Observations upon Liberal Education. George Turnbull
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the necessity of a public religion, and the mischiefs of superstition, and of evincing the excellency of the Christian religion considered with regard to the ends of a public religion, above every other that hath ever appeared in the world—Benevolence is the perfection of man, and it is in a particular sense the law, the new law of Christ, p. 354.
In short, there is no moral or political truth which a judicious reader of history will not find frequent opportunity of explaining and confirming to young people—And both in natural and moral philosophy, facts ought to go before reasonings or conclusions, which can only be inferred from facts—Besides, it is fit youth should see mankind as they really are, in the worst colours they have ever appeared—But notwithstanding all the wickedness that hath ever abounded in the world, men are made for society, and have a social disposition deeply inlaid into their frame—What it is to be made for society, and men are so made, p. 355.
In reading history, youth ought to be taught to attend to the rise and progress of empire, the generative principle of dominion, and the natural cause of changes in it—To observe how men are made for civil coalitions—And to the advantages of good civil orders and constitutions—Several reflexions on this subject, p. 359.
History-lessons ought not to stop short till youth are brought home to modern times, and their own country, and are instructed in its history, government, laws and interest—But it is best to begin with ancient history, and descend regularly and gradually to modern times, that youth may see the connexion and suite of human affairs, p. 360.
But after all, the chief lesson is to teach them wherein true merit consists, viz. in wisdom and virtue—In what sense virtue is its own reward explained, p. 362.
All the arts ought to be called on, in their proper places, to recommend virtue—Great use might be made of poetical fictions— Great use might be made of fables, parables and allegories—Their antiquity—Whence their aptitude to instruct or insinuate moral truths agreeably, proceeds, p. 365.
Of the Socratic method of teaching—Of the fitness of instructing youth by the familiar way of conference—The admirable success of Socrates in that way of teaching—The invention of youth ought to be improved by practising them in finding out truths by themselves—In resolving questions—about morals in particular, p. 370.
History gives proper opportunities of explaining ancient customs, religious or civil—When these occur in history, then is the proper place for medals, basso-relievo’s, and other ancient monuments or prints of them—Any other way of teaching antiquity is dry and insipid, p. 372.
It will likewise afford the best occasions of explaining the chief rules of oratory; for then is it the proper time to discourse of them when youth are agreeably affected by the beautiful speeches that occur in historians—How preposterous it would be to speak of rules till the effects they are designed to produce, and which the observance of them produces, have been felt—Reading history will give occasion to point out the invention, rise and improvements of all arts, and consequently, of trying different genius’s, and inviting them to discover and exert themselves—Modern education too stinted—Observations on this subject—How schools ought to be furnished to serve this important business—The instituto at Bologna how adorned, p. 372.
Education ought to be large, whatever particular profession one may afterwards betake himself to—The advantages the Grecian youth had in this respect—The practice of their great men in laying themselves out to be useful to youth of promising parts recommended, p. 376.
Chapter V
Of instruction in poetry and her sister arts, painting, sculpture, music, and architecture; and the place which these arts ought to have in liberal education, in order to form elegant taste, which is one of the best preservatives against luxury, being naturally assistant to and corroborative of virtue.
The author hath hitherto been labouring to prove a very plain truth, That science, or real knowledge, and not mere words, ought to be the principal scope of education—What is meant by real knowledge—All the objects of human enquiry may be divided into these two, science and languages—What science comprehends—What is meant by languages—The didactic stile, oratory, poetry, painting, sculpture, fall under the idea of languages—This illustrated, by shewing painting to be a language, the truth and propriety of which it is well worth while to understand, p. 381.
Previous to instruction, care ought to be taken to form good habits—To form the deliberative habit—What this means—It is freedom of mind—It is mastership of one’s self, and the foundation of virtue, p. 382.
In instruction what rules ought to be observed—Youth ought to be taught to reason from facts alone, and not from imaginary theories and feigned hypotheses—And to reason first and chiefly about things relating to life and practice—And they ought to be taught to keep a just view of human nature before them, and to consider man neither as a merely sensitive nor a purely moral being, but as he really is a compound of moral and sensitive powers nicely blended together—Errors arising from not considering man in this view—Hence vague, loose, unmeaning raillery against luxury, in which several useful, as well as ornamental arts, are confounded with it, p. 384.
But having said enough of science, we proceed to consider languages as above defined—First the didactic stile, how masters ought to study clearness and perspicuity, and how youth will learn this stile from masters who excel in it, while they are taught by it—But youth ought to be employed in teaching what they know to others—The advantages of so employing them—There is another eloquence that ought not to be neglected in education, which is the concise stile, in which men ought to talk to men—How youth may be improved in this—How the rules of oratory ought to be taught—They are all founded in human nature, and teaching them aright, is developing human nature, because it is shewing how and by what the passions of men are affected—Observations on this subject, p. 386.
The same is true of poetry—Observations from Plutarch upon reading the poets with youth—Further reflexions on this subject— Of the common commentaries upon classic authors, upon the Greek and Roman poets in particular—Mr. Pope’s notes on Homer a true model of criticism, p. 391.
Painting and sculpture considered—Their ends, their rules, their connexion with natural or moral philosophy—The author is shorter on this subject, having elsewhere treated of it at large, p. 397.
Of instructing youth early in drawing—The advantages of it—How youth ought to be inured to view and examine pictures and poems—By what rules or questions both ought to be tried, and of the false taste in painting corresponding to verbal criticism in classical reading—Upon the necessity of improving the imagination of youth—Our eyes and ears were designed by nature for improvement, being capable of very noble improvements—What genius and wit means—How the imagination may be improved and refined—The fancy will ever be pursuing some species of beauty, some Venus—The advantage of directing it early towards the true Venus, the true beauty—This is the only way of securing it against straying, wandering and seduction, p. 400.
An important rule of nature to be attended to in teaching the arts which imitate nature, viz. the connexion in nature between beauty and utility—This rule must be attended to by all artists, if they would gain the end of their arts, which is to please an intelligent eye—Reasonings from Vitruvius, Cicero, Quintilian, on this subject—Nature’s beauty proceeds from her steady observance of this rule, Natura nil frustra facit, and art must imitate nature, p. 405.
The polite arts have been condemned by some moralists as a part of the luxury which hath always proved so fatal to states—Reflexions on this subject—The argument from abuse considered—Poetry and painting have always flourished together—They lend each other mutual aids and charms—They only lend their ornaments to virtue with willingness—When they are prostituted to bad purposes, the force, the constraint, the violence they suffer appears—They have flourished best in virtuous times—Their genuine uses and ends described, p. 408.
They cannot be cultivated in poor indigent states, ’tis only in times of ease and opulence there is leisure or spirit for cultivating them—But affluence soon corrupts men—Philosophy itself hath always been first