it highly probable, nay, absolutely certain, that a perfectly kind providential care of her interests begun here, is to be extended to a succeeding life, and perfected hereafter.” There is such a foundation laid, nay, such an advancement made here, as plainly points out the nature and scope of that moral building intended to be carried on to its completion in another state. For that work or scheme must be advanced gradually, because virtue must be gradually formed to ripeness and vigour, by means of proper exercises and trials: And virtue cannot possibly in the nature of things have the happiness resulting from its exercises, but in proportion as it advances and improves. Education must precede perfection in the moral, as spring must go before harvest in the natural world. And moral perfection must be arrived to full maturity by proper cultivation, before the excellent fruits it can then, and then only produce, can be reaped and enjoyed. Virtue must be fit to be placed in the circumstances which alone can render it fully happy, by affording it proper means and occasions of exerting its complete force and excellence, before it can be placed in such circumstances; or being so placed, could reap to<vii> the full, all the advantages of such a situation: but being well provided for, and duly attended to and supported in its first state of education and discipline, what reasonable ground of doubt or fear can there be with regard to its future condition, or its succeeding circumstances in another state, after it is brought by due culture, step by step, to considerable strength, beauty and perfection, as virtue must: Gradual improvement to perfection by proper diligence to cultivate it, being involved in the very notion of virtue and merit.
I think I need say no more of the design in a Preface. The variety of materials contained in this Essay, and the order in which it proceeds, may be soon seen by casting one’s eye on the Contents, as they are digested into a regular summary of the whole. And therefore all that remains to be said here is, in the first place, that the margine is filled with quotations from ancient authors, not to make a shew of reading; but because, in reality, the best observations in this enquiry are taken from some ancient moralist; and it seem’d to me so much the more necessary to do justice to them on this occasion by such references, that it hath been so lately asserted, the wisest ancients had not just notions of God, or of a future state; or, at least, were not able to produce any conclusive arguments on these important subjects. But of this opinion I have said enough in my Conclusion. And therefore I shall just say a word of the modern authors from whom I have received the greatest assistances in this work. I think all of them from whom I have borrowed any thing are referred to in the notes. But the pleasure and advantage I have reaped from them, render it but justice in me to make more particular mention of them in this place.<viii>
Some few very good and useful remarks are taken from Dr. John Clark’s excellent Sermons at Boyle’s lecture.3
I have quoted some very beautiful passages relating to the necessity of general laws, and to the wise order of nature appearing in the established connexions between our sensible ideas of different senses, from the philosophical writings of Dr. Berkley (Bishop of Cloyd) a writer highly esteemed by all persons of good taste.4
I have used some of Dr. Butler’s (Bishop of Bristol) phrases in his discourse on the analogy,5 &c. because I thought them very proper, and well chosen for the purpose to which they are employed: and this I take to be a liberty that does not so much as border on plagiarism. Beside that, I am obliged to the same treatise for several very useful and truly philosophical observations on human nature. But every intelligent reader, who is acquainted with his excellent sermons, will quickly perceive, that throughout the whole I am yet more indebted to them. And, indeed, that true method of enquiring into human nature, which is delineated with such force and perspicuity of argument in the admirable preface to these divine discourses, being strictly kept to in them, they make a full vindication of human nature, and of the ways of God to man. There the natural dignity of human nature, the real excellence of virtue, the solid happiness it creates, and it alone can give, and the indefeasible, unalienable right of moral conscience to maintain the superiority, and govern in the human breast, are set forth in the most forcible convincive manner, with evidence truly irresistible.
I cannot express the vast satisfaction, and equal benefit, with which I have often read the