General Principles of Right.

       CHAPTER I

       Of the Nature of Man considered with Regard to Right: Of the Understanding, and whatever is relative to this Faculty.

      Design of this work: What is meant by Natural Law.

      I. My design is to enquire into those rules which nature¹ alone prescribes to man, in order to conduct him safely to the end, which every one has, and indeed ought to have, in view, namely, true and solid happiness. The system or assemblage of these rules, considered as so many laws imposed by God on man, is generally distinguished by the name of Natural Law. This science includes the most <2> important principles of morality, jurisprudence, and politics, that is, whatever is most interesting in respect as well to man as to society. There can be nothing therefore more deserving of the application of a rational being, of a being that has its perfection and felicity seriously at heart. A just knowledge of the maxims we ought to follow in the course of life, is the principal object of wisdom; and virtue consists in putting them constantly in practice, without being ever diverted from so noble a pursuit.

      We must deduce the principles of this science from the nature and state of man.

      II. The idea of Right, and much more that of Natural Right, are undoubtedly relative to the nature of man. It is from this nature therefore, from the constitution and state of man, that we are to deduce the principles of this science.

      The word Right (Droit^*) in its original signification, comes from the verb dirigo, which implies, to conduct a person to some certain end by the shortest road. Right, therefore, in its proper and most general sense, and that to which all the others must be reduced, is whatever directs, or is properly directed. This being premised, the first thing we have to examine is, whether man is susceptible of direction and rule in respect to his actions. That we may attempt this with a greater probability of success, we are to trace matters to their very origin, and ascending as high as the nature and constitution of man, we must there unravel the principle of his actions, and the several states that properly belong to him, in order to demonstrate afterwards in what manner, and how <3> far, he is susceptible of direction in his conduct. This is the only method of knowing what is right, and what is not.

      Definition of man; what his nature is.

      III. Man is an animal endowed with understanding, and reason; a being composed of an organized body, and a rational soul.

      With regard to his body, he is pretty similar to other animals, having the same organs, properties, and wants. This is a living body, organized and composed of several parts; a body that moves of itself, and feeble in the commencement, increases gradually in its progress by the help of nourishment, till it arrives to a certain period, in which it appears in its flower and vigor, from whence it insensibly declines to old age, which conducts it at length to dissolution. This is the ordinary course of human life, unless it happens to be abridged by some malady or accident.

      But man, besides the marvelous disposition of his body, has likewise a rational soul, which eminently discriminates him from brutes. It is by this noble part of himself that he thinks, and is capable of forming just ideas of the different objects that occur to him; of comparing them together; of inferring from known principles unknown truths; of passing a solid judgment on the mutual fitness or agreement of things, as well as on the relations they bear to us; of deliberating on what is proper or improper to be done; and of determining consequently to act one way or other. The mind recollects what is past, joins it with the present, and extends its views to futurity. It is capable of penetrating into the causes, progress, and consequence of things, and of disco-<4>vering, as it were at one glance, the intire course of life, which enables it to lay in a store of such things as are necessary for making a happy career. Besides, in all this, it is not subject to a constant series of uniform and invariable operations, but finds itself at liberty to act or not to act, to suspend its actions and motions, to direct and manage them as it thinks proper.²

      Different actions of man: Which are those that are the object of Right?

      IV. Such is the general idea we are to form of the nature of man. What results from hence is, that there are several sorts of human actions: Some are purely spiritual, as to think, to reflect, to doubt, &c. others are merely corporeal, as to breathe, to grow, &c. and some there are that may be called mixt, in which the soul and body have both a share, being produced by their joint concurrence, in consequence of the union which God has established between these two constituent parts of man; such as to speak, to work, &c.

      Those actions, which either in their origin or direction depend on the soul, are called human or voluntary; all the rest are termed merely physical. The soul is therefore the principle of human actions; and these actions cannot be the object of rule, but inasmuch as they are produced and directed by those noble faculties with which man has been inriched by his Creator. Hence it is necessary to enter into a particular inquiry concerning this subject, and to examine closely into the faculties and operations of the soul, in order to discover in what manner they concur to the production of human actions. This will help us, at the same time, to unfold the nature of <5> these actions, to assure ourselves whether they are really susceptible of rule, and how far they are subject to human command.

      Principal faculties of the soul.

      V. Let man reflect but ever so little on himself, sense and experience will soon inform him, that his soul is an agent, whose activity displays itself by a series of different operations; which having been distinguished by separate names, are likewise attributed to different faculties. The chief of these faculties are the understanding, will, and liberty. The soul is, indeed, a simple being; but this does not hinder us, when we attend to its different ways of operating, from considering it as a subject in which different powers of acting reside, and from giving different denominations to these powers. If we consider the thing in this manner, we shall find it will give a greater exactness and perspicuity to our ideas. Let us remember therefore, that these faculties are nothing else but the different powers of acting inherent in the mind, by means of which it performs all its operations.

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