The Tribes and Castes of the Central Provinces of India, Volume 1. Robert Vane Russell
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clear that the Korku pays no regard to the sense but solely to the word or sound. This belief in the concrete force of words has had the most important effects both in law and religion. The earliest codes of law were held to be commands of the god and claimed obedience on this ground. The binding force of the law rested in the words and not in the sense because the words were held to be those of the god and to partake of his divine nature. In ancient Rome the citizen had to take care to know the words of the law and to state them exactly. If he used one wrong word the law gave him no assistance. “Gaius tells a story of a man whose neighbour had cut his vines; the facts were clear; he stated the law applying to his case, but he said vines, whereas the law said trees; he lost his suit.”115 The divine virtue attached to the sacred books of different religions rests on the same belief. Frequently the books themselves are worshipped, and it was held that they could not be translated because the sanctity resided in the actual words and would be lost if other words were used. The efficacy of spells and invocations seems to depend mainly on this belief in the concrete power of words. If one knows an efficacious form of words connoting a state of physical facts and repeats it with the proper accessory conditions, then that state of facts is actually caused to exist; and if one knows a man’s name and calls on him with a form of words efficacious to compel attendance, he has to come and his spirit can similarly be summoned from the dead. When a Malay wishes to kill an enemy he makes an image of the man, transfixes or otherwise injures it, and buries it on the path over which the enemy will tread. As he buries it with the impression that he will thereby cause the enemy to die and likewise be buried, he says:
It is not I who am burying him,
It is Gabriel who is burying him,
and thinks that the repetition of these words produces the state of facts which they denote so that the guilt of the murder is removed from his own shoulders to those of the archangel Gabriel. Similarly when he has killed a deer and wishes to be free from the guilt of his action, or as he calls it to cast out the mischief from the deer, he says:
It is not I who cast out these mischiefs,
It is Michael who casts them out.
It is not I who cast out these mischiefs,
It is Israfel who casts them out,
and so on, freeing himself in the same manner from responsibility for the death of the deer.116 Names also are regarded as concrete. Primitive man could not regard a name as an abstract appellation, but thought of it as part of the person or thing to which it was applied and as containing part of his life, like his hair, spittle and the rest of his body. He would have used names for a long period before he had any word for a name, and his first idea of the name as a part of the substantive body to which it is applied has survived a more correct appreciation. Thus if one knew a person’s name one could injure him by working evil on it and the part of his life contained in it, just as one could injure him through the clippings of his hair, his spittle, clothes or the earth pressed by his foot. This is the reason for the common custom of having two names, one of which, the true name, is kept secret and only used on ceremonial occasions when it is essential, as at a wedding, while the other is employed for everyday life. The latter, not being the man’s true name, does not contain part of his life, and hence there is no harm in letting an enemy know it. Similarly the Hindus think that a child’s name should not be repeated at night, lest an owl might hear it, when this bird could injure the child through its name, just as if it got hold of a piece of cloth worn or soiled by the child. The practice of euphemism rests on this belief, as it was thought that if a person’s name was said and a part of him was thus caused to be present the rest would probably follow. Hence the rule of avoiding the use of the names of persons or things of which one does not desire the presence. Thus Sir E.B. Tylor says: “The Dayak will not speak of the smallpox by name, but will call it ‘The Chief,’ or ‘Jungle leaves,’ or say, ‘Has He left you?’ The euphemism of calling the Furies the Eumenides, or ‘Gracious Ones,’ is the stock illustration of this feeling, and the euphemisms for fairies and for the devil are too familiar to quote.”117 Similarly the name of a god was considered as part of him and hence partaking of his divine nature. It was thus so potent that it could not be mentioned on ordinary occasions or by common persons. Allah is only an epithet for the name of God among the Muhammadans and his True or Great Name is secret. Those who know it have power over all created things. Clearly then the divine power is held to reside in the name itself. The concealment of the name of the tutelary deity of Rome, for divulging which Valerius Soranus is said to have paid the penalty of death, is a case in point.118 Sir E.B. Tylor gives many other interesting examples of the above ideas and points out the connection clearly existing in the savage mind between the name and the object to which it is applied. The Muhammadans think that Solomon’s name is very efficacious for casting out devils and evil spirits. The practice of naming children after gods or by the epithets or titles applied to the divine being, or after the names of saints, appears to be due to the belief that such names, by reason of their association with the god or saint, acquire a part of his divine life and virtue, which when given to children the names will in turn convey to them.119 On the other hand, when a Hindu mother is afraid lest her child may die, she sometimes gives it an opprobrious name as dirt, rubbish, sweepings, or sold for one or two cowries, so that the evil spirits who take the lives of children may be deceived by the name and think that such a valueless child is not worth having. The voice was also held to be concrete. The position of the Roman tribune was peculiar, as he was not a magistrate chosen by divine authority and hence could not summon people to his court; but the tribune had been dedicated to the city gods, and his person was sacrosanct. He could therefore lay hands on a man, and once the tribune touched him, the man was held to be in the magistrate’s power, and bound to obey him. This rule extended even to those who were within hearing of his voice; any one, even a patrician or consul, who heard the tribune’s voice was compelled to obey him. In this case it is clear that the voice and spoken words were held to be concrete, and to share in the sanctity attaching to the body.120 When primitive man could not think of a name as an abstraction but had to think of it as an actual part of the body and life of the person or visible object to which it belonged, it will be realised how impossible it was for him during a long period to conceive of any abstract idea, which was only a word without visible or corporal reality.
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