The Law of Nations Treated According to the Scientific Method. Christian von Wolff
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or pledge ought not to be made.
§ 489, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 494, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 768, part 7, Jus Nat.
§ 842, part 7, Jus Nat.
Undoubtedly it is to the public advantage to take precaution lest the property of a corporation be alienated or pledged to the disadvantage of the corporation in the future, and lest those who now make up the corporation take some right away from those who shall constitute the corporation in the future, when they diminish their right. But the consideration of public advantage belongs to none other than the superior or ruler of the state, to whom likewise are subject the actions of those who form the corporation, so far as they have regard to the end of the state. Since corporations consist of individuals and therefore remain the same, even if some withdraw and others succeed to their places, and consequently even if all have died who are now in the corporation, in this respect they are like minors, who have need of a curator in the management of their property, consequently without the consent of their curator they cannot alienate or pledge their property. And so the superior or ruler of the state plays the part of a curator. This indeed is also the reason why the civil laws confer the rights of minors upon corporations. It is customary also to compare corporations to wards whose tutor is the ruler of the state. The natural obligation not to alienate or pledge the property of the state to the prejudice of the future is not sufficient to provide adequately for the future. Therefore it is necessary that there should be some external check in addition, as that the act of alienation or pledge may be invalidated at the will of the superior or ruler of the state.
§ 92. Of eminent domain over the property of a corporation
§ 111, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 88 h, and § 6, part 8, Jus Nat.
Eminent domain over the property of a corporation belongs to the ruler of the state. For eminent domain over the property of citizens belongs to the ruler of a state. Therefore since the property of a corporation is likewise the property of citizens, eminent domain over the property of a corporation belongs to the ruler of the state.
Note, § 91.
§ 93.
Eminent domain is not to be confused with that right of the ruler of a state upon which depends his consent to alienation and pledge, as is apparent from its effect.
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§ 93. Of its effect
§ 92.
§ 111, part 8, Jus Nat.
Since eminent domain over the property of a corporation belongs to the ruler of a state, moreover since by virtue of eminent domain he can dispose of property belonging to citizens for the sake of the public good in case of necessity; the ruler of a state also can dispose of the property of a corporation for the sake of the public good in case of necessity.
§ 23, part 8, Jus Nat.
N., § 92.
With respect to the advantage of the public the advantage of any corporation or community is considered as a private matter, just as the goods themselves of any corporation with respect to those of the whole state or commonwealth are considered as private goods, although in other respects they are and can be spoken of as public also. And hence is plain the difference we have just mentioned between eminent domain belonging to the ruler of the state over the goods of a corporation and the right otherwise belonging to him over them. Obviously, by virtue of eminent domain consideration is had for the public advantage or the advantage of the whole state, but by the remaining right only for the advantage of the corporation or of that group to which the goods belong. For example, let us assume that in some city there is a public granary, which must be destroyed for the purpose of saving the city. It is allowable to destroy that by virtue of eminent domain, since it is to the advantage of the commonwealth that the city should be defended in the best way.
§ 94. Of the use of the property of a corporation
§ 88.
§ 129, part 2, Jus Nat.
Individuals who are in a corporation have the right to use and enjoy its property, and the use is either open indifferently to the individuals, as shall seem best to each one, or limited by definite conditions. For since the goods of a corporation are in a mixed common holding of definite groups or communities, and since the ownership of the goods in a mixed common holding belongs to the corporation, but the use of them belongs indifferently to the individuals, according of course as each one shall have need, the use of the goods of the corporation also is open indifferently to the individuals who are in it, as shall seem best to each. Which was the first point.
§§ 118, 216, part 2, Jus Nat.
§ 789, part 3, Jus Nat.
But if indeed the property does not admit of that use which shall seem best to each, it is necessary that it should be limited by definite conditions
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agreed upon between the individuals. And since the individuals can jointly dispose of the use of the goods of a corporation as of their own property according to their liking, they are able also to agree together for any reasons whatever as to the method by which the property is to be used and by this agreement to limit the use of the same by definite conditions. Therefore, since agreements must be observed, in this case the individuals are not able to use the property of a corporation except upon those conditions by which its use has been limited. Which was the second point.
So in forests fit for cutting which belong to some district, individuals can cut as great a supply of wood as they need, if indeed there shall be an adequate supply of wood. If, however, in the opposite case, it has been laid down by a definite provision, how much each one is allowed to cut, each one ought to be content with just that amount. But in a public theatre individual citizens may look on, as shall have seemed best to each. And in the same way individuals can hurl javelins on the field used for javelin practice, and bathe in the public bath.
§ 95. Who are restrained from it
§ 88 h, and § 112, part 2, Jus Nat.
§ 130, part 2, Jus Nat.
No one can use the goods of a corporation who is outside the corporation, unless that be allowed him by the consent of the corporation. For the goods of a corporation are in the mixed common holding of the corporation. Therefore, since those who are in a mixed common holding may in their own right exclude all who are outside the corporation, in like manner no one can use the goods of a corporation who is outside the corporation. Which was the first point.
§ 94, Note 2.
Nevertheless, since all together can dispose of the use according to their liking, as we have just proved, it is not to be doubted that those who are in a corporation can by common consent grant to an outsider any use of the goods of a corporation. Which was the second point.
So no one can feed cattle in a common pasture, or cut grain with a sickle in the common meadow, who is outside the corporation, unless that is allowed him by the corporation. But nothing stands in the way of granting this, since it concerns only those who now are in the corporation, that no one outside may feed his cattle in the common pasture or cut grain with the sickle in the common meadow.
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§ 96. Of the prohibition of the proper use of the property of a corporation
§ 94.
§ 336, part 2, Jus Nat.
No one who is in the corporation can without wrong be restrained from using the property of the corporation as it suits him. For suppose some one who is in the corporation is restrained from the use of the property of the corporation permitted by the provision which sets bounds to its use. Since the individuals who are in the corporation have the right of using and enjoying the property of the corporation, either in general, as shall seem best, or by that provision by which the use is limited, his right is taken from him without his consent. But one’s right cannot be taken from him