Institutes of Divine Jurisprudence, with Selections from Foundations of the Law of Nature and Nations. Christian Thomasius
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which does not have something in common with another in relation to a third term.
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§15. (4) When the intellect, therefore, contemplates the nature of things, it either contemplates their shared characteristics or their differences. Thus, every definition is based on this twofold concept, that is, of similarity in the genus and dissimilarity in the specific difference.
§16. (5) He who is able to draw out the similarities of things is said to have a powerful mind; he who accurately discerns differences has judgment.
§17. (6) Moreover, by contemplating the essence of things and their nature the intellect either conceives them as they really are or combines them with each other by some fiction, as they are not. And this act of the intellect is called imagination.
§18. By comparing all those things we have surveyed so far with each other we arrive at the supreme and first proposition, that is, the one to which all others can be referred, but which itself cannot be derived by means of demonstrative proof: anything either is or is not. Or, it is impossible for something to be and not to be at the same time. Or finally, mutually contradictory things cannot be true simultaneously. For these all mean the same. And this is generally called the first theoretical principle.
§19. Among those things, however, that are proper subjects for contemplation, man also finds himself. And when he contemplates his nature he sees that he was created not only for the sake of speculation, but for action as well.
§20. But when he compares his actions with his essence, he realizes that his nature does not allow him to be free of law and to regulate his actions without any norm.
§21. From this follows the definition of law. It also leads to the concept of a ruler and that of obligation since these are implied in the definition of law.
§22. When he finds that there are a variety of laws, he compares them with each other and looks for their differences. The upshot of these contemplations,
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or the conclusion, which is the first law and to which all others must be related, is called the first practical principle.
§23. From what has been said it is clear that the first practical principle is not the first in an absolute sense, but is subordinated to the first theoretical principle.
§24. For the first theoretical principle is the sum of all contemplations on the essences of things and nature. The practical is on the essence of one thing in particular, that of law. The species, however, is contained within the genus.
§25. The practical principle, therefore, already presupposes the knowledge of various things and above all of man and of human actions. And thus it also presupposes the theoretical principle.
§26. Thus they are mistaken who believe that the first practical principle is not subordinate to the theoretical.
§27. For it would follow that the theoretical principle would be false if there were anything in my mind which neither is nor is not.
§28. And so they who teach this deny in fact the first principle of the intellect.
§29. Or they make two distinct entities out of the human intellect.
§30. I will not mention that they themselves admit there is no point arguing against someone who denies first principles. We happily accept this in the case of the first theoretical principle. For nobody will readily deny this if he is human and no peasant.
§31. But if we assume the same in the first practical principle, we will not escape controversy, since the most erudite men disagree over this with each other, each of them surrounded by a crowd of his pupils.
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§32. If they all kept on contradicting each other, saying that there is no point arguing with someone who denies the first principles, except by resorting to physical violence, then a war would in fact break out, if not of all against all, certainly of most of the learned with each other.
§33. Therefore, the first practical principle must be demonstrated immediately from the theoretical.
§34. If I be permitted to do so, I can express this principle in a few words: “Obey him who has the power to command you.”
§35. I prove this first from the definition of him who commands. He who commands is one who has the power to bind another. If there were no need to obey him he would not have this power, but it is impossible for something to be and not to be at the same time.
§36. From the definition of law: Law is the command of a ruler binding subjects, etc. If there were no need to obey him who commands, the law would therefore not be law.
§37. From the definition of obligation: we have explained this above. There would be no obligation if there were no need to obey him who commands.
§38. This axiom deserves to be called a first practical principle because, for one thing, all particular laws must be related to it which can easily be proved through inductive argument from examples.
§39. It also deserves this name because it cannot itself be demonstrated using another law, since it follows from the definition of law in general.
§40. You could therefore call the principle the object of jurisprudence in general. For all forms of jurisprudence presuppose it.
§41. But since we have divided jurisprudence into divine and human, we must see what the first principle of divine jurisprudence is.
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§42. Its nature rests on the fact that all divine laws are referred to it, and that it itself is, however, demonstrated immediately from the first practical principle, mediately from the first theoretical principle.
§43. It will be the following: “Obey God.”
§44. The immediate proof is that this is true because God is a ruler.
§45. The mediate demonstration of this is that this is true because otherwise God would not be God.
§46. Either proof will be developed a little more fully since here it is simply supposed that there is a God and that he is a superior.
§47. Even the most barbarian nations have acknowledged and continue to acknowledge that there is a God. Many have even demonstrated it, especially those who wrote on natural theology or argued against the atheists.
§48. And here various arguments can be put forward. The most powerful is taken from the order of the causes of things. Whatever we see in this terraqueous globe does not exist out of itself, but is dependent on something else; yet we also see that those things on which they are dependent do not exist out of themselves, and so on. Thus we have to stop at some first cause, because the progress ad infinitum is repugnant to the intellect. This first cause is God.
§49. But our intellect cannot know perfectly what God is, even if it is assisted by the light of revelation, because of the infinite distance of human nature from the divine. The light of reason on its own is even less capable of understanding these mysteries.
§50. Thus, it is quite evident from what has been said about the existence of God that his essence is nobler than that of humans, who, as nature tells us, are in all other respects the most perfect among the sublunary creatures and are consequently longer lasting than those entities which
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we see around us, etc.; in one word, that he transcends our intellect, since our intellect can only understand what is equally or less perfect than ourselves.
§51. Yet there is a need for more subtle demonstrations if you want to prove from the light of nature that God is not one of the celestial bodies, since most humans do not know their changes, and I fear that even the most erudite would not be able to do so if they set aside revelation. When the Apostle, therefore, argues from the light of reason against