Institutes of Divine Jurisprudence, with Selections from Foundations of the Law of Nature and Nations. Christian Thomasius
Читать онлайн книгу.
the affirmation or denial of which implies heterodoxy or breeds scandal in the church. Thus, just as I do not demand
[print edition page 35]
that the learned esteem my opinion, so do I not believe there to be any need to search in the commentaries of our theologians to see whether one or the other supports my opinion. I confess that there are several whom I have seen embrace a different opinion from my own. However, if we have to act on the basis of authority, I oppose to all of these the words of Luther on Genesis, chapter 3:60 “But if Eve had remained in the state of innocence, she would not have been subject to the rule of the man but would have herself been his companion in government, which is now a matter for men alone”; but if we want to argue on the basis of reason [rather than authority], I refer to those arguments which I discuss in more detail again in book 3, chapter 3, §§35ff., where I have also taken up this question.
§45. In chapter 1, §51, I state the common axiom: “Nothing is in the intellect which was not previously in the senses,” and this I declare to be true without limitations. But in chapter 2, §39, I say that the human intellect in the state after the fall from grace is like a clean slate, which is suitable for receiving various impressions: and in the same chapter, §§66 and 67, I declare that right reason is part of man from birth as a potential faculty capable of exerting its powers once the ideas have been formed previously by the intellect from sense impressions. I consider the doctrine of the Scholastics far too subtle; they teach that even infants have certain first practical principles by nature in the form of some kind of faculty with which they are born, etc. All these I add here because one follows from the other. And first, concerning that principle “Nothing is in the intellect …” this is so trite and widespread that it is to be found in all Peripatetic works on physics, so that I need not fear that this might be an assertion that does not conform to theology; see my blessed father’s Physics, chapter 49, questions 66ff., pages 263ff., and Zeidler’s Posterior Analytics, page 231, thesis 31, and page 572, §8.61 Concerning the other argument, it must be pointed out briefly that Plato and Aristotle disagreed over the way in which cognition works in our minds: Plato claimed this is the result
[print edition page 36]
of remembering, while Aristotle said it occurs through the reception of external sense impressions by the intellect. Plato therefore compared the human intellect to a slate that has been wiped clean, Aristotle to a bare one that has never been written on; see Zeidler, Posterior Analytics, page 391, thesis 4, and page 586, thesis 1. You should not however need to believe that when I mention a clean slate I have run over to the side of Plato. The previous principle, “Nothing is in the intellect …,” proves that this is not what I mean. This is directly opposed to Platonic philosophy, as I shall demonstrate to you elsewhere. I used the term clean [rasa] according to the common manner of speaking, in which clean [tabula rasa] and bare [nuda] are often used interchangeably. I am, however, happy for this term to be exchanged for the other in order to remove any cause for ambiguity. Finally, concerning the third point, I here have the consent of erudite men above all suspicion, and not only from other universities, but from our own. I refer again to Melchior Zeidler from Königsberg, who in his frequently cited treatise, book 2, chapter 3, §2, and in many following chapters shows in great detail that human reason from the time of birth is only a potential, and that ideas are innate only as mere possibilities, but not as actual qualities [habitus]. I also appeal to Conrad Horneius from Helmstedt, who in book 4 of his Moral Philosophy, chapter 2, §6, page 559, shows quite clearly that first principles, both theoretical and practical, require a previous knowledge of the terms and cannot be understood by infants.62 I also refer to Johannes Zeisold from Jena, who in the years from 1651 in four public disputations on natural ideas demonstrated our opinion from basic principles and strengthened it against the objections of Sperling at the University of Wittenberg.63 From our doctrine I refer you back to that of my blessed father, who, according to the judgment of our much revered Alberti in his oration on my parent,64 was a Christian philosopher
[print edition page 37]
(a title he aspired to throughout his entire life, and which is commonly applied to those people who do not contradict sacred theology by philosophizing, nor defend any opinions which are contrary to Scripture and could disturb theology. But if someone wanted to distort the meaning of this elogy and imply that this blessed man confused the disciplines of philosophy and theology, which are most clearly distinct, and that he attempted to demonstrate theological theses from principles of reason or philosophical theses from hypotheses of revelation, then he would do my blessed father a great injustice, since he would never have dreamed of confusing the two). My father therefore put forward these same principles which we have taught concerning natural knowledge, even concerning the knowledge of God himself; see his Physica, questions 68ff., page 284:
This rule is valid (nothing is in the intellect, etc.), but only concerning those ideas which are in the intellect in the form of an act, or an intelligible species, but not concerning those that are there in the form of a potential or a habit. A.: Prove it. B.: There are in our intellect certain innate ideas of the first principles, but they exist in the form of a potential, even if no sense perception of these principles preceded them. A.: I thought, however, that there are some intelligible species in our intellect, without having entered through the senses. For is not God (to leave aside other examples) in our intellect, although he cannot be grasped by sense perception? B.: Hear therefore another qualification: there is nothing in the intellect, which did not previously exist in the senses, whether in itself, or through something else. Thus I grant that God is not himself an object of sense perception, but I deny that he does not become such an object through something else.65
§46. These passages will show you that my opinions on these matters are neither new nor particularly heterodox because they were defended by men who have never been suspected of heterodoxy. Those who disagree, however, as well as those who generally defend the opinion of the Scholastics
[print edition page 38]
point to Romans 2, verse 15, where it is said that the law of nature is inscribed on the hearts of men. That is why the Index of Novelties, n. 19,66 also claims that the illustrious Pufendorf denies the law of nature to be something implanted in human nature and an innate faculty. But the illustrious man makes a fully satisfactory reply to this in his Apology, pages 46ff.,67 where he shows very clearly, and by using other, parallel passages of Scripture, that the phrase writing on the hearts of men means something other than an innate faculty of this kind. And Zeisold in his entire fourth disputation already tried to show the view that our opinion was not contrary to religion, and gave a satisfactory reply to many contrary arguments by Sperling and pointed out that already in his time our famous philosopher and theologian Jacob Martinus had attacked that doctrine of the Scholastics.68 Sperling therefore, in his Anthropologia, book 1, chapter 3, question 8, pages 186ff., insisted on the passage from the Apostle as a proof for innate ideas by writing:
For this the Apostle said: “For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves: Which shew the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the mean while accusing or else excusing one another.”69 Here it is possible to form the following conclusion: Whatever is inscribed on the hearts of pagans is not acquired but innate. The work of the law of nature is inscribed on the hearts of the pagans. Therefore the work of the law of nature is not acquired, but innate.70
Among other things he cites the response of Martinus from the Partitiones metaphysicae, section 3, question 4, page 321, where he writes as follows:
The response to the authority of the Apostle is at hand: a distinction needs to be drawn between the inscription itself and the means of inscription. When natural [innate] knowledge is denied, this does not mean that
[print edition page 39]
pagans do not have the law of God inscribed on them by nature, since they do what is required by God’s law; but what is denied is the form which some insist on, namely, that it is inscribed at birth: that