"There appears to have got abroad in the United States, a very erroneous impression respecting the influence of Comte's writings in England. I suppose that the currency obtained by the words 'Positivism' and 'Positivist,' is to blame for this. Comte having designated by the term Positive Philosophy all that body of definitely-established knowledge which men of science have been gradually organizing into a coherent body of doctrine, and having habitually placed this in opposition to the incoherent body of doctrine defended by theologians, it has become the habit of the theological party to think of the antagonist scientific party under this title of Positivists applied to them by Comte. And thus, from the habit of calling them Positivists there has grown up the assumption that they call themselves Positivists, and that they are the disciples of Comte. The truth is that Comte and his doctrines receive here scarcely any attention. I know something of the scientific world in England, and I cannot name a single man of science who acknowledges himself a follower of Comte, or accepts the title of Positivist. Lest, however, there should be some such who were unknown to me, I have recently made inquiries into the matter. To Professor Tyndall I put the question whether Comte had exerted any appreciable influence on his own course of thought: and he replied, 'So far as I know, my own course of thought would have been exactly the same had Comte never existed.' I then asked, 'Do you know any men of science whose views have been affected by Comte's writings?' and his answer was: 'His influence on scientific thought in England is absolutely nil.' To the same questions Prof. Huxley returned, in other words, the same answers. Professors Huxley and Tyndall, being leaders in their respective departments, and being also men of general culture and philosophic insight, I think that, joining their impressions with my own, I am justified in saying that the scientific world of England is wholly uninfluenced by Comte. Such small influence as he has had here has been on some literary men and historians – men who were attracted by the grand achievements of science, who were charmed by the plausible system of scientific generalizations put forth by Comte, with the usual French regard for symmetry and disregard for fact, and who were, from their want of scientific training, unable to detect the essential fallaciousness of his system. Of these the most notable example was the late Mr. Buckle. Besides him, I can name but seven men who have been in any appreciable degree influenced by Comte; and of these, four, if not five, are scarcely known to the public."

      Comte thus founded social science, and opened a path for future discoverers; but he did not perceive, any more than previous inquirers, the fundamental law of human evolution. It was reserved for Herbert Spencer to discover this all-comprehensive law which is found to explain alike all the phenomena of man's history and all those of external nature. This sublime discovery, that the universe is in a continuous process of evolution from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, with which only Newton's law of gravitation is at all worthy to be compared, underlies not only physics, but also history. It reveals the law to which social changes conform.

      Reverent and bold – reverent for truth, though not for the forms of truth, and not for much that we hold true – bold in the destruction of error, though without that joy in destruction which often claims the name of boldness; – these works are interesting in themselves and in their relation to the current thought of the time. They seem at first sight to form the turning point in the positive philosophy, but closer examination shows us that it is only a new and marked stage in a regular growth. It is the positive philosophy reaching the higher relations of our being, and establishing what before it ignored because it had not reached, and by ignoring seemed to deny. This system formerly excluded theology and psychology. In the works of Herbert Spencer we have the rudiments of a positive theology and an immense step toward the perfection of the science of psychology… Such is a brief and meagre sketch of a discussion which we would commend to be followed in detail by every mind interested in theological studies. Herbert Spencer comes in good faith from what has been so long a hostile camp, bringing a flag of truce and presenting terms of agreement meant to be honourable to both parties: let us give him a candid hearing… In conclusion, we would remark that the work of Herbert Spencer referred to (First Principles) is not mainly theological, but will present the latest and broadest generalizations of science, and we would commend to our readers this author, too little known among us, as at once one of the clearest of teachers and one of the wisest and most honourable of opponents.

      Though we find here some unwarranted assumptions, as well as some grave omissions, yet this part (Laws of the Knowable) may be considered, upon the whole, as a fine specimen of scientific reasoning. Considerable space is devoted to the "Law of Evolution" the discovery of which is the author's chief claim to originality, and certainly evinces great power of generalization. To quote the abstract definition without a full statement of the inductions from which it is derived would convey no fair impression of the breadth and strength of the thought which it epitomizes. Of Mr. Spencer's general characteristics as a writer, we may observe that his style is marked by great purity, clearness, and force; though it is somewhat diffuse, and the abstract nature of some of his topics occasionally renders his thought difficult of apprehension. His treatment of his subjects is generally thorough and sometimes exhaustive; his arguments are always ingenious if not always convincing; his illustrations are drawn from almost every accessible field of human knowledge, and