The Long Nineteenth Century: A History of Europe from 1789 to 1918. Charles Downer Hazen
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such a text was extremely useful they believed. And the reason why they believed this was that they had a profound faith in the power of truth, of reason. This was, as Michelet pointed out long ago, the essential originality of the Constituent Assembly, this "singular faith in the power of ideas," this firm belief that "once formed and formulated in law the truth was invincible." These political dogmas seemed to the members of the Assembly so true that they thought they had only to proclaim them to insure their efficiency in the actual conduct of governments. These men believed that they were inaugurating a new phase in the history of humanity, that, by solemnly formulating the creed of the future, they were rendering an inestimable service, not to France alone but to the world. Though America had set an example, it was felt that France could 'perfect' it for the other hemisphere and that the new declaration might perhaps have the advantage over the other of making "a loftier appeal to reason and of clothing her in a purer language."
The seventeen articles of this creed asserted that men are free and equal, that the people are sovereign, that law is an expression of the popular will, and that in the making of it the people may participate, either directly, or indirectly through their representatives, and that all officials possess only that authority which has been definitely given them by law. All those liberties of the person, of free speech, free assembly, justice administered by one's peers, which had been worked out in England and America were asserted. These principles were the opposite of those of the Old Regime. If incorporated in laws and institutions they meant the permanent abolition of that system.
As a matter of fact the expectation that the Declaration would constitute a new evangel for the world has not proved so great an exaggeration as the optimism of its authors and the pessimism of its critics would prompt one to think. When men wish anywhere to recall the rights of man it is this French document that they have in mind. The Declaration long ago passed beyond the frontiers of France. It has been studied, copied, or denounced nearly everywhere. It has been an influence of indisputable factor in the political and social evolution or modern Europe. During the past century, whenever a nation has aspired to liberty, it has sought its principles in the Declaration. "It has found there," says a recent writer, "five or six formulas as trenchant as mathematical propositions, true as the truth itself, intoxicating as a vision of the absolute."
The Declaration was, of course, only an ideal, a goal toward which society should aim, not a fulfilment. It was a list of principles, not the realization of those principles. It was a declaration of rights, not a guarantee of rights. The problem of how to guarantee what was so succinctly declared has filled more than a century of French history, and is still incompletely solved. We shall now see how far the Assembly which drafted this Declaration was willing or able to go in applying its principles in the constitution, of which it was the preamble.
The constitution was only slowly elaborated. Some of its more fundamental articles were adopted in 1789. But numerous laws were passed in 1790 and 1791, which were really parts of the the new constitution. Thus it grew piece by piece. Finally all this legislation was revised, retouched, and codified into a single document, which was accepted by the King in 1791. Though sometimes called the Constitution of 1789, it is more generally and more correctly known as the Constitution of 1791. It was the first written constitution France had ever had. Framed under very different conditions from those under which the constitution of the United States had been framed only a short time before, it resembled the work of the Philadelphia Convention in that it was conspicuously the product of the spirit of compromise. With the exception of the vigorous assertions of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, which was prefixed to it, the document was marked by as great a moderation as was consistent with the comprehensive changes that were demanded by the overwhelming public opinion, as represented in the cahiers. It is permeated through and through with two principles, the sovereignty of the people, all governmental powers issuing from their consent and will, and the separation of the powers sharply from each other, of the executive, the legislative, and the judicial branches, a division greatly emphasized by Montesquieu as the sole method of insuring liberty.
The form of government was to be monarchical. This was in conformity with the wishes of the people as expressed in the cahiers, and with the feelings of the Constituent Assembly. But whereas formerly the king had been an absolute, henceforth he was to be a limited, a constitutional ruler. Indicative of the profound difference between these two conceptions, his former title, King of France and of Navarre, now gave way to that of King of the French. Whereas formerly he had taken what he chose out of the national treasury for his personal use, now he was to receive a salary or civil list of the definite amount and no more of 25,000,000 francs. He was to appoint the ministers or heads of the cabinet departments, but he was forbidden to select members of the legislature for such positions. The English system of parliamentary government was deliberately avoided because it was believed to be vicious in that ministers could bribe or influence the members of Parliament to do their will, which might not at all be the will of the people. Ministers were not even to be permitted to come before the legislature to defend or explain their policies.
A departure from the principle of the separation of powers, in general so closely followed, was shown in the granting of the veto power to the king. The king, who had hitherto made the laws, was now deprived on the law-making power, but he could prevent the immediate enforcement of an act passed by the legislature. There was much discussion over this subject in the Assembly. Some were opposed to any kind of a veto; others wanted one that should be absolute and final. The Assembly compromised and granted the king a suspensive veto, that is, he might prevent the application of a law voted by two successive legislatures, namely, for a possible period of four years. If the third legislature should indicate its approval of the law in question, then it was to be put into operation whether the king assented or not.
The king was to retain the conduct of foreign affairs. He was to appoint and receive ambassadors, was to be the head of the navy and army, and was to appoint to higher offices. The Assembly at first thought of leaving him the right to make peace and war, then, fearing that he might drag the nation into a war for personal or dynastic and not national purposes, it decided that he might propose peace or war, but that the legislature should decide upon it.
The legislative power was given by the Constitution of 1791 to a single assembly of 745 members, to be elected for a term of two years.
Several of the deputies desired a legislature of two chambers, and cited the example of England and America. But the second chamber in England was the House of Lords, and the French, who had abolished the nobility, had no desire to establish an hereditary chamber. Moreover the English system was based on the principle of inequality. The French were founding new system upon the principle of equality. Even among the nobles themselves there was opposition to a second chamber the provincial nobility fearing that only the court nobles would be members of it. On the other hand, the Senate of the United States was a concession to the states-rights feeling, a feeling which the French wished to destroy by abolishing the provinces and the local provincial patriotism, by thoroughly unifying France. Thus the plan of dividing the legislature into two chambers was chamber deliberately rejected, for what seemed good and sufficient reasons.
How was this legislature to be chosen? Here we find a decided departure from the spirit and the letter of the Declaration, which had asserted that all men are equal in rights. Did not this mean universal suffrage? Such at least was not the opinion of the Constituent Assembly, which now made a distinction between citizens, declaring some active, some passive. To be considered an active citizen one must be at least twenty-five years of age and must pay annually in direct taxes the equivalent of three days' wages. This excluded the poor from this class, and the number was large. It has been estimated that there were somewhat over 4,000,000 active citizens and about 3,000,000 passive.
The active citizens alone had the right to vote. But even they did not vote directly for the members of the legislature. They chose electors at the ratio of one for every 100 active citizens. These electors must meet a much higher property qualification, the equivalent of from 150 to 200 days' wages in direct taxes. As a matter of fact this resulted in rendering eligible as electors only directly by about 43,000 individuals. These electors chose the members of the legislature, the deputies. They also chose the judges under the new system. Thus the Constituent Assembly, so zealous in abolishing old privileges, was, in defiance of its own principles, establishing