The Story of the Great War (Vol. 1-8). Various Authors
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the Anglo-Russian arrangement of 1907, of which we shall hear more when considering the histories of the three countries directly involved. Whether or not the German claim that these agreements were concluded with the ulterior motives of isolating and then crushing Germany and her allies had foundations, is of little importance. For the fact remains that they were considered in this light, not only by Germany's diplomats, but by the nation at large, and ever after Germany's foreign policy was based on this consideration.
Even before England had actually come to a definite understanding with Russia, the first test was put to the new line-up of the European powers. In 1905 trouble arose about the extension of French influence in North Africa. Although a general European war seemed more possible at that time than at any other time within recent years, it was averted as a result of the so-called Algeciras Conference. In this first inning Germany won together with Italy and Austria against France, backed by Russia and England, and the result was the declaration of Morocco's integrity.
Europe in Twelfth Century, Historical Map.
During the next decade the foreign policy of Germany showed the same chief characteristic that was noticeable in that of the other countries—high tension. One is almost tempted to compare this period of Europe's history to the hours immediately preceding a violent electrical storm. The diplomatic atmosphere was surcharged with electricity, and long before the storm really broke the growl of distant thunder could be heard and occasional flashes of lightning announced its approach. That, in spite of all signs, so many people firmly believed that the storm would never break, is easily explained with the innate optimism of mankind, and is on a par with the spirit of unbelief in unpleasant things that makes people go out unprepared for rain, as long as rain only threatens, but does not actually fall.
In 1911, Morocco again almost became the stumblingblock. In that year France annexed this north African country in spite of the agreement that had been reached at Algeciras. Germany immediately entered a strong protest, which, however, was later withdrawn in consideration of certain commercial privileges in connection with the development of the country, and the cession of territory in central Africa. Once more war had been avoided.
This period also saw numerous upheavals in the Balkans. Throughout these Germany made it clear that it would permit nothing in that part of the world which would work out to the disadvantage of its ally—Austria.
In spite of temporary reduction in the tension existing between Germany on the one hand, and England, France, and Russia respectively on the other, the differences between these countries became more marked, diplomatic clashes more frequent, and their mutual suspicion of each other more pronounced. England especially resented the ambitious naval program of Germany, which seriously threatened British supremacy on the sea and forced England to tremendous expenditures to maintain its overwhelming naval strength. France was menaced by Germany's increase in the peace strength of its army, which was accomplished in 1913 by means of special taxation known as the "Wehrbeitrag."
The German-French relations were influenced considerably, not only by French colonial policy, but also by conditions in Alsace-Lorraine. We have already heard of the French attitude in regard to these so-called "lost provinces." Right after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71, and for a considerable period afterward, the desire for restitution and the demand for the reconquest of the lost territory undoubtedly was as sincere as it was widespread among the French nation. It is, however, no less true that these sentiments decreased in fervor, and most likely would have subsided entirely if they would have been permitted to take their natural course. Instead of this, this question gradually became a political issue of the first magnitude, and now one political party and then another would use it for its own purposes. It was thus that the French-German animosity was kept alive and nurtured. On the German side the more or less uncompromising attitude toward all things French as far as Alsace-Lorraine was officially claimed to be a matter of political necessity. At any rate it gave continual opportunities to French politicians to make capital out of the conditions as they existed in Alsace-Lorraine. One of the most severe outbreaks of anti-German and antimilitary feeling in that part of the German Empire happened in December, 1913, in the small Alsatian garrison town of Zabern, when some Alsatians of French antecedents and sympathizers were wounded in a clash with German officers and soldiers. Unimportant as this affair was, in a way, it resulted in a great deal of very pointed and unfriendly comment in the French press, and undoubtedly added fuel to the fire of Franco-German animosity which was burning even then stronger than it had done for many years.
In 1908, near the end of Prince von Bülow's incumbency of the chancellorship, his position became very difficult, because of the general disapproval on the part of the nation of the German emperor's custom to make long speeches concerning foreign affairs. Some of these speeches caused a considerable amount of offense in foreign capitals, and, while this matter, too, may be considered a minor detail in Germany's relations with foreign powers, it had at the same time some influence. Throughout this period the chancellor was supported by a combination of the National-Liberal and Conservative parties. But in 1909 the continuation of this combination became impossible on account of the divergence of opinion existing between these two parties in regard to the Government's financial reforms. The National-Liberal as well as the Social-Democrat and other radical members of the Finance Committee withdrew, and the Conservatives formed a new combination with the Center party. This new majority, however, made so many changes in the original Government bill, and forced through measures which the chancellor so thoroughly disapproved, that he handed his resignation to the emperor. It was not accepted right away, but upon his continued insistence, he finally was permitted to resign in July. His successor was Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, up to then Minister of the Interior of Prussia, a member of an old patrician house with strong National-Liberal tendencies.
In 1910 the Far Eastern problem again became acute. Russia, Japan, and England, of course, were most vitally interested in the future of China. Both France and Germany, too, had important commercial interests. For a time it looked as if these great powers would clash about the Chinese question, which each wished to solve in such a manner that the greatest possible advantage and gain would come to itself and none or the least possible to the others. However, in 1910 the United States proposed that the Manchurian railway, just then the principal issue, be financed by an international syndicate, reasserting, thereby, its previous stand for an "open-door" policy in China. Germany supported this attitude, and undoubtedly did not make through this action any friendships among the other powers.
In May, 1911, the Reichstag, after long discussion, accepted a bill giving a separate constitution to Alsace-Lorraine, making, thereby, this territory more equal to the other parts of the German Empire. This action, of course, was welcomed by the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, and was a long step toward reconciling them sometime to the German overlordship. In the same degree in which it accomplished this it caused displeasure in France, where, by this time, every success in the Germanizing of the "lost provinces" was viewed naturally with almost as much disapproval as the original occupation.
It was in the same year, 1911, that the Morocco difficulties arose again with France, as we have already seen, but in spite of the appearance of a German gunboat at the port of Agadir and the threatening attitude of Germany, matters were finally settled amicably. The terms of the settlement, however, pleased neither the German nor the French nation at large, and a considerable feeling of enmity remained.
Late that year, 1911, a determined campaign was started by the German Navy League in an effort to bring about an increase of Germany's naval forces through the force of public opinion. This activity, which met with considerable success, was viewed with alarm and displeasure in England. These sentiments grew and spread to France when in the spring of 1912 the newly elected Reichstag adopted a bill carrying greatly increased expenditures for both army and navy.
In the summer of 1912 the Balkan question, which is treated in detail in a separate chapter, assumed threatening proportions. Germany as well as the other great powers, however, at that time managed to find a common basis and kept all from active participation in the two Balkan wars, restricting their activities to the exertion of their various influences for as just a settlement as was possible under the circumstances when the time