1 Theorizing Social Psychology

      Social psychology is relevant today as much as it was over a hundred years ago. But academics would argue that the impetus, and at the core, of any discipline is its theoretical foundation. The genesis to the maturity of social psychology from the early twentieth century to the second decade of the twenty-first century has seen the creation and development of numerous theories intended to conceptualize spheres of reality that were somewhat outside of the range of sociology or general psychology. Many of these theories still meaningfully contribute toward the research and theoretical expansion of the discipline.

      Gordon Allport (1968) defined social psychology as “an attempt to understand and explain how the thoughts, feelings and behavior of individuals are influenced by the actual, imagined or implied presence of others.” As limited as definitions are, this definition of social psychology captured the dynamism, focus, and direction of the discipline. Important to an understanding of social psychological behavior is taking into consideration not only what is happening socially to the person but also what is occurring internally, including cognitively, to the individual, which, in turn, affects social behavior. From its genesis rooted in the work of William James’s Principles of Psychology to current development of the discipline, there has always been an emphasis on the individual within the social interaction paradigm. Theorization, therefore, in the discipline has fallen within this paradigm, which is now extended to include the neurological functioning of human beings within the social psychological context.

The early works on social psychology by the psychologist William McDougall (1908) and the sociologist Edward Ross (1908) weighted social behavior on instinctual or social factors, respectively. Later, Floyd Allport (1924) emphasized a behaviorist stimulus–response paradigm for the understanding of social psychological behavior. Theories of psychology and sociology during this early period seem to have been competing to understand a realm that had neither the theorization nor the research sophistication to claim discovery status. Much of the work undertaken in social psychology has been done within the discipline of psychology, with sociological social psychology contributions being relatively sparse. Notably, the discipline of sociology has contributed tremendously to the early development of the concept and theorization of self, especially via theories of symbolic interactionism, phenomenology, and, later, ethnomethodology. On the other hand, psychological social psychology’s contributions have been crucial to the genesis and development of both the pure and applied branches of the discipline.

      Theories often articulate constructs, hypothetical concepts, that allow us to understand phenomena that otherwise would have been impossible to appreciate (see Morgeson & Hofmann, 1999). The human mind in no way can comprehend the complexities of reality. But the assumptions, constructs, concepts, abstractions, hypotheses and propositions within a theory provide a structure to explain dimensions of reality. As the synthesized relationship between a theory and research develops, we gain further understanding into the obscurity of reality. The theory is, then, strengthened with the continuous applications and rigors of scientific testing. The predictive power is often the boast of a good theory. But Waltz (1997, p. 913) cautioned that: “the explanation, not the prediction is the ultimate criterion of a good theory … a theory can be validated only by working back and forth between its implications and an uncertain state of affairs that we take to be the reality against which theory is tested, and that the results of tests are always problematic”.

      As Kuhn (1996) has suggested, theory, and by extension knowledge, develops within paradigms. The theories discussed in this volume are evolving within paradigms and contributing to the growth of scientific knowledge. As Kuhn states, a paradigm is “universally recognized scientific achievements that, for a time, provide model problems and solutions for a community of researchers” (1996, p. x). The anomalous research results, vis-à-vis consistent expanding frontiers, derived from testing of theories presented in this volume have not, thus far, created any threats towards a paradigm shift away from the current paradigms under which these theories operate. Theories demonstrate the normal scientific adventure of the movement from pre-paradigm to normal science to revolutionary changes and finally the formation of a new paradigm. Anomalous findings and loss of confidence push resources from one paradigm into a new and emerging paradigm leading to the development and rise of new theorization (Kuhn, 1996).

Many theories are constructed to be tested. But other theories, because of unmeasurable constructs and concepts, are difficult to be evaluated in the Popperian sense of falsification (Popper, 1965). Though falsification is important in the development of scientific theorization it should not be the main criterion for the acceptance or non-acceptance of paradigms. As the famous ship analogy suggests: If you are on a sinking ship with many holes, would you immediately jump into the ocean, or would you wait for another ship to come along? As a critique of falsification, non-confirmation of theories during research does not mean that you should discard the theory and much more, the paradigm within which the theory operates. Rather the output, utility and explanatory power of the theory and paradigm are what sustain the continuance of many theories. But many theories still continue to exert the academic and applied influence even having been exhaustively criticized. Some of the theories presented in this volume are cases in point. Waltz (1997, p. 914) puts it this way, “In contrast, Lakatos observes that “the most admired scientific theories simply fail to forbid any observable state of affairs” (Lakatos, 1970, p. 100). This is true for many reasons. Lakatos himself points out that we always evaluate theories with a ceteris paribus clause implied, and we can never be sure that it holds.” Many social psychological theories are open theories. Popper (1982) argued that open theories expose their propositions, assumptions and hypotheses to constant evaluation, assessment of logical consistency and testing of validity – a process of falsification. A falsification process allows for the continual growth of a theory, and by extension, science.

      Social psychology has seen numerous studies testing hypotheses drawn from theories. However, less frequent in the literature is the emergence of theories – a renaissance that is much needed for the development and impetus of the discipline. However, many of the theories that currently exist within social psychology are as important to the discipline as they were over seventy years ago. A renaissance starts with a reassessment of the efficacy of current theories.

      Theories have the power of insight and understanding, allowing scientists to see phenomena that previously they would have been