Russia. Crimea. History. Nikolay Starikov

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Russia. Crimea. History - Nikolay Starikov


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its dissolution. He also felt very insulted that Yeltsin was the first who phoned to the President of the USA George Bush – to report about the accomplished deed…

      Keeping in mind all last events in Ukraine and reunion of Crimea with Russia, there is a lot of talks that Yeltsin should have got the peninsula back just during the meeting in the Belovezhskaya Pushcha in December 1991. While he allegedly was not raising the issue at all. To be fair, let us quote the narrative of Leonid Kravchuk about how Boris Yeltsin once tried to discuss the Crimean issue during a criminal conspiracy to eliminate the USSR:

      “When we were considering the agreement about the establishing of CIS (The Commonwealth of the Independent States), a question arose of the nuclear weapons and about Crimea. Yeltsin began reasoning… Well, Crimea… 1954. Khrushchev made a gift to Ukraine. May be, he said, it is time to re-establish justice and order.

– And give Crimea back to Russia!

      – Well well, I replied – there were no gift at all. On the contrary, Ukraine took a huge burden. Khrushchev said at the time that Crimea should be handed over to Ukraine, not because it is forever…

– That is, temporarily handed over to you, huh?

      – There was no word “temporarily” there… Rather, Ukraine was to help rebuild the economy of Crimea and to make it a tourist center. And I told Yeltsin: let us now skip the issue of the handover of Crimea.

– And Crimea was not handed back.

      – We just agreed, that let us establish CIS, let us start living and let us see how it will go on, and after that will consider all borders, legitimately, according to the international law. Yeltsin agreed…”[3]

      The main guilt of Yeltsin and the other two “leaders”, who sentenced our superpower to a disintegration, is not that they “have forgotten” to get Crimea back to Russia, but is that they have split Russia. The USSR was in fact the Big Russia…

      Anyway, let us come back to the personalities of the Ukrainian Presidents. We need it in order to understand how the consequent events would unfold. Leonid Kuchma replaced Kravchuk at the helm of Ukrainian state. An engineer and constructor, he was even awarded with the Lenin’s Prize for his contribution in the designing of SS-18 and SS-20, which the West regarded as the main threat to its nuclear security. Later he started a political career, became a Parliament member, and was a Prime Minister of Kravchuk’s Government. In 1994, he became the President of Ukraine. The answer to the question, how did the head of Ukraine in 1994 make his decisions, is simple, if we recall what has happened in Russia in 1993. Moscow just ceased to be a center of power. Ministries of the Yeltsin’s Government were besieged by American advisers of all stripes, like a hive of bees. It was a climax of the one-polar world – the USA were at the summit of its might. Ukraine was (and is) one of the strategically important points of the policy of the West. An estrangement of Ukraine from Russia gives a lot of strategic advantages:

      • it hinders re-establishment of a strong Euro-Asian alliance – it is not possible without Ukraine;

      • it enables a launch of a brainwashing campaign of Ukrainian citizens targeted on creating a new nation from Ukrainian-Russians and setting it off on Russians and Russia.

      Therefore, the second Ukrainian President was closely controlled by the Americans. The further events of 2004 were directly connected to his personality. The essence of the first “orange” Maidan was not too complicated. American “partners” and advisors suggested to Kuchma quite a “reliable ploy” which can enable him to stay at helm for another one term. Two politicians should be put forward on the political scene; both must be supported by large numbers of voters but by no means – majority of them whatsoever. Next, they both should be set upon each other, thus creating a crisis. Kuchma himself was supposed to play a wise arbitrator, who could tackle all problems. And that’s it – people’s gratitude would be ensured – together with a new set of authorities. Being a rocket engineer of the highest skills, which was reaffirmed by the Lenin’s Prize reward, Leonid Danilovich Kuchma was a mediocre politician. That is why he has entirely and blindly relied on experts from the States. They, however, had their own plans for the future of Ukraine. The time to seed havoc was coming. The “orange” scenario was tested in Serbia and Georgia. Ukraine was to become a “bundle of sticks” to start an “orange” fire in Russia[4].

      Now it is time to step aside from the events in Ukraine for a while, and to talk about the technologies of a coup that are now known as the “Orange Revolution”. First – the main point. To carry out any coup, you need traitors. Without them – nothing will work out. A “fifth column” inside a country is a must for any change of power. Precisely this “orange” column helps external forces to find an ostensible cause for either explicit diplomatic or clandestine (or both) pressure on existing state authority. At the same time, street protesters (to cut it short, we will call them in the future just the “Street”) demonstrate the level of “popular mistrust to a corrupt government”. A part of local elite supporting the “orangists” represents a split at the top and also “manages” the level of “popular discontent” and governs the “street democracy”. Social instability reaches a certain degree that enables external forces to deploy maximum diplomatic and clandestine activity and put a pressure on the existing Government. Using carrot and stick approach, these forces try to bring about an additional split into the remaining loyal part of the elite, and force the existing authorities to voluntarily give up their powers, yielding their positions to that part of the elite, which has already took the side of “orangists”.

      This is an essence in a nutshell, now is the time for important details. It is believed that an American professor Gene Sharp developed the technology of non-violent action in his handbook “From Dictatorship to Democracy”. When studying this “theory” – as well as many other “products” of the same kind – one can understand that all this so called “literature” together with particular “manuals” conceals something very substantial. Scattered pieces, each of them being apparently quite logical and apprehensible inside, fail to be put together in order to form a general concept. A finished concept, which gives comprehensive view – when one can see everything at once and in whole. And really understand how “it” works. What are the father-founders of “orange” technologies keeping back from us? They are not talking about the “cement”, which holds together all their techniques. They keep silent about those several pre-requisites, which give “orangists” opportunities and possibilities to reach their objectives via quite simple actions. One can compare the difference between “orange” revolutions and “usual” revolutions of the past with athletes, who use doping and thus who can achieve better results with significantly smaller efforts, and athletes, who does not do this. So, what is the “doping of orangism”?

      They are several. They work only together. Neutralization of one of them results in a failure of all “orange” efforts. Here they are:

      • It’s mandatory for the local elites to be involved in an “orange” revolution. Most of the elites or not, more influential ones or less – all these questions are not crucial – rather they are “technological” ones. But these elite, participating in an “orange” revolution, must have the possibility and authority to be able – if necessary – to block all functioning state institutions, or – at least – to hamper them to a large extent.

      • An “orange” revolution must have own “Street” (means – significant number of “ordinary” protesters), i. e. there must be a kind of a “critical mass” of “dissatisfied”. At the same time, the “indignation” of the “dissatisfied” should not be a result of their hopeless destitution. The cause of the dissatisfaction must be a feeling (maybe, inspired from outside) that people are deceived and are deprived from something. This is one of the most important conditions. It keeps the “Street” under control. In fact, in all “orange” revolutions the “dissatisfied” are well fed, more or less well dressed, employed and enjoy all benefits of the social security provided by the state. But propaganda has persuaded them that their protest can help them personally to reach a higher level of


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<p>3</p>

A. Gamov. Leonid Kravchuk, ex-President of Ukraine: Yeltsin solicited to get Crimea back to Russia… http://www.kp.ru/daily/26207/3093145/ (in Russian).

<p>4</p>

Russian authorities understood this very well, therefore after the victory of the first Maidan, emerged a number of youth organizations (for example, “Nashi” – “Ours”). Their main purpose was to occupy squares and streets just in time – in order to prevent deployment of an “orange” scenario.