How Sentiment Matters in International Relations: China and the South China Sea Dispute. David Groten
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disadvantages may point to the relevance of respect. Likewise, cases in which Chinese policy actors are “forcefully expressing their national position, even though they are presuming that this may cause undesired diplomatic responses” (Wolf, 2008, p. 20) may also indicate that respect concerns are at stake. The same logic applies to circumstances under which Chinese policymakers made their position abundantly clear and were adamant about the latter, even though the issue at stake was a rather marginal one to which a more cautious (or no) response would incur less diplomatic, symbolic and political costs85 (cf. Schröder, 1994). Such circumstances, for instance, may be illustrated by international negotiations (on certain rights) that are actively being interrupted or suspended by China even though a continuation would appear to be much more to China’s advantage than struggling for such minor rights as a matter of principle.
Ultimately, if these six indicators described, or at least the majority of them, can be traced in FPTT discourses on the SCS in question, Hypothesis II, pertaining to the presence of respect dynamics and disrespect experiences, is considered to be confirmed.
[58] 2.4 Think Tanks as Research Subjects
In theory, a whole range of different methodological research subjects appears feasible to conduct the research project’s single case study research. For instance, it may be possible to examine any kinds of documents likely to contain discursive manifestations of disrespect and respect expectations such as political speeches by Chinese government officials, PRC strategy papers, media articles by the leading Chinese mouthpieces (such as Xinhua News Agency) and others. PRC documents naturally reflect official party/government line and position commonly adopting official public diplomacy wording86 and tend not to go into details regarding certain South China Sea policy issues but offer somewhat limited and rather pragmatic insights into different facets of ‘China’s political psyche’ with regard to face, respect needs and expectations. As mentioned previously, the project at hand scrutinizes expert or elite discourses by two of the most prestigious Chinese foreign policy think tanks (FPTTs)87 instead, the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) and the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS).
The reasons for examining elite think tank discourses are manifold. In general, scientific policy advice and political counseling play an ever-increasing role for national governments and political decision-makers around the globe (Jasanoff, 2009; Wilsdon & Doubleday, 2013). As a result, the significance of think tanks in (particularly U.S.) foreign policy-making has received considerable academic attention during the last two decades (Abelson, 2006; Higgot & Stone, 1994; Parmar, 2004; Stone & Denham, 2004). It is agreed that roles, objectives and ultimately influence of a given think tank depend on its specific structure and the context it operates in (Glynn et al., 2002; Stilgoe et al., 2014). For instance, a think tank may constitute an independent institution (financially and/or by structure) or can be affiliated with an official state body, a corporation, an international foundation or a university. Moreover, a think tank may be structured as a permanent body or [59] as an entity operating on an ad hoc basis88. Consequently, scholars widely differ in their understanding and definition as to what constitutes a think tank. This is manifested in the whole bunch of terminologies and labels such as research institutes, intelligence agencies, knowledge actors, research centers, academic institutes and policy analysis institutes that circulate. For the sake of clarification, the McGann’s definition is shared by the author:
“[P]ublic-policy research analysis and engagement organizations that generate policy-oriented research, analysis, and advice on domestic and international issues, thereby enabling policymakers and the public to make informed decisions about public policy“ (2012, p. 8).
The key objectives of (foreign policy) think tanks are regarded as follows: to inform and advice government bodies (on matters of foreign and security policy), corporations or the civil society on complex political issues in an understandable and reliable manner. In this vein, think tank discourses are anticipated to differ from political and other discourses. That said, regardless of its direct affiliation to party or government bodies, think tanks are generally presumed to occupy a more (scientifically) reflected, critical (within certain boundaries), blunt instead of symbolic, and at times visionary position than political discourses. Politicians must weigh every word and behave in a more pragmatic, reactionary and diplomatic manner, not least due to the necessity to legitimize their actions. Likewise, official speeches frequently adopt, particularly in China, a very diplomatic language instead of providing notable insights into the perceptions and individual assessments of the speaker in question. In contrast, think tank discourses presumably contain a higher level of pluralism of opinions compared to political discourses. At the same time, very similar to political discourses, think tank discourses are capable of initiating, steering and dominating certain discourses and narratives89 and thereby influencing foreign policy agendas and preferences to a certain degree90. As a result, a close analysis of think tank discourses is deemed a reasonable and feasible approach in consideration of the project’s core objective of tracing and examining discursive manifestations of disrespect and respect expectations beyond the symbolic and/or instrumental level.
[60] 2.4.1 Chinese FPTTs: Characteristics
Generally speaking, the most prestigious Chinese FPTTs are directly affiliated to, and to a significant extent funded by governmental and/or CPC party bodies. Therefore, these institutions and most of their staff rely on official bodies in terms of funding, patronage, attention of senior level decision-makers and licenses to operate. As Chen Kaimin, a CICIR scholar himself, admits, “chasing funds has become a major obstacle for Chinese think tanks in their global move” (2014, p. 93). To be sure, such close affiliation and reliance is a double-edged sword from a researcher’s perspective. On the one hand, party oversight and governmental budget control may hamper the articulation and quantity of viewpoints91 deviating from the official party line, at least with respect to more sensitive issues such as the status of Taiwan, China’s legal claims in the South China Sea or the East China Sea, or related topics. On the other hand, strong ties and interaction between think tanks and government/CPC branches provide the researcher with a good opportunity to gain valuable insights into foreign policy debates in China and prevailing perception patterns, point of views and clues about “China’s future path” (Chen Kaimin, 2014, p. 100). These common characteristics of Chinese FPTTs are underscored by Zhu Feng, also a think tank scholar, yet turned into a point of criticism:
“Currently, Chinese think tanks only have one [influence] –that is to take instructions from government. But actually they should have three. The first is to take instructions from government and seek official information and guidance in the form of government reports and advice. The second influence is society. US think tanks occupy a space in society according to their political leanings, and are influenced by social forces and community voices. The third one is international; that is they need to work globally, and exchange ideas” (2016, pp. 16).
In terms of overall political influence, Chinese and non-Chinese scholars commonly distinguish between different sources, levels of political influence and structural access points of Chinese FPTTs. According to Morrisson, FPTTs obtain their influence through three sources of access to foreign policy [61] decision-making in China, being their “bureaucratic position, personal connections, and issue-specific knowledge or experience” (2012, p. 80). Further examples of the direct relationship between think tanks and the Chinese administration involve existing patterns of revolving-door mechanisms, denoting the (temporary or permanent) staff exchange between members of think tanks, government bodies and university research institutes (Li, 2009, 2017). In addition, Zhu Xufeng, a well-known expert on think tanks in China, recognizes two further dimensions on which FPTTs can exert its policy influence, apart from its direct influence on decision-makers and political bodies; these are “social elite influence, and public influence” (2009, p. 336). Furthermore, numerous other scholars also draw attention to the special role, history and significance of Chinese think tanks:
“With improved knowledge, Chinese scholars have attained an influential position in foreign policy debates. While transmitting their views through publications and the media, scholars and think-tank researchers