A Companion to Global Gender History. Группа авторов
Читать онлайн книгу.
benefited women.
Locke's Two Treatises of Government both reflected and contributed to a developing split between public and private virtue in the minds of contemporaries. Its theoretical formulations separated civic or public authority on the one hand, and familial or private authority on the other, providing philosophical legitimation for closing down the possibilities women had to participate in political affairs. In rebutting earlier patriarchal arguments based on analogies of state and familial power, Locke distinguished between the state and the family as civic entities, relegating the family to a private sphere disconnected from politics. In separating the two, and in insisting that qualification for participation in the public political sphere rested on property ownership and independence of the control or influence of others, Locke effectively excluded women from political activity. Married women, we have seen, could not own property under common law. Moreover, even if women did own property, under an equity settlement or as femes sole, they were considered dependent upon men within the family and therefore disqualified from public life. Henceforth, in ideological terms, women would occupy the private sphere of home and family, where they could best display the moral and especially sexual virtue now expected of them; men would demonstrate virtuous behavior in the public sphere of work and politics.
The French Revolution
French revolutionaries also fashioned a story about family relationships in the process of overthrowing a patriarchal, absolute monarch and usurping his power, but they legitimated their actions in somewhat different familial imagery than did the English. Whereas English notions of social contract, at least in the writings of Locke, drew upon analogies to the relationship of husband and wife, French thinking about a new political ordering emphasized the relationship of fathers to sons, as the widely disseminated and powerful revolutionary slogan, “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity,” suggests. As we have seen in the case of England in the seventeenth century, the vast majority of the French in the eighteenth century regarded their monarch as a father who ruled over a country depicted as a large family. In order for eighteenth‐century reformers to contemplate a challenge to the theoretically unrestricted power and authority of their ruler, they would first have to imagine, consciously or unconsciously, placing restrictions on the theoretically unlimited power of fathers over their children. Indeed, as one historian has shown (Hunt, 1992), decades before the revolution broke out in 1789, novels and paintings began to show harsh, oppressive fathers in a negative light and to highlight a new kind of fatherhood in which care, concern, and affection for children prevailed. The trend toward representations of the “good father” prepared the collective psychological ground for attacking absolute monarchical authority. Just as tyrannical fathers could not be tolerated, so too must despotic kings be eliminated.
Once the revolutionaries had curbed the power of the monarch with constitutional checks on his authority, they turned to making legislation that would limit the power of fathers over their children. They established family councils that could make decisions previously enjoyed by fathers exclusively; eliminated so‐called lettres de cachet through which fathers could imprison children of any age; made inheritance equal among all children, girls and boys alike, ending the system of primogeniture that gave preeminence to the eldest son and future patriarch; and lowered the age of consent to 21 for women and 25 for men so that children might marry as they wished, free of their fathers’ control. They also gave women equal rights to divorce, but they stopped short of acknowledging them as citizens. Women, no matter what status they might enjoy, could not vote. “Fraternity” did not embrace “sorority” when it came to participation in politics and law‐making, a situation against which many women vociferously protested.
Questions about women’s place in politics intensified as the revolution became more radical after 1792 and especially in the aftermath of the execution of the king. The elimination of the father/king entirely by the “band of brothers” who ordered his death ushered in a period in which no single authority figure could be tolerated. Fathers virtually disappeared from the iconography celebrating the revolution. French republicans, unlike their American counterparts, eschewed the mantle of “founding fathers,” insisting instead upon their permanent fraternal status. But this raised the question of where women fit in and made male republicans especially anxious when women insisted on engaging in public, political activities. Seen as threatening the stability of the republic by behaving in “unnatural” ways when they ventured into the political realm, women became figures of disdain and abuse. This was especially so in the case of Marie‐Antoinette, whose trial for treason against the republic revolved around charges of sexual promiscuity and the corruption of her husband and son. Standing in for all women, the queen represented for republicans the dangers to the state of women acting politically. By putting her on trial and executing her; by repressing the societies and clubs women organized to participate in revolutionary politics; and by emphasizing the proper role of women as mothers inhabiting the domestic, private sphere of home and family, where their primary task was the education of their children in morality and virtue, the band of brothers shut down any question of “fraternity” including women and strengthened their ties to one another.
With Napoleon’s rise to power, the fraternal conception of politics lost ground to a newly conceived paternal ordering. In the representations of the Napoleonic era, brothers became fathers, presiding lovingly over domesticated wives and adored children. Women became mothers, more highly valued than in prerevolutionary iconography for the educational and moral benefits they could bestow on their children. Under the civil laws consolidated under the Napoleonic Code of 1804, which drew heavily upon the patriarchal model of ancient Rome and which were settled upon the rest of Europe by the armies of France, women became the dependents of their husbands and fathers. Men did not own their wives and children, as in earlier patriarchal regimes, but the marital power granted them by the code gave them administrative control over virtually all of women’s legal, civic, and financial affairs. The code also regulated women’s sexual activities in such a way as to criminalize female behavior that did not accord with the state’s intentions that women exist exclusively as wifely, motherly, domestic, virtuous beings. Adultery and illegitimacy, for example, on the part of women – but not of men – were punished by the state, conferring upon women – but not men – a legal accountability for private sexual acts. As one historian has noted, the Napoleonic Code made women’s virtue, now a sexual rather than a political quality, a matter of state control (Smith, 1989).
Liberalism explicitly denied women political citizenship. The potential contradiction between, on the one hand, a liberal ideology that had legitimated the dismantling of aristocratic power and authority and the enfranchisement of middle‐class, and later working‐class, men in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and, on the other, the denial of the claims of women to full citizenship was resolved by appeals to biological and characterological differences between the sexes. New definitions of femininity evolved whose qualities were antithetical to those that had warranted widespread male participation in the public sphere. Men possessed the capacity for reason, action, aggression, independence, and self‐interest. Women inhabited a separate, private, domestic sphere, one suitable for the so‐called inherent qualities of femininity: emotion, passivity, submission, dependence, and selflessness. These notions had been extant in political thought for centuries, extending as far back as Aristotle, but a new explanation for women’s incapacities and legal and political disabilities emerged: all derived, it was claimed insistently, from women's sexual and reproductive organization. Upon the female as a biological entity, a sexed body, nineteenth‐century theorists imposed a socially and culturally constructed femininity, a gender identity derived from ideas about what roles were appropriate for women. This collapsing of sex and gender – of the physiological organism with the normative social creation – made it possible for women to be construed as at once pure and purely sexual; although paradoxical, these definitions excluded women from participation in the public sphere and rendered them subordinate to men in the private sphere as well (Kent, 1987).
Under the law of coverture, married women had no rights or existence apart from their husbands. “By marriage,” wrote the English jurist Sir William Blackstone, “the very being or legal existence of a woman is suspended, or at least