Common Sense. Thomas Paine
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pamphlet highly, but proves that he has only glanced at it by his exception: "The pamphlet is full of scurrilous abuse of the English people; and resorts to such stupid arguments as the denial of the English origin of the Americans" (i., p. 174). Starting with the principle that the cause of America is "the cause of all mankind," Paine abuses no people, but only their oppressors. As to Paine's argument, it might have appeared less "stupid" to Professor Fiske had he realized that in Paine's mind negroes were the equals of whites. However, Paine does not particularly mention negroes; his argument was meant to carry its point, and it might have been imprudent for him, in that connection, to have classed the slaves with the Germans, who formed a majority in Pennsylvania, and with the Dutch of New York. In replying to the "Mother-Country" argument it appears to me far from stupid to point out that Europe is our parent country, and that if English descent made men Englishmen, the descendants of William the Conqueror and half the peers of England were Frenchmen, and, if the logic held, should be governed by France.
4. Sec Almon's Remembrancer, 1777, p. 28, for Paine's graphic journal of this retreat, quoted from the Pennsylvania Journal. In reply to those who censured the retreat as pusillanimous, he states that "our army was at one time less than a thousand effective men and never more than 4,000," the pursuers being "8,000 exclusive of their artillery and light horse"; he declares that posterity will call the retreat "glorious—and the names of Washington and Fabius will run paralell to eternity." In the Pennsylvania Packet (March 20, 1779) Paine says: "I had begun the first number of the Crisis while on the retreat, at Newark, with a design of publishing it in the Jersies, as it was General Washington's intention to have made a stand at Newark, could he have been timely reenforced; instead of which nearly half the army left him at that place, or soon after, their time being out."
5. The pamphlet was dated December 23rd, but it had appeared on the 19th in the Pennsylvania Journal, the pen none have achieved such vast results as Paine's "Common Sense" and his first Crisis, Before the battle of Trenton the half-clad, dis-heartened soldiers of Washington were called together in groups to listen to that thrilling exhortation.
6. Paine's enemy, Cheetham, durst not, in the face of Washington's expression of his "lively sense of the importance of your (Paine's) works," challenge well known facts, and must needs partly confess them: "The number was read in the camp, to every corporal's guard, and in the army and out of it had more than the intended effect. The convention of New York, reduced by dispersion, occasioned by alarm, to nine members, was rallied and reanimated. Militiamen who, already tired of the war, were straggling from the army, returned. Hope succeeded to despair, cheerfulness to gloom, and firmness to irresolution. To the confidence which it inspired may be attributed much of the brilliant little affair which in the same month followed at Trenton." Even Oldys is somewhat impressed by Paine's courage: "The Congress fled. All were dismayed. Not so our author."
7. Condit's "History of Easton," pp. 60, 118,
{1777}
Chapter VIII. Soldier And Secretary
After their disaster at Trenton, the English forces suspended hostilities for a long time. Paine, maintaining his place on General Greene's staff, complied with the wish of all the generals by wielding his pen during the truce of arms. He sat himself down in Philadelphia, "Second Street, opposite the Quaker meeting,"—as he writes the address. The Quakers regarded him as Antichrist pursuing them into close quarters. Untaught by castigation, the leaders of the Society, and chiefly one John Pemberton, disguised allies of the Howes, had put forth, November 20, 1776, a second and more dangerous "testimony." In it they counsel Friends to refuse obedience to whatever "instructions or ordinances" may be published, not warranted by "that happy constitution under which they and others long enjoyed tranquillity and peace." In his second Crisis (January 13, 1777) Paine refers to this document, and a memorial, from "a meeting of a reputable number of the inhabitants of the city of Philadelphia," called attention of the Board of Safety to its treasonable character. The Board, however, not having acted, Paine devoted his next three months to a treatment of that and all other moral and political problems which had been developed by the course of the Revolution, and must be practically dealt with. In reading this third Crisis, one feels in every sentence its writer's increased sense of responsibility. Events had given him the seat of a lawgiver. His first pamphlet had dictated the Declaration of Independence, his second had largely won its first victory, his third had demonstrated the impossibility of subjugation, and offered England peace on the only possible terms. The American heart had responded without a dissonant note; he held it in his hand; he knew that what he was writing in that room "opposite the Quaker meeting" were Acts of Congress. So it proved. The third Crisis was dated April 19, 1777, the second anniversary of the first collision (Lexington). It was as effective in dealing with the internal enemies of the country as the first had been in checking its avowed foes. It was written in a city still largely, if not preponderantly, "tory," and he deals with them in all their varieties, not arraigning the Friends as a Society. Having carefully shown that independence, from being a natural right, had become a political and moral necessity, and the war one "on which a world is staked," he says that "Tories" endeavoring to insure their property with the enemy should be made to fear still more losing it on the other side. Paine proposes an "oath or affirmation" renouncing allegiance to the King, pledging support to the United States. At the same time let a tax of ten, fifteen, or twenty per cent be levied on all property. Each who takes the oath may exempt his property by holding himself ready to do what service he can for the cause; they who refuse the oath will be paying a tax on their insurance with the enemy. "It would not only be good policy but strict justice to raise fifty or one hundred thousand pounds, or more, if it is necessary, out of the estates and property of the King of England's votaries, resident in Philadelphia, to be distributed as a reward to those inhabitants of the city and State who should turn out and repulse the enemy should they attempt to march this way."
These words were written at a moment when a vigorous opposition, in and out of Congress, was offered to Washington's Proclamation (Morris-town, January 25, 1777,) demanding that an oath of allegiance to the United States should be required of all who had taken such an oath to the King, non-jurors to remove within the enemy's lines, or be treated as enemies. Paine's proposal was partly followed on June 13th, when Pennsylvania exacted an oath of allegiance to the State from all over eighteen years of age.
Paine was really the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. His election had not been without opposition, and, according to John Adams, there was a suggestion that some of his earlier writings had been unfavorable to this country. What the reference was I cannot understand unless it was to his anti-slavery essay, in which he asked Americans with what consistency they could protest against being enslaved while they were enslaving others. That essay, I have long believed, caused a secret, silent, hostility to the author by which he suffered much without suspecting it. But he was an indefatigable secretary. An example of the care with which foreign representatives were kept informed appears in a letter to William Bingham, agent of Congress at Martinique.
"Philadelphia, July 16th, 1777.—Sir,—A very sudden opportunity offers of sending you the News-papers, from which you will collect the situation of our Affairs. The Enemy finding their attempt of marching thro' the Jersies to this City impracticable, have retreated to Staten Island seemingly discontented and dispirited and quite at a loss what step next to pursue. Our Army is now well recruited and formidable. Our Militia in the several States ready at a day's notice to turn out and support the Army when occasion requires; and tho' we cannot, in the course of a Campaign, expect everything in the several Parts of the Continent, to go just as we wish it; yet the general face of our Affairs assures us of final success.