Captured Peace. Christine J. Wade
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had closed.
With all avenues for nonviolent protest eliminated, increasing repression drove once divided opposition groups together. The Democratic Revolutionary Front was established in April 1980 by three center-left parties, members of which had participated in the junta. During the summer of 1980 the FDR organized several general strikes designed to demonstrate the popular support for the group.80 The public nature of the FDR’s activities naturally drew the attention of the military. The murders of one organization’s leadership later that year had a dramatic impact on the group’s organizational capacity within the country. The FDR gained international prominence through the establishment of diplomatic missions abroad and was recognized as the Salvadoran representative to the Socialist International. In 1981 the FDR was recognized by the governments of France and Mexico as a “representative political force.”81 In October 1980 five guerrilla organizations formed the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN).82 The FDR, which had an open alliance with the FMLN’s predecessor, the United Revolutionary Directorate (DRU), then aligned with the FMLN.83 The polarizing events and heightened repression of 1979–82 provided ample opportunity for recruitment. The FMLN peaked in 1983 with some twelve thousand troops, making it one of the largest, most disciplined guerrilla movements in the hemisphere. Almost one-third of FMLN combatants and 20 percent of commanders were women. The FMLN derived much of its strength from the grassroots and peasant organizations, both in terms of recruitment and general support.
U.S. Policy and the Emergence of ARENA
U.S. interest in El Salvador, which had been fairly negligible compared to other countries in the region before 1979, rose sharply with the victory of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the emergence of the FMLN. The goal of the Carter administration was to prevent the accession of a leftist regime in El Salvador while promoting human rights, a policy it sought to promote throughout Latin America. Believing that the 1979 junta offered the best solution to the political violence, the Carter administration approved the reprogramming of $5.7 million in nonlethal military aid to the junta in March 1980.84 In an effort to support the junta and diminish support for the guerrillas, the administration developed a policy that included agrarian reform and the nationalization of banks and coffee.85 These policies, which many elites characterized as socialist, were deeply at odds with the interests of most elites and their policy preferences at the time. Despite efforts by some in the Carter administration to tie human rights to aid, abuses increased and aid continued to flow in an effort to combat the encroaching “communist threat” posed by the FMLN rebels.86
But elites found a much more suitable partner in the Reagan administration.87 The attitudes and policy preference of hardliners within the administration coincided with those of El Salvador’s elites. Salvadoran elites and the military successfully resurrected the 1932 narrative, which was also echoed by the administration: the situation in El Salvador was the result of Soviet encroachment into the hemisphere and a consequence of Carter’s permissive policy environment in the region.88 The FMLN’s failed January 1981 offensive fueled speculation in Washington that the guerrillas were receiving significant assistance from Cuba and Nicaragua.89 The Reagan administration, eager to use El Salvador as a showcase in its efforts to combat communism in the hemisphere, developed a strategy to undercut support for the guerrillas while also supporting democracy.90 The Reagan Doctrine, as it came to be known, and the fear of communist expansion in the hemisphere dominated U.S. policy in the region for almost a decade.91
The dominant narrative about the FMLN’s military weakness and lack of popular appeal undermined attempts for political resolution of the conflict throughout the decade. The military, many elites, and the Reagan administration believed that the FMLN could be defeated on the battlefield. During the 1980s the United States spent $4.35 billion, $1.035 billion of that in military aid, to defeat the FMLN.92 As a result, there was little support for a negotiated end to the conflict during much of the 1980s. Failed talks between the Duarte administration and FDR-FMLN at La Palma, Chalatenango, in October 1984, Ayagualo in November 1984, and numerous overtures in 1985–86 received no support from the military or the Reagan administration.
While the support of a military victory was clearly one of the defining features of Reagan’s policy, elections were paramount for achieving the administration’s overall goal. Not only would elections provide legitimacy for the Salvadoran government and guarantee continued aid from a highly critical, Democrat-controlled Congress, but they would also undermine guerrilla efforts by providing a democratic alternative.93 Elections were held in 1982 for a Constituent Assembly, which would, in turn, elect a provisional president and replace the junta. The primary goal of the assembly was to draft a new constitution to create a new framework for a more inclusive electoral democracy. These elections, and the subsequent elections in 1984, were touted as “free elections” by the United States despite obvious deficiencies—not the least of which was that they were held against the backdrop of the war.94 Seven parties registered with the new Central Elections Council (CCE), including the PCN and the PDC.
In 1981 a new party, the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA), emerged as the political expression of right-wing extremism. In some respects, ARENA mirrored past patronage party networks, combining repression with tightly controlled political participation. The party grew out of FAN, uniting the oligarchy, military, and death squads in the anticommunist cause. The ORDEN organizational network served as the “foundation” for the party.95 Among the party’s founders was former intelligence chief Maj. Roberto D’Aubuisson, who combined ultranationalist and anticommunist rhetoric to galvanize support for the new party. His charismatic persona and fiery speeches fueled U.S. fears that the election could deliver a “slow-motion right-wing coup” rather than victory for the center-right PDC.96 The Reagan administration reacted to the growing strength of ARENA by channeling financial support to Duarte in hopes of ensuring a PDC victory, which was seen as vital to approval for continued military aid.
While the PDC won a plurality of the votes (40.27 percent, twenty-four seats) in the 1982 elections, ARENA (29.32 percent, nineteen seats) joined in coalition with the PCN (19.03 percent, fourteen seats) to ensure control of the assembly. As a result, D’Aubuisson, who had been described by former U.S. ambassador Robert White (1977–80) as a “pathological killer” was poised to be elected as provisional president. The Reagan administration sent the message via a congressional delegation that U.S. aid was contingent on the election of a moderate government. In a conciliatory move, Salvadoran banker Dr. Álvaro Magaña was named president. Unhappy with Washington’s influence and manipulation, D’Aubuisson was named assembly president.97 There were deep divisions between the PDC, ARENA, and the PCN, which had a general mistrust of one another. Under pressure from the United States, the parties signed the Pact of Apaneca in an attempt to end the infighting between parties. Though its strength was somewhat diminished following the pact, ARENA was able to use its position in the transitional government to limit the size of land expropriated in the land reforms, protecting some of the larger estates and also overseeing the ministries charged with land reform, which enabled ARENA to essentially halt the reforms.98 Thus, the oligarchy was establishing a foothold in politics once again thanks, in part, to the electoral process.
“Demonstration” Democracy and the Making of a New Right
The March 1984 elections were supposed to signify the transition away from the political uncertainty that had plagued El Salvador since the 1979 coup. Still concerned that a victory by ARENA would threaten the flow of military aid to defeat the FMLN, the United States spent $6 million on the elections, including $2 million in covert aid to Duarte and the PCN.99 No parties from the Left participated in the elections, based on both principle and security concerns. Despite a number of significant irregularities and much confusion at polling stations, voter turnout was higher than predicted. Approximately 1.4 million Salvadorans voted in the 1984 elections. Duarte won 43 percent of the vote, followed by 30 percent for D’Aubuisson. Duarte’s failure to win a majority of the vote necessitated a runoff in May. Duarte defeated ARENA’s D’Aubuisson for president in the runoff with almost 54 percent of the vote. Duarte’s presidential victory was also buoyed by PDC victories in the 1985