Globalization. George Ritzer
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but development also involved technological and military aid.
Development was inherently an elitist project with the nation-states of the North, given, or better taking, the responsibility for the development of the nation-states of the South (Brooks 2017; Ziai 2019). (Thus, unlike the later globalization project, development was based on the nation-state as the fundamental unit of concern both as that which was to be aided as well as that which was doing the helping.) The assumption was that not only was the North better off economically (and in many other ways) than the South, but it knew best how the South was to develop. Thus, it tended to help the South on its terms rather than on the South’s own terms. Furthermore, there was an assumption that the North was the model, something approaching the ideal model, and the goal was to make the South as much like the North as possible. This often extended beyond simple economics, to making the South resemble the North in many other ways (culturally, morally, politically, etc.). Implied was the fact that the South was “inferior” to the North in various ways and that the only solution was for it to change, or to be changed, so that it came to resemble the North to a greater degree and in many different ways. This tended to be associated with the “Orientalism” that characterized the North (more the West in this case) as well as its academic work, and thinking, on the South (East). Furthermore, it tended to be associated with efforts by the North to exert control over the nation-states of the South. Thus, development was not simply an economic project, but it was also “a method of rule” (McMichael 2016).
There is also a whole body of work critical of the development project and development theory known as dependency theory (Cardoso and Faletto 1979; Mahoney and Rodríguez-Franco 2018). As the name suggests, it emphasizes the fact that the kinds of programs discussed above led not so much to the development of the nation-states of the South, but more to a decline in their independence and to an increase in their dependence on the countries of the North, especially the US. Underdevelopment is not an aberrant condition, or one caused by the less developed nations themselves, but it is built into the development project (as well as into global capitalism). It also involves the idea that instead of bringing economic improvement, development brings with it greater impoverishment. The notion of dependency has wide applicability (e.g. in the food dependency created, at least in part, by food aid).
A key work in dependency theory is Andre Gunder Frank’s (1969) “The Development of Underdevelopment.” One of his arguments is that behind the whole idea of development is the notion that the present of less developed countries resembles the past of the developed countries. Thus, if the less developed countries simply follow the same path taken by developed countries, they too will become developed. However, the developed countries were never in the same position of less developed countries today; the developed countries were undeveloped while the less developed countries were (and are) underdeveloped. The result is that the path followed by the former is not necessarily the best one for the latter.
Frank also rejects the idea that the underdevelopment of a country is traceable to sources internal to that country. Rather, he argues that it is a product of the capitalist system and of the relationship between developed and underdeveloped countries within that system. Further, he rejects the idea that the solution to underdevelopment lies in the diffusion of capital, institutions, values, and so on from the developed world. He contends, however, that the less developed countries can only develop if they are independent of most of these capitalist relationships which, after all, are really the cause of their lack of development. It is capitalism that is the cause of development in the developed nations and of underdevelopment in the less developed nations.
Dependency theory has tended to wane,6 but it has been replaced, and to some degree incorporated, in a broader theory known as world system theory (Wallerstein 1974, 2004). This theory (see also Chapter 13) envisions a world divided mainly between the core and the periphery with the nation-states associated with the latter being dependent on, and exploited by, the core nation-states.7 Nordstrom (2004: 236) critiques this distinction, as well as the North–South differentiation, arguing that the periphery “is not merely ‘useful’ to cosmopolitan centers; it is critical. It is not the periphery of the economic system; it is central to it.”
While the development project had some successes, it was basically a failure since the world clearly remained, and remains, characterized by great inequalities, especially economic inequalities, between the North and the South. More pointedly, most nations associated with the South did not develop to any appreciable degree. Indeed, it could be argued that they fell further behind, rather than gaining on, the developed countries. Furthermore, the whole development project came to be seen as offensive since it tended to elevate the North, and everything about it, especially its economic system, while demeaning everything associated with the South. In its place, the globalization project at least sounded more equitable since it was inherently multilateral and multidirectional while development was unilateral and unidirectional with money and other assistance flowing from the North to the South. There is much evidence that the globalization project has not worked out much differently than the development project in terms of differences between the North and South. Furthermore, many of the institutions created during the period of dependency (those associated with Bretton Woods and the UN) continue to function and play a central role in globalization. This raises the question of whether globalization is simply development with another, less offensive, label. This would be the view taken by those who are critics of neoliberalism which undergirds much of contemporary economic globalization (see Chapter 4).
WESTERNIZATION
There are many who not only associate globalization with Westernization, but who see the two as more or less coterminous (Bozkurt 2012; Sen 2002). This, of course, is closely related to equating globalization with Americanization (see below), but the latter in this case is subsumed under the broader heading of Westernization, largely by adding its influence to that of Europeanization (Headley 2008, 2012). It is also common, especially today as a result of globalization, to ascribe a negative connotation to Westernization (as it is to Americanization) if one lives in other parts of the world (although critics in the West also view Westernization negatively), especially the South. Specifically, it is tied closely to the notions and earlier periods of Western imperialism and colonialism. Much of the world now blanches at the idea of Western imperialism or colonialism of any kind… and for good reason. However, in rejecting them, what tends to be ignored or excluded is the best of what the West has had to offer, and can still offer, to other parts of the world.
Claims of the Westernization of the world are supported in various ways, but it is important to recognize both differences within the West, as well as differences between the West and other parts of the world, even those that seem to adopt Western ways (Gray 2000). For example, political democracy is closely associated with the West and the effort to democratize many other parts of the world is linked to Westernization. However, there are great differences between the nature of democracies in the West (e.g. between the US and Great Britain) and, more importantly, between Western democracies broadly conceived and those that have arisen elsewhere. This is reflected in Turkey, which is widely considered to have become a democracy after World War II when they legalized opposition political parties and required the election of future presidents. But the military was given the responsibility of enforcing its secular structure, which has regularly been contested by conservative Muslims in Turkey. As a result, there have been a handful of military coups, after which rule was return to elected leaders. In recent decades, however, President Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) has reversed many democratic gains and become more authoritarian (Çınar 2018). After an attempted military coup in 2016, the government detained thousands of soliders and judges suspected for their involvement in the coup, and also shut down dozens of media outlets. In 2019, President Erdoğan overturned the election of Istanbul’s mayor when his party’s candidate lost (Reuters 2019). Critics contended that the moves damage Turkey’s fragile democracy, but its political system has always functioned with an unusual mix of democratic and non-democratic institutions.