Lineages of the Absolutist State. Perry Anderson
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see J. Russell Major, Representative Institutions in Renaissance France, 1421–1559, Madison 1960, p. 9.
3. Major, Representative Institutions in Renaissance France, p. 6.
4. There is a particularly trenchant statement of the general thesis that Estates-Generals in France and elsewhere nearly always served, not hindered, the promotion of royal power in the Renaissance, in Major’s excellent study: Representative Institutions in Renaissance France, pp. 16–20. In fact, Major perhaps presses the argument somewhat too unilaterally; certainly, in the course of the 16th century, it became steadily less true, if it had once been so, that monarchs ‘had no fear of the assemblies of estates’ (p. 16). But this is nevertheless one of the most illuminating single discussions of the topic in any language.
5. See the convergent opinions expressed by Lewis and Major: P. S. Lewis, ‘The Failure of the French Mediaeval Estates’, Past and Present, No. 23, November 1962, pp. 3–24, and J. Russell Major, The Estates-General of 1560, Princeton 1951, pp. 75, 119–20.
6. Major, Representative Institutions in Renaissance France, pp. 126–7.
7. This thesis is advanced in the stimulating essay by Brian Pearce, ‘The Huguenots and the Holy League: Class, Politics and Religion in France in the Second Half of the Sixteenth Century’ (unpublished), who suggests that the Northern towns were consequently more concerned with the consolidation of French national unity. However, many of the main ports in the South and West also remained Catholic: Bordeaux, Nantes and Marseille all rallied to the League. Marseille suffered in consequence, pro-Spanish policies depriving it of its traditional Levantine trade: G. Livet, Les Guerres de Religion, Paris 1966, pp. 105–6.
8. Livet, Les Guerres de Religion, pp. 7–8.
9. J. H. Elliott, Europe Divided 1559–1598, London 1968, p. 96, which includes inter alia a skilful narrative of this period in French history, in the setting of the international political struggles of the age.
10. For a political sociology of the municipal leadership of the League in Paris at the height of the Religious Wars, see J. H. Salmon, ‘The Paris Sixteen, 1584–1594: The Social Analysis of a Revolutionary Movement’, Journal of Modern History, 44, No. 4, December 1972, pp. 540–76. Salmon shows the importance in the Council of Sixteen of the middle and lower ranks of the legal profession, and stresses its manipulation of the plebeian masses, together with a provision of some economic relief, under its dictatorship. A brief comparative analysis is sketched in H. G. Koenigsberger, ‘The Organization of Revolutionary Parties in France and the Netherlands during the Sixteenth Century’, Journal of Modern History, 27, December 1955, pp. 335–51. But much work remains to be done on the League, one of the most complex and enigmatic phenomena of the century; the movement which invented urban barricades has yet to find its Marxist historian.
11. This point is emphasized by J. H. Salmon, ‘Venality of Office and Popular Sedition in 17th Century France’, Past and Present, July 1967, pp. 41–3.
12. Menna Prestwich, ‘From Henri III to Louis XIV’, in H. Trevor-Roper (ed.), The Age of Expansion, London 1968, p. 199.
13. Prestwich, ‘From Henri III to Louis XIV’, p. 199.
14. There is a good discussion of this phenomenon in A. D. Lublinskaya, French Absolutism: The Crucial Phase 1620–1629, Cambridge 1968, pp. 234–43; for the size of the take from the taille appropriated by tax-farmers, see p. 308 (13 million out of 19 million livres in the mid 1620’s).
15. ‘Or to change the metaphor: if royal authority was a brilliant sun, there was another power which reflected, concentrated and tempered its light, a shade enclosing that source of energy on which no human eye could rest without being blinded. We refer to the Parlements, above all the Parlement of Paris.’ Ernst Kossmann, La Fronde, Leyden 1954, p. 23.
16. B. F. Porshnev, Les Soulèvements Populaires en France de 1623 à 1648, pp. 547–60.
17. Prestwich, ‘From Henri III to Louis XIV’, p. 203; Mousnier, Peasant Uprisings, London 1971, p. 307.
18. This is Porshnev’s view in Les Soulèvements Populaires en France.
19. For this aspect, see Kossmann, La Fronde, pp. 117–38.
20. Kossmann, La Fronde, pp. 20, 24 250–2.
21. Pierre Goubert, ‘Les Problèmes de la Noblesse au XVIIe Siècle’, XIIIth International Congress of Historical Sciences, Moscow 1970, p. 5.
22. Pierre Goubert, Louis XIV et Vingt Millions de Français, pp. 164, 166.
23. Goubert, Louis XIV et Vingt Millions de Français, p. 72.
24. J. Stoye, Europe Unfolding 1648–1688, London 1969, p. 223; Goubert, Louis XIV et Vingt Millions de Français, p. 186.
25. Roland Mousnier, Peasant Uprisings, London 1971, p. 115, justly stresses this point, commenting that the rebellions of 1675 in Brittany and Bordeaux were the last serious social upheavals of the century.
26. Goubert, Louis XIV et Vingt Millions de Français, pp. 90–2.
27. Even in a certain sense its cultural ideals: ‘The newly acquired symmetry and order of the parade-ground provided, for Louis XIV and his contemporaries, the model to which life and art must alike conform; and the pas cadencé of Martinet – whose name is in itself a programme – echoed again in the majestic monotony of interminable alexandrines.’ Michael Roberts, ‘The Military Revolution 1560–1660’, Essays in Swedish History, London 1967, p. 206.
28. The Cardinals had sought to subject the aristocracy to disguised imposts, in the form of ‘commutations’ of the military ban owed on fiefs. These were much disliked by the gentry and were abandoned by Louis XIV. See Pierre Deyon, ‘A Propos des Rapports entre la Noblesse Francaise et la Monarchie Absolue pendant la Première Moitié du XVIIe Siècle’, Revue Historique, CCXXXI, 1964, pp. 355–6.
29. Goubert, Louis XIV et Vingt Millions de Français, pp. 158–62.
30. Louis XIV, of course, proved unable to appreciate this change – hence his constant diplomatic blunders. The temporary weakness of England in the 1660’s, when Charles II was a French pensioner, led him to underestimate the island ever afterwards, even when its central political importance in Western Europe was already obvious. Louis XIV’s failure to extend any preemptive aid to James II in 1688, before the landing of William III, was thus to be one of the most fatal errors of a career well supplied with them.
31. Albert Goodwin, ‘The Social Structure and Economic and Political Attitudes of the French Nobility in the 18th Century’, XIIth International Congress of Historical Sciences, Rapports, I, p. 361.
32. J. McManners, ‘France’, in Goodwin (ed.), The European Nobility in the 18th Century, pp. 33–5.
33. For the attitudes of the Parlements of the last years of the Ancien Régime, see J. Egret, La Pré-Révolution Française, 1787–1788, Paris 1962, pp. 149–60.
34. A. Soboul, La Révolution Française, I, Paris 1964, p. 45.
35. J. Lough, An Introduction to 18th Century France, London 1960, pp. 71–3.
36. The naval budget never totalled more than half that of England: Dorn, Competition for Empire, p. 116. Dorn presents a telling account of the general deficiencies of the French fleets in this epoch.
In the Middle Ages, the feudal monarchy of England was generally far more powerful than that of France. The Norman and Angevin dynasties created a royal State unrivalled in its authority