The Truth of the Christian Religion with Jean Le Clerc's Notes and Additions. Hugo Grotius
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Understanding: For can any one be so foolish, as to expect any thing so accurate from Chance? He may as soon believe that pieces of Timber, and Stones, should frame themselves into a House; (b) or from Letters thrown at a venture, there should arise a Poem; when the Philosopher, who saw only some Geometrical Figures on the Sea-shore, thought them plain Indications of a Man’s having been there, such Things not looking as if they proceeded from Chance. Besides, that Mankind were not from Eternity, but date their Original from a certain Period of Time, is clear, as from other Arguments, so from the *Improvement of Arts, <14> and those desart Places, which came afterwards to be inhabited; and is further evidenced by the Lan-<15>guage
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of Islands, plainly derived from the neighbouring Continents. There are moreover certain Ordinances so universal amongst Men, that they don’t seem so much to owe their Institution to the Instinct of Nature, or the Deductions of plain Reason; as to a constant Tradition, scarce interrupted in any Place, either by Wickedness or Misfortune: <16> Of which sort were formerly Sacrifices, amongst holy Rites; and now Shame in Venereal Things, the Solemnity of Marriage, and the Abhorrence of Incest.
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Sect. VIII. The Objection concerning the Cause of Evil, answered.
Nor ought we to be in the least shaken in what has been said, because we see many Evils happen, the Original of which cannot be ascribed to God, who, as was affirmed of Him, is perfectly good. For when we say, that God is the Cause of all Things, we mean of all such Things as have a real Existence; which is no Reason why those Things themselves should not be the Cause of some Accidents, such as Actions are. God created Man, and some other Intelligences superior to Man, with a Liberty of Acting; which Liberty of Acting is not in itself Evil, but may be (a) the Cause of something that is Evil. And to make God the Author of Evils of this kind, which are called Moral Evils, is the highest Wickedness. But there are other Sorts of Evils, such as Loss or Pain inflicted upon a Person, which may be allowed to come from God, suppose for the Reformation <17> of the Man, or as a Punishment which his Sins deserve: For here is no Inconsistency with Goodness; but on the contrary, these proceed from Goodness itself, in the same manner as Physick, unpleasant to the Taste, does from a good Physician.
Sect. IX. Against Two Principles.
And here, by the way, we ought to reject their Opinion, who imagine that there are (b) two Active Principles, the one Good, and the other Evil.
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For from Two Principles, that are contradictory to each other, can arise no regular Order, but only Ruin and Destruction: Neither can there be a self-existent Being perfectly Evil, as there is One Self-existent perfectly Good: Because Evil is a Defect, which cannot reside but in something which has a Being; (a) and the very having a Being is to be reckoned amongst the Things which are Good.
Sect. X. That God governs the Universe.
That the World is governed by the Providence of God, is evident from hence: That not only Men, who are endued with Understanding; but Birds, and both Wild and Tame Beasts, (who are lead by Instinct, which serve them instead of Understanding) take care of, and provide for their Young. Which Perfection, as it is a Branch of Goodness, ought not to be excluded from God: And so much the rather, because He is All-wise, and All-powerful, and cannot but know every thing that is done, or is to be done, and with the greatest Fa-<18>cility direct and govern them; To which we may add, what was before hinted, concerning the Motion of particular Things, contrary to their own Nature, to promote the Good of the Whole.
Sect. XI. And the Affairs of this lower World.
And they are under a very great Mistake, who confine this Providence (b) to the Heavenly Bodies; As appears from the foregoing Reason, which holds as strong for all created Beings; and moreover from this Consideration, that there is an especial Regard had to (c) the Good of Man, in the
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Regulation of the Course of the Stars, as is confessed by the best Philosophers, and evident from Experience. And it is reasonable to conceive, that greater Care should be taken of that, for whose Sake the other was made, than of that which is only subservient to it.
Neither is Their Error less, (a) who allow the Universe to be governed by Him, but not the <19> particular Things in it. For if He were ignorant of any particular Thing (as some of them say,) He would not be thoroughly acquainted with himself. Neither will his Knowledge be Infinite (as we have before proved it to be) if it does not extend to Individuals. Now if God knows all Things, what should hinder his taking care of them; Especially since Individuals, as such, are appointed for some certain End, either Particular or General: And Things in General (which they themselves acknowledge to be preserved by God) cannot subsist but in their Individuals: So that if the Particulars be destroyed by Providence’s forsaking them, the Whole must be destroyed too.
Sect. XII. This is further proved by the Preservation of Empires.
The Preservation of Commonwealths hath been acknowledged, both by Philosophers and Historians, to be no mean Argument for the Divine Providence over Humane Affairs. First, in General; (b) because where
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ever good Order in Government and Obedience hath been once admitted, it has been always retained; and in particular, certain Forms of Government have continued for many Ages; as that of Kings among the Assyrians, Aegyptians and Franks; and that of Aristocracy among the Venetians. Now though Humane Wisdom may go a good way towards this; yet if it be duly considered, what a Multitude of wicked Men there are, how many external Evils, how liable Things are in their own Nature to change; we can hard-<20>ly imagine any Government should subsist so long without the peculiar Care of the Deity. And this is more visible where it has pleased God (a) to change the Government; For all Things (even those which do not depend upon Humane Prudence) succeed beyond their Wish (which they do not ordinarily in the variety of Humane Events) to those whom God has appointed Instruments for this Purpose, as it were destined by him; (suppose Cyrus, Alexander, Caesar the Dictator, (b) the Cingi amongst the Tartars, (c) Namcaa amongst the Chinese:) Which wonderful Agreeableness of Events, and all conspiring to a certain End, is a manifest Indication of a Provident Direction. For though a Man may now and then throw a particular Cast on a Die by Chance; yet if he should do it a hundred times together, every Body would conclude there was some Art in it.
But the most certain Proof of Divine Providence is from Miracles, and the Predictions we find in Histories: It is true indeed, that a great many of
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those Relations are fabulous; but there is no Reason to dis-believe those which are attested by credible Witnesses, to have been in their Time, Men whose Judgment and Integrity have never been called in question. For since God is All-<21>knowing and All-powerful, why should we think him not able to signify his Knowledge or his Resolution to Act, out of the ordinary Course of Nature, which is his Appointment, and subject to his Direction and Government? If any one should object against this, that inferior intelligent Agents may be the Cause of them, it is readily granted; and this tends to