Captured Peace. Christine J. Wade
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Concerns about the lack of adequate training, impunity and continuing human rights abuses were common during the transition.59 Some members of the former security apparatuses were reluctant to submit to the new institutions and they quickly came to dominate the new police force, although cases of strife between former FMLN and former security officers were relatively few.60 In June 1993 the government appointed former military officer Oscar Peña Durán as the PNC’s operations director. During his ten months in office, Peña transferred two units of the National Police into the PNC—the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) and the Anti-Narcotics Division (UEA), for the latter of which Peña was the former head—a clear violation of the peace accords. Peña not only flagrantly violated the peace accords through the appointments and his refusal to allow ONUSAL’s continued training of new units, but he also evaded COPAZ consultations that were mandated by the accords. ONUSAL described the refusal of its police training as “a self-defeating move,” though later evidence would suggest that the decision was, in fact, designed to preserve elite control over the new police force.61 Despite protests from ONUSAL and increasing reports of human rights violations by the PNC, the Cristiani administration exhibited little political will in enforcing these aspects of the accords. In fact, Cristiani attempted to delay the dissolution of the PN until June 1994, presumably in hopes that a new administration would be able to shirk international verification and any responsibilities of further compliance with the accords.62 The veil of impunity, however, was lifted in June 1994 when a dozen agents in National Police uniforms robbed a bank in broad daylight, killing six and wounding five others. The incident, which generated public outrage and exposed the extent of the ongoing impunity, was caught on video and broadcast on television and in print media.63 Shortly thereafter, it was announced that the National Police would be dissolved. Despite significant delays, the PNC was fully deployed in October 1994 and had a force of seventy-two hundred officers by 1995. By then, however, the damage to the PNC had been done.64
Socioeconomic Reforms
The final stage of the ONUSAL mission concentrated on the socioeconomic issues addressed in the Chapúltepec Accords. The three main provisions of the socioeconomic section of the accords addressed land transfer, the creation of the Foro, and a national development plan. The Land Transfer Program (PTT) was intended primarily as a process by which to reintegrate FMLN combatants and their supporters into society, not as a means to redress the serious land issue that had plagued the country for more than one hundred years.65 The land transfer program was complicated by titling and verification problems, as well as political disputes. Determining ownership before occupation and designating proper recipients was time consuming and sometimes impossible.66 Additionally, the process was confusing for beneficiaries. Many misunderstood the terms of the accords and were surprised to discover that they would actually have to purchase the land, albeit on favorable terms (6 percent interest and a thirty-year repayment plan). There was also significant political tension and mistrust between the FMLN and ARENA that delayed the transfers, particularly with regard to ARENA’s notion that land transfers were considered “rewards” for FMLN supporters in advance of the 1994 elections.67 At one point, the FMLN halted demobilization and the government responded by stalling on the purification of the armed forces.68 In October 1992 the UN developed a plan designed to distribute one hundred thousand manzanas of land to some 25,000 civilians and 22,500 ex-combatants (15,000 soldiers and 7,500 FMLN, about three manzanas (about two hectares) each.69 The agreement did not resolve the many problems associated with the program. Some beneficiaries did not want to move, some could not be located, some died, while still others complained about the quality of the land. Landowners were not willing to sell or resented the bureaucracy of the Land Bank. Land costs, which had been depressed by the war, increased significantly after the conclusion of the conflict. Despite numerous delays and much political wrangling, the land transfer process was near completion in 1997. By the time the Land Bank was dissolved in January 1998, 36,089 beneficiaries had received some 103,300 hectares, or 10 percent of agricultural land.70
The Foro, which was intended as a forum for government, business, and labor to address issues such as labor rights, wages, privatization and other issues, died shortly after its creation, in September 1992. The business sector initially refused to participate because of land invasions by peasants in connection with the land transfer program. During its brief tenure, the Foro reached agreement on the ratification of the ILO conventions, twelve of which were ratified by the Legislative Assembly by 1995.71 The business sector halted participation in late 1993 due to the upcoming March 1994 elections. The Foro was reestablished as the Consejo Superior del Trabajo, although it never met. One UN report laid the blame squarely on the shoulders of the business community: “the Forum did not fulfill its original mandate.”72
The failure of the Foro was demonstrative of the unwillingness of the Cristiani government to allow open discussion of its economic policies. Neither the Cristiani administration nor the private sector favored labor’s participation in the policymaking process and made no effort to promote or sustain the Foro. According to Miguel Sáenz, “The private sector understood that it was the instrument that could start the debate, which would lead to agreements for the economic and social transformation [of the country], so it killed it.”73 Rubén Zamora called the Foro “a disaster” and suggested that the FMLN might have been naive to believe that the Foro would be able to address significant socioeconomic issues, given Cristiani’s opposition to it.74 Thus, not only was the neoliberal model off the table at the peace accords, but the one mechanism created by the peace accords to address socioeconomic issues was quickly abolished. As such, there was little if any opportunity for labor to participate in policymaking. This failure to incorporate labor into the policymaking process relegated labor to the same position that it was in before the peace accords—outside the system, gaining attention for its demands through strike activity.
The government launched the National Reconstruction Plan (PRN) in 1992 after the inclusion of recommendations from the FMLN and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The FMLN and the UNDP were critical of the PRN to the extent that project development lay largely in the hands of the government and marginalized other participants; infrastructure was given priority over other needs of the former conflict zones; and the target area of the PRN was geographically too small.75 The government responded to these criticisms by easing potential participation for NGOs, increasing the number of targeted municipalities from 84 to 115 (of a total 262), and redefining some programs to give a greater emphasis to the development of human capital over infrastructure.76 While the government changes to the PRN marked some improvement, the problem of NGO participation was never fully resolved. NGOs were required to apply to the National Reconstruction Secretariat for funding, and those associated with the Left were often excluded.77
The PRN had three main areas: investment projects (infrastructure, ex-combatant programs), technical assistance (small UNDP projects), and democratic institutions (National Civilian Police, Human Rights Ombudsman).78 Of those, investment projects received the most donor funding, giving the PRN a focus on the reconstruction of the infrastructure of the former conflict zones. The government established the Secretariat for National Reconstruction (SRN) to oversee the reconstruction process, which was designated as the distributor of funds to those projects. Additionally, the UNDP was instrumental in the reconstruction process. The UNDP, which was specifically included in the accords as a third party at the insistence of the FMLN, was responsible for the development of reinsertion and reconstruction programs.79 The government hoped to raise $800 million for the reconstruction effort, and by 1994 it had succeeded in raising more than $900 million.80
The Ministry of Planning (MIPLAN), the government agency in charge of the PRN, estimated that the war cost $1.5 billion in infrastructure alone, with a replacement cost of $1.63 billion. In addition, the 1986 earthquake caused $1.2 billion in damages.81 During the peace process, El Salvador received assurances from many countries, including the United States, that funding for reconstruction would be forthcoming. Indeed, many believed that the bulk of the funding responsibility would fall on the United States. Of the $698.9 million in external assistance from individual country