From Paideia to High Culture. Imelda Chlodna-Blach
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of the subject of virtues (man), a certain desire to act in line with this internal measure in every situation, which is beautiful according to Aristotle but rare at the same time and above all difficult. The greatest of all virtues is magnanimity. It is on top in two meanings: firstly, it consists of a set of human virtues, called kalokagathía, secondly, the awareness of man, who possesses it, of their value due to which the indicated virtues are brought to full bloom. Moreover, the consciousness makes the magnanimous man want only the great things and despise the small ones.
Speaking of magnanimity, Aristotle has in mind the desire to possess the greatest external good, and this is what we give to the gods, what people holding the highest positions aim at and what constitutes a reward for the noblest deeds. This is reverence (timé). That is why the justified pride is associated with reverence,182 which is one of the most significant features of a magnanimous man. The benevolent man honours the virtue above all, and being aware of possessing it, he expects honour for his virtue and for himself from others. The reverence is the greatest external good.183 It is a kind of worship usually conducted by people ←53 | 54→with reference to gods only. It is inseparably associated with “great deeds.” It is the greatest award for virtue. Proper attitude towards reverence and infamy is also a secondary object of magnanimity.
Moreover, Aristotle emphasizes that the justifiably proud man is at the same time the bravest man in ethical terms. The more virtues we have the greater things we are worthy of. The man with the greatest number of virtues is worthy of the greatest things. The reverence is therefore a reward for ethical valour and is awarded only to those who are ethically brave. Thus, it is impossible to be justifiably proud without ethical excellence (kalokagathía).184 A justifiably proud man enjoys the privileges coming from noble men, however, he ignores the privileges coming from insignificant people and resulting from unimportant deeds.185 In addition, he disdains the symptoms of infamy because they are not just with reference to him.186 The man with a well-founded pride can be therefore recognized by, among other things, his attitude to privileges, wealth and power,187 success and failure in general. Such man will be primarily characterized by virtue of moderation.
Thus, Aristotle strongly stresses the significance of ethical valour. He points out that people, who have external goods without ethical valour, easily become proud and impudent and additionally, they are wrongly convinced of their superiority.188
The man who is justifiably proud faces dangers when it comes to important things. He is also willing to make benefactions, he helps willingly and acts openly, tells the truth, he is not vindictive, he does not gossip, he does not complain and ask for things of small significance or the ones which are immutable. ←54 | 55→He is inclined to have rather beautiful things and not the ones that yield benefit or profit.189
The virtue associated with justified pride is ambition. As Aristotle writes, it does not have a Greek synonym (name). It is translated as a restraint with regard to the greed for reverence.190
When it comes to the consequences for the entire moral life, resulting from the reverence understood in this way, it must be stressed that it presupposes moral perfection (virtuous conduct in every sphere of life), since – in accordance with the definition of a magnanimous man – the one who does not follow virtue in a particular area (behaves badly) cannot be worthy of the highest reverence.191 This perfection is not to be understood in the current sense, as having an act of all virtues, but as an improvement to given acts (dispositions for them).192 Such striving for greatness in behaviour provides not only the unity of all virtues (is a prerequisite of this unity) but also, in consequence, the unity of a human character.
Continuous striving for greatness becomes a permanent feature of character and adds a feature of perfection to each action. Therefore, the reverence is such a general feature which is a prerequisite for a full moral life, due to striving for what is great and the second feature, next to prudence, that unites all virtues as if from the interior, by maintaining a proper measure of reason in every act. A similar thought guided Marcin from Brakara (the sixth century), who replaced valour with magnanimity among the cardinal virtues in his treaty entitled Formula vitae honestae.193
The disadvantages corresponding to magnanimity are: presumption (vanity – chaunotes) – when one considers himself worthy of great things, not being worthy of them, not having real achievements, and exaggerated humility (pusillanimity – mikropsychia) – when someone does not demand the reverence at all or regards himself as worthy of smaller things than what he deserves; and ←55 | 56→therefore he does not regard himself as worthy of something great, even though he has the features due to which he can be duly considered to be worthy of them; he is too shy.194 Pusillanimity is thus associated with cowardice and a lack of trust to one another, whereas vanity is associated with presumptuousness.
For Aristotle, magnanimity was a typical virtue from the group of valour, characterized by striving for good associated with difficulties. It stems from the tradition dating back to the times of Homer, in which the feeling of the aristocratic pride forced one to undertake the greatest efforts in order to achieve fame, and the fame was for the Greeks some sort of immortality in a human dimension, it was the greatest thing. Magnanimity was a model of moral perfection; however, it was not accessible to everyone; it could be achieved only by few – nobly born individuals.195 It was the consequence of the ethical system by Aristotle for whom the aim (happiness) of man was to act in compliance with nature – to act rationally. Living according to the precepts of reason guarantees the implementation of human potentialities and a self-improvement by a proper good. Therefore, someone deprived of intellectual development in any way would also be deprived of virtue, and even more, of absolute happiness.196 The indicated problem could be solved only with the advent of Christianity. The proper perspective for the indicated issues was introduced by the concept of the personal God, the creation ex nihilo, providing the basis for the understanding of a human being as a person.197
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2. From paidéa to humanitas – the way of the Romans
2.1. CULTURE AS ANIMI CULTURA – TOWARDS HUMANITAS
Although both Plato and his disciple Aristotle strongly stressed the association between the term paidéia and politeia, their followers departed from that type of thinking. They did not subordinate education to the interests of the state any more, but above all emphasized the comprehensive education and the improvement of an individual according to a specified pattern. Paidéia gained the status of a specific way of human existence, facilitating the development of the entire spiritual and intellectual potential of man, leading to full humanity. This very concept of paidéa was absorbed by the culture of ancient Rome: “The idea of paidéa understood in this way was developed in the works of the disciples of Aristotle and the stoics, spreading throughout the whole Greek world of that time and recovering through the ideas of Cicero and the Roman humanitas.’198
The meeting of the Greek paidéa with the Roman ideal of education took place at the end of the fourth century BC, when Athens lost the political power. As a result, the Athenians scattered all over the then world, spreading the Hellenistic culture and contributing to the emergence of new centres of philosophical thought. What the ancient Greeks called paidéia, understood as a universal “cultivation,” a rational human education in the individual and social aspect, found its continuation in the ancient Rome under the name “culture.’199 Cicero was the first to describe philosophy as the soul cultivation: cultura animi philosophia est.200 From Cicero, therefore, the term animi cultura started to be ←57 | 58→used, understood as the “culture of the spirit” – refining the human mind, basically through philosophy.201
The theory developed by Cicero in his Tusculan Disputations had its origins in the thought of Panaetius of Rhodes – a stoic philosopher who lived in the second century BC. He impacted the circle of the philhellene aristocrats centred around Scipio Africanus the Younger (the so-called Scipionic Circle). The group played a major role