Captured Peace. Christine J. Wade
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gave the UN an entrée into El Salvador while negotiations continued. It also complicated the division’s work. There was a fundamental tension between ONUSAL’s human rights division, which was charged with monitoring and reporting abuses committed by the parties, and the UN secretary general’s office, which wanted to ensure that negotiations progressed. Should reports of violations be suppressed if they advanced the larger goal of attaining a resolution to the conflict? Would suppressing reports damage the integrity of the mission and undermine respect for human rights in the long term? On the ground, there was some sense among division staff that human rights were subservient to other aspects of the negotiations, particularly political and military concerns.35 After the ceasefire, ONUSAL’s mandate expanded to include demilitarization and demobilization, civilian policing, and elections. While this helped reduce the number of human rights violations, it also shifted emphasis to other matters. As one division official relayed to the Lawyers’ Committee, “once the other divisions arrived, it was more difficult. It was clear that human rights were no longer a priority for anyone. The government had never been interested, but now not even the UN or the FMLN were interested.”36
The National Counsel for the Defense of Human Rights (PDDH) was established in 1991. Its main function was to receive and investigate complaints of human rights abuses. While the institution had the power to make recommendations, it had no enforcement capabilities. The first national counsel, Carlos Fonseca Molina, was appointed in February 1992. Due to Fonseca’s own lack of experience in human rights advocacy and the general disinterest of the Cristiani administration, the institution got off to a slow start.37 Relations with the human rights division and human rights organizations were strained, and it was not until 1994 that the national counsel and ONUSAL began working together to strengthen the institution. The appointment of Victoria Marina Velásquez de Avilés to the PDDH in 1995 helped to transform the institution.38 Velásquez de Avilés became an outspoken defender of human rights and denounced abuses by state institutions, particularly the PNC. Public confidence in the PDDH rose considerably during her tenure, in large part due to her leadership.39 She was rewarded for her efforts with a 10 percent budget cut in 1997, which reduced the capabilities of the institution at a critical time.40
Security and Policing
The second phase of implementation was the restructuring and reduction of the armed forces, abolition of security forces, and the creation of a new civilian police force, and the demobilization of the FMLN. Within one year of the signing of the accords, the armed forces had effectively been reduced by one-half, from 63,175 to 31,000.41 Because the reduction was completed a full year ahead of schedule, some have speculated that the original number of troops had been inflated.42 The demobilization of the Rapid-Deployment Infantry Battalions (BIRIs) was delayed by three months, but the process was completed on March 31, 1993.43 The change in the armed forces was not only notable for the reduction in forces but also for the general willingness with which the military accepted its new role in Salvadoran society. Not all aspects of demilitarization went so smoothly. The UN appointed three Salvadoran civilians to the Ad Hoc Commission, a mechanism agreed to in the accords to review military records and purge human rights offenders. It was the first time that any military in Latin America had allowed an external review of its forces.44 Beginning in May 1992 the commission reviewed military-personnel files and documentation from human rights organizations, and met with members of the U.S. Defense Department and congressional and human rights groups in the United States.45 Due to the three-month time constraint, the commission was able to interview only approximately 230 officers—a mere 10 percent of all officers in the armed forces. In September 1992, the commission delivered its confidential report to President Cristiani and UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, which called for the removal of 102 officers, including Defense Minister René Emilio Ponce. Protests from the military high command led to stalling tactics by Cristiani. Despite the agreement that named officers were to be removed with sixty days, only twenty-three had been formally dismissed by January 1993.46 It required significant pressure from abroad and the release of the Truth Commission’s report to force the removal of remaining officers.47
The dissolution of internal security forces accompanied the reduction of the armed forces. The National Guard and the Treasury Police were scheduled to be dismantled by March 1992. Instead, they were renamed and incorporated directly into the armed forces.48 ONUSAL intervened in what it considered to be a violation of the accords. The security forces were officially dissolved by the end of June 1992, although there was little doubt that some members continued to function on their own. Additionally, the National Intelligence Directorate (DNI) was dissolved and replaced by a new civilian State Intelligence Organ (OIE) in June 1992.
The FMLN’s registration as a political party was dependent on certification of its demobilization. In January 1992 the Legislative Assembly passed a law on national reconciliation that permitted the return of FMLN members from abroad, including the General Command. On February 1 the FMLN began the process of establishing itself as a political party by collecting signatures and presenting them to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. By May the FMLN began to press for its legalization as a political party, going so far as to hold a rally to mark its beginnings as a political party later that month.49 On July 30, 1992, the FMLN was officially recognized by the government of El Salvador as a “political party in formation.” However, the government also submitted a request to the TSE that the FMLN not be formally recognized until it had fully demobilized. The TSE responded that the FMLN’s final registration would not be granted until ONUSAL verified its total disarmament and demobilization.50 The United Nations certified on December 15, 1992, that the FMLN had successfully disarmed and it was registered as a political party.
The FMLN’s failure to completely disarm was exposed when an arms cache belonging to the Popular Forces of Liberation (FPL) was discovered following an explosion in Managua, Nicaragua, in June 1993. In a letter to the UN secretary general, FPL leader Salvador Sánchez Cerén stated that the FPL had retained the arms only out of profound distrust for the Armed Forces of El Salvador (FAES) and had no intention of remilitarizing the conflict.51 The FMLN subsequently disclosed more than one hundred additional arms deposits in El Salvador and neighboring countries. In August 1993, ONUSAL was able to verify that all FMLN arms had been destroyed and that the FMLN no longer constituted a combatant force. Despite this transgression, the FMLN’s status as a political party was not revoked and the ceasefire was never broken.
The deployment of the new National Civil Police (PNC) began in March 1993 under the guise of ONUSAL’s police division, which was deployed in February 1992.52 Recruits for the new force were drawn from the existing police (20 percent), the FMLN (20 percent), and new recruits (60 percent), provided they met requirements laid out in the New York Agreement. Dismantling old policing structures, however, did not proceed as quickly or as cleanly as hoped. Funding shortfalls and delays in opening the new National Academy for Public Security (ANSP) resulted in the deferred deployment of the new police force.53 Although the agreements clearly stated that the National Police would be responsible for public security until its units could be replaced by the PNC, there was also the expectation that the National Police would be phased out as the PNC was deployed. Instead, the National Police training school continued to operate and graduate students, which contributed to the growth of the National Police.54 The continued functioning of the National Police deprived the PNC of vital resources. During the transition period (1992–94), the National Police received $77 million while the PNC received only $45 million and the ANSP received $22 million.55 Moreover, more than one thousand personnel from the National Guard and Treasury Police, and entire BIRI units were transferred into the National Police. In December 1992, the GOES and the FMLN agreed, without consulting the UN, to the transfer of low-ranking officers from the armed forces and other units. Known as Plan 600, the agreement provided FMLN guerrillas with benefits in a time of scare resources.56 ONUSAL complained that such transfers were “incompatible with the thrust of the accords and contravene their spirit,” which had clearly mandated the screening of PNC personnel in response to FMLN concerns about human rights records of National Police officers.57 The government justified these actions based on growing crime rates (see