Captured Peace. Christine J. Wade
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respect for human rights; the effort to prevent crime; and the subordination of the force to the constitutional authorities.”22 Additionally, the PNC’s leaders were required to be civilians. In an effort to further distinguish the police from the military, the police were no longer permitted to reside in barracks and were permitted to carry only small arms. A new national public security academy was created to train recruits, and a basic level of education was established for recruits. A limited number of former members of the National Police and the FMLN were allowed to join the PNC provided they met specified criteria. Additionally, it was the designated role of the PNC to protect the right of assembly and demonstration, adding, “citizens’ exercise of their political rights may not be impaired by police activities.”23 This provision underlined police responsibility to protect the rights of the citizenry rather than the rights of the state.
Chapters III and IV addressed judicial and electoral reform, reaffirming the agreements reached in the Mexico Agreement. The Chapúltepec Accords specifically addressed the National Judiciary Council’s independence from the state, the role of the Judicial Training School in improving the professional training judges and attorneys, and the responsibilities of the PDDH. Chapter IV, which addressed electoral reform, was a single paragraph reaffirming the Mexico Agreement. The accords did stipulate that COPAZ appoint a special commission to propose necessary electoral reforms. Both chapters lacked specificity and were the least developed sections of the accords; the former was a single page and the latter was a single paragraph. The lack of specificity and the extent to which the reforms were left to domestic actors became a serious issue during implementation.
Chapter V addressed the socioeconomic issues of the peace accords. During the negotiations, the FMLN had been primarily concerned with military and institutional reform. Although the FMLN had based its armed struggle on battling socioeconomic injustices, the social and economic aspects of the peace accords were left until the end of the negotiations and were very limited in scope. The neoliberal policies adopted by the ARENA government were not subject to negotiation.24 This was the position of the Cristiani administration and the FMLN, which was far more concerned about the military and human rights issues, never contested this position. According to FMLN negotiator Rubén Zamora, “The moment the FMLN agreed that we were going to negotiate with the ARENA government, the socioeconomic model was out of the discussion. Maybe we could do something on secondary issues, but the basic thing was to get to the table. This is the basic tenet of negotiations. People go to negotiate, not to sacrifice themselves.”25 According to Teresa Whitfield, it was “remarkable that socioeconomic issues even were the subject of a substantive agreement.”26 Nicaragua’s experience, however, had demonstrated the danger of failing to make provisions for ex-combatants after demobilization. As such, the accords addressed five main issues: land transfer; increase and ease of loans to the agricultural sector; small business and microenterprise; reforms to permit external aid directed to community development; and measures to alleviate the social cost of structural adjustment programs. The accords also reaffirmed the commitment to privatization as a means to spread wealth to workers.27 The land transfer program was intended to facilitate the reintegration of members of the FMLN and their supporters into society. Thus, the economic measures agreed to in the peace accords were specifically focused on rebuilding former conflict zones and the reintegration of FMLN forces through land transfer and improved access to credit—not on addressing fundamental issues of poverty and inequality.28
The accords also created the Forum for Economic and Social Consultation (Foro) and the National Reconstruction Plan (PRN). The purpose of the Foro was to address those socioeconomic issues not discussed in the accords, including wages, labor standards, and privatization. The Foro was to be composed of high-level government officials, specifically those with the authority to make decisions, and business and labor representatives. The terms of the Foro as specified in the accords were vague, as were the structure and issues to be addressed by the Foro. The accords required the PRN to be designed by the government within thirty days of signing the agreement for submission to the FMLN for review and comment. The National Reconstruction Plan was to focus on the reintegration of the FMLN into Salvadoran society, development of former conflict zones, issues of job creation, increase in production of basic foodstuffs, promotion of agricultural development, guarantee of basic social services, and development or redevelopment of basic infrastructure.29
Chapter VI specifically addressed the reintegration of the FMLN into Salvadoran society and had two main components: the reintegration of former combatants and the legalization of the FMLN as a political party. As such, the accords provided for the freedom to conduct business attributed to political parties, such as canvassing for new members, access to the media, and the right of assembly. The accords also included a special security provision for FMLN leaders following the signing of the peace accords. Political prisoners being held by the government were freed and those in exile were allowed to return. That said, the FMLN would still be required to complete the formal process of registering as a political party with the TSE.
Chapter VII, the last section of the accords, addressed the cessation of armed conflict. Accordingly, the ceasefire was to begin February 1, 1992, and to be completed on October 21, 1992. This section detailed agreements reached on the ceasefire, separation of forces, demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of the FMLN, as well as UN verification of these processes.30 These provisions were to be monitored and verified by ONUSAL. Additionally, COPAZ was charged with evaluating progress made on the implementation of the agreements.
The Implementation of the Accords
The formal ceasefire began on February 1, 1992, although there had been an unofficial ceasefire since December. The United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) was formally established by Security Council Resolution 693 in May 1991 to verify the implementation of the accords.31 The ONUSAL mission had four responsibilities: human rights monitoring, demobilization, election monitoring, and compliance with the judicial and socioeconomic requirements of the accords (see table 2.1).
TABLE 2.1 Phases of the ONUSAL mission, 1991–95
Source: Adapted from Tommie Sue Montgomery, Peacemaking and Democratization in the Western Hemisphere (Miami: North-South Center Press, 2000), 144.
Throughout its work, the mission repeatedly commented on issues where it believed that the parties were not living up to the agreements established in the accords. ONUSAL’s documentation of communications with the parties, as well as its own reports, is extensive. A careful review of the communications reveals the difficulties faced by the mission with regard to the implementation process. While there were certainly some significant issues that related directly to the FMLN, most of the documented difficulties reveal the recalcitrance of governing elites. This was particularly notable in the areas of police and judicial reform.
Human Rights
Although the deployment of the ONUSAL human rights division was originally scheduled to occur after the ceasefire, both parties requested that the mission begin its work ahead of schedule. The secretary general’s office sent a small delegation to determine if the work could be conducted in the absence of a ceasefire. The division began operations in July 1991, well before any necessary reforms related to strengthening human rights had been implemented. Although the mission expanded over time, the division’s chief responsibility was to investigate and report human rights violations occurring after July 26, 1991. Violations committed before that date were entrusted to the Truth Commission. Requests for division assistance often exceeded its mandate.32 Shortly after arriving, the division expressed some concern that “vast numbers of Salvadorians right across the political spectrum believe that the Mission will be able to prevent, or at least punish, human rights violations,” although it did not have the powers to do so.33 Reports from the division generally emphasized two challenges: the difficulty of adequately monitoring violations during conflict and failure of the judiciary to investigate or follow up on alleged violations.34
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