Selections from Three Works. Francisco Suárez
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from one having charge of the community, even as this very definition provides, for the definition must be understood in its essential terms and formally.
Similarly, prayer, or petition, should be excluded from this ordinance of the reason. For these three things—precept, counsel and petition—agree in this respect: that, through each of them, one person is ordered or directed to action by means of another’s reason, so that each of the three may be said to be an ordinance of the reason. And nevertheless, they differ one from another. For a petition is normally addressed by an inferior to a superior; although it may occur between equals and may sometimes proceed from a superior with respect to an inferior, which, however, does not apply in so far as regards the true nature of petition. Indeed, even in such an [abnormal] situation, the one submits himself, in a sense, to the other; as I have remarked above. Counsel, on the other hand, passes essentially between equals; and if it implies a certain pre-eminence on the part of the counsellor, that pre-eminence is one of wisdom only, not of power. But law essentially proceeds from a superior with respect to an inferior; and this is indicated by the definition under discussion. Accordingly, counsel is in this way sufficiently excluded from partaking of the nature of law. Furthermore, the kind of ordinance in question should be interpreted as being an efficacious ordinance that has compulsory force, as Aristotle declared; and this specification would seem to be laid down in the word ‘promulgated’, since true promulgation apparently does not pertain to counsel. For the word promulgation implies an order for the purpose of creating an obligation, and it is in this respect most of all that counsel differs from law.
5. Another objection. Finally, there would seem to be [another] objection to this same definition of law, namely: the fact that it is possible that a
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prelate may, in accordance with right reason, and by making his will sufficiently clear to the community, order those subject to him to execute a given act; and that [in so doing] he will nevertheless not be making a law, since [his order] does not involve a perpetual and stable precept, such as is requisite, according to what we have said, to the nature of law; so that the entire definition given above is applicable [, it would seem,] to precepts promulgated for a community, even when they have been enjoined only for a day.
Solution. To this objection, I reply briefly that either St. Thomas understood ‘law’ in the broader sense, including thereunder every precept of this sort; or else, the first part of the definition should, indeed, be so interpreted that the phrase ‘an ordinance of the reason’ is made to refer solely to ordinances that are stable and enduring.
The definition laid down by the author. Therefore, law may perhaps be more briefly defined as follows: law ‘is a common, just and stable precept, which has been sufficiently promulgated’. For this generic definition has also been laid down by St. Thomas (qu. 96, art. 1, ad 2 [I.–II, qu. 96, art. 4]) and by the jurist [Papinian] (Digest, I. iii. 1); and by means of that definition, particular precepts are excluded, while by means of the remaining terms, all those elements are provided for which can be desired in the case of law, as is easily apparent to any one who reflects upon the remarks made above.
CHAPTER XVIII
Are All Men in This Life Subject to Law and Bound by It?
1. We have said that the chief effect of law consists in its binding power,1 and that all its other effects have their roots in that one alone. Binding power, however, must of necessity relate to some one on whom it is imposed; and therefore, in order to provide a perfectly clear understanding
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of this effect, it is necessary to explain what persons fall under the binding power of law, or are capable of so doing. For although we have already demonstrated that law is established for men, and for men considered in common—that is to say, established for some community—still, we have not explained whether all men are capable of being subject to this obligation, or whether some are (so to speak) exempt.
This question has been discussed by St. Thomas (I.–II, qu. 96, art. 5), in special relation to human law; for he may have thought the discussion unnecessary with respect to law in general, in view of the fact that absolutely all adult human beings in this life (for of such are we speaking) are most clearly subject to some law.
However, the heretics of the present age force us to deal generally, at this point, with the said question. In the course of this investigation, we are not asking what men are bound by positive laws—divine or human; nor even what men are bound by the natural law. For these are points to which we shall later2 give special consideration. Much less, then, do we inquire whether all men are bound by all laws, since it is clear that every individual is not bound by each and every law. For such a state of affairs, in so far as concerns positive laws, is neither necessary nor possible; as is self-evident. Therefore, we inquire solely whether the binding force of law, as such, or of some particular law, considered abstractly or in itself alone, extends to all men in such a way that there is no one of them not subject to the yoke of some law.
2. The heretics exempt all just men from [the yoke of] law. For the heretics of the present age hold that just3 men are exempt from the yoke of law; nor are they speaking simply of human law, as some persons believe, but rather of law in the absolute sense, a fact which may clearly be inferred from the fundamental principles that they uphold.4
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These principles have been carefully and accurately explained by Peter Canisius (De Verbi Dei Corruptelis, Bk. I, chap. xi), by Salmerón (on the Epistle to the Galatians, Disp. xiv) and by Cardinal Bellarmine (De Iustificatione, Bk. IV, chap. i) where the latter cites, among other blasphemies pronounced by Luther, the following, from one of Luther’s sermons: ‘Let us beware of sins, but far more of laws, and good works; and let us give heed only to the promise of God and to faith.’ [Bellarmine] furthermore relates that [these heretics] interpret Christian liberty as consisting in the just man’s freedom from the duty of fulfilling the law before God, so that all works are indifferent to him, that is to say, neither prescribed nor forbidden.
They base their view partly upon their own errors, partly upon certain misinterpreted Scriptural passages.
The principal basis of that view is their denial of true justice5 and of the necessity of works for the attainment of justice. For they say that men are justified solely through their acceptance by God, and through the lack of any extrinsic imputation [of sin] by Him; a state attained by every person who firmly believes that his sins have been forgiven him, or rather, are not imputed to him, because of Christ’s merits. Furthermore, they say that this faith suffices for salvation, whatever works a man may do. From this basic argument, it necessarily follows that a just man, as conceived by them, is not bound by any law, provided he remains steadfast in the faith; since, whatever works he may perform while believing that they are not imputed to him, he does not incur any punishment, nor are his acts imputed to him as sin. Thus, these heretics would not seem to deny that men are bound by law, in such a way as to imply in their denial that works opposed to law are not sins; on the contrary, they teach that, from other standpoints, all the works of the just are sinful, that it is impossible even for the just to fulfil the law of God, and similar doctrines which presuppose that law has binding force and is a rule for such works. They assert, then, that this obligation is morally removed (so to speak) or rendered ineffective, by that faith of theirs; since [such faith] renders one not liable to punishment,6
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and since, by reason of it, one’s deed does not appear as evil in the sight of God, even though it may in itself be evil.
Another basis for their view is derived from a certain false distinction made between the law and the Gospel, which we shall consider below, when we treat of the law of grace.7 And as for the Scriptural testimony on which they make a show of reliance, that will be discussed in the following Chapter.8
3. The Faith teaches that all men in this life are subject to law. But the true Catholic belief is that all men in this life are subject to law to such an extent, that they are bound to obey it, and become legal culprits in the sight of God, if they do not voluntarily observe the law. This is a certain conclusion, and one of faith, defined