China's Leaders. David Shambaugh
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do not do so are punished. The CCP is a hierarchical vertical institution with horizontal mechanisms that penetrate throughout society. Leninist parties like the CCP are not voluntary organizations, where members participate out of their own free will and make their own decisions about what to say and do—there is rigid and strict discipline. This is what is variously referred to as the “dictatorship of the proletariat,” the “people’s democratic dictatorship,” or “democratic centralism.” The concept underlying all three terms is that the Party is the “vanguard” of the “masses” and “people,” and legitimately acts on behalf of the populace. So, where does the aforementioned term “democratic” come in? This harkens back to Mao’s concept of the “mass line,” first developed by him in Yanan (the Communists’ revolutionary stronghold after 1937) whereby the Party floats a policy idea to the masses, gets feedback from them, and then it makes a policy decision—after which strict adherence is required during policy implementation. This “down-up-down” process of policy formulation and implementation is meant to (theoretically at least) give the veneer of mass participation in the system. Related to the need to maintain strict hierarchy and discipline is the corollary of checking factionalism. Factionalism is an endemic feature of Chinese political culture. Rooted in interpersonal guanxi and the belief that there is safety in personal networks, Chinese citizens, cadres, and leaders alike have a long history of factionalism. It is hard-baked into the DNA of Chinese politics. There are a variety of factional types in the PRC: institution-based, locality-based, patron/client-based, “line”-based, issue-based, school-based, and more.22 The past seven decades (and before the CCP seized power) have been rife with factional struggles and power plays. Some losers find themselves in Qingcheng Prison (the facility outside of Beijing reserved for elite prisoners). But factionalism runs exactly counter to hierarchical Leninism. Hence there has been a longstanding attempt by the CCP to quell factionalism within its ranks and particularly at the top of the system. This has particularly been the case since the leadership split on the eve of the June 4, 1989, massacre.
The nomenklatura. The CCP may portray itself as a mass political party, representing the vast peasantry and working class of China, but in fact it is very much an elite party. Its current 94 million Party members only represent approximately 6 percent of the population of 1.5 billion people. Because of this obvious asymmetry of leaders and led, and the popular perception that the Party is a class in itself,23 the CCP goes to extensive lengths to promote the propaganda narrative that the Party “cherishes the people,” “puts people first” (以人为本), and otherwise is not detached from the masses. But not only is the Party a small percentage of broader society, but there is a “Party within the Party.” This is known as the nomenklatura—a Soviet term to identify the list of official positions in the Party and throughout the country that must be staffed by Party members. The most recent data we have on the CCP nomenklatura is from 2003, when there were 525,000 individuals identified as “leading cadres” (领导干部), essentially the nomenklatura corps. These elites not only run the Party—they run all major institutions in society (media, major universities, state-owned enterprises, and many companies, and so on).24 There is a list of 3,800 institutional positions (编制 in Chinese) that require the appointment of a “leading cadre” selected by the CCP Organization Department. The nomenklatura system is thus not only a prime example of Party penetration of the entire society, but also of all the key organs of institutional power. Such penetration, and thereby control, is the essence of how Leninist parties exercise control.
“The Party controls the gun.” In addition to controlling socioeconomic entities, the CCP has always kept a tight grip on the internal security services and the military. As Chairman Mao memorably said in 1938, “Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun. Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun shall never be allowed to command the Party.”25 The People’s Liberation Army is thus a “party-army” that is 100 percent under the control of the CCP and not the government or the nation per se. The military is, moreover, an instrument for domestic security (as well as external security). The PLA has used force repeatedly during the People’s Republic to backstop and rescue the Party—most notably during the Cultural Revolution and in 1989. It is therefore imperative that the leader of the CCP simultaneously control the Central Military Commission. In addition to the PLA and its various service branches, China’s “armed forces” include the paramilitary People’s Armed Police, the national militia, and a variety of local self-defense units. The internal security services also include the Ministry of Public Security (police) and Ministry of State Security (internal and external intelligence and counter-intelligence organ similar to KGB). The security apparatus available to the CCP and its leaders is thus sprawling and enormous, and it is another key instrument of the Party’s power.
Constantly under siege by internal and external enemies. A second related concept concerns the “people”—as distinct from the “enemy.” Early on Mao made this distinction in his 1949 essay “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship.”26 The CCP represents the “people,” who are primarily drawn from the “working class” plus other “united front” elements in society (essentially any social elements who were willing to submit to CCP hegemony). In his essay Mao asked: “Who are the people? At the present stage in China, they are the working class, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie.”27 At that time, Mao distinguished the “people” from “reactionaries,” but later he would broaden the latter into a wide variety of “class enemies.” As noted below and discussed at length in the next chapter, the Maoist era was one extended series of attacks and persecutions of different groups of society not deemed to be part of the “people.” At one point in 1957, in his speech “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People,” Mao deemed that 98 percent of Chinese constituted the “people” while 2 percent were “enemies.” Do the math: China in 1957 had a population of 646.5 million = 32.3 million “enemies of the people”! In this hallmark speech Mao explained at great length which social elements comprised each category as well as how to handle “contradictions” (矛盾) in each. The point here is not so much that the CCP legitimizes repressive methods toward elements of the domestic population—but that the CCP has a “siege mentality” whereby domestic enemies always are assumed to exist and seek to undermine hegemonic Party rule. Moreover, Mao insisted, external enemies also exist in large numbers, and similarly seek to undermine and subvert CCP rule—often in collaboration with internal enemies. Ever since the CCP came to power, every single day over the past 70 years, the CCP has operated on the assumption that the West and the noncommunist world (particularly the United States) seeks to usurp and overthrow CCP rule and the PRC. This is an axiomatic belief of all Chinese communist leaders.
The United Front. The concept of the “united front” arose during the Communists’ rise to power. There were two ways the CCP adopted “united front” tactics.28 The first was to cooperate with the Nationalists (Guomindang or KMT). This occurred twice: the first beginning in 1924 on the Soviet Comintern directive to infiltrate the KMT (the “bloc within”), which ended in the bloody April 12, 1927, Shanghai massacre by the Nationalists against the Communists; a second CCP–KMT united front was formed in 1937–1941 to fight together against Japan. This was one definition of united front in CCP history: to collaborate with the KMT. A second definition was for the CCP to enlist and co-opt various social groups in support of the CCP cause. This was extended to foreigners as well.29 The tactic was also applied to most domestic opponents. Some who could not be co-opted must be unremittingly resisted, but the CCP theorizes that a majority segment of people inside and outside of China can be “won over” through various inducements—and thereby neutralized and effectively controlled.
Inside the CCP there is an entire department in the Central Committee (one of only five), the United Front Work Department (中央统战部), charged with this task domestically and abroad. Externally, there are also other CCP and PRC departments and agencies devoted to co-optation of foreign elites (so-called “elite capture”) and sectors of foreign societies. In both cases the operative normative assumption is that the CCP and PRC must