The Long Nineteenth Century: A History of Europe from 1789 to 1918. Charles Downer Hazen
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new ones. Political rights in the new state were made the monopoly of those who possessed a certain amount of property. There was no property qualification required for deputies. Any active citizen was eligible, but as the deputies were elected by the propertied men, they would in all probability choose only propertied men - the electors would choose from their own class.
The judicial power was completely revolutionized. Hitherto judges had bought their positions, which carried with them titles and privileges and which they might pass on to their sons. Henceforth all judges, of whatever rank in the hierarchy, were to be elected by the electors described above. Their terms were to range from two to four years. The jury, something hitherto absolutely unknown to modern France, was now introduced for criminal cases. Hitherto the judge had decided all cases.
For purposes of administration and local government a new system was established. The old thirty-two provinces were abolished and France was divided into eighty-three departments of nearly uniform size. The departments were divided into arrondissements, these into cantons, and these into municipalities or communes. These are terms which have ever since been in vogue.
France, from being a highly centralized state, became highly decentralized. Whereas formerly the central government was represented in each province by its own agents or office-holders, the intendants and their subordinates, in the departments of the future the central government was to have no representatives. The electors, described above, were to choose the local departmental officials. It would be the business of these officials to carry out the decrees of the central government. But what if they should disobey? The central government would have no control over them, as it would not appoint them and could neither remove nor discipline them.
The Constitution of 1791 represented an improvement in French government; yet it did not work well and did not last long. As a first experiment in the art of self-government it had its value, but it revealed inexperience and poor judgment in several points which prepared trouble for the future. The executive and the legislature were so sharply separated that communication between them was difficult and suspicion was consequently easily fostered. The king might not select his ministers from the legislature, he might not, in case of a difference of opinion with the legislature, dissolve the latter, as the English king could do, thus allowing the voters to decide between them. The king's veto was not a weapon strong enough to protect him from the attacks of the legislature, yet it was enough to irritate the legislature, if used. The distinction between active and passive citizens was in plain and flagrant defiance of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, and inevitably created a discontented class. The administrative decentralization was so complete that the efficiency of the national government was gone. France was split up into eighty-three fragments and the coordination of all these units, their central direction toward great national ends in response to the will of the nation as a whole, was rendered extremely difficult, and in certain crises impossible.
The work of reform carried out by the Constituent Assembly was on an enormous scale, immensely more extensive than that of our U. S. Federal Convention. We search history in vain for any companion piece. It is unique. Its destructive work proved durable and most important. Much of its constructive work, however, proved very fragile. Mirabeau expressed his opinion in saying that "The disorganization of the kingdom could not be better worked out."
There were other dangerous features of the situation which inspired alarm and seemed to keep open and to embitter the .relations of various classes and to foster opportunities for the discontented and the ambitious. The legislation concerning the Church proved highly divisive in its effects. It began with the the confiscation of its property; it was continued in the attempt profoundly to alter its organization.
The States-General had been summoned to provide for the finances of the country. As the problem grew daily more pressing, as various attempts to meet it proved futile, as bankruptcy was imminent, the Assembly finally decided to sell for the state the vast properties of the Church. The argument was that the Church was not the owner but was merely the administrator, enjoying only the use of the vast wealth which had been bestowed upon it by the faithful, but bestowed for public, national purposes, namely, the maintenance of houses of worship, schools, hospitals; and that if the state would otherwise provide for the carrying out of the intentions of these numerous benefactors, it might apply the property, which was the property of the nation, not of the Church as a corporation, to whatever uses it might see fit. Acting on this theory a decree was passed by the of the Assembly declaring these lands national. They constituted perhaps a fourth or a fifth of the territory of France and national represented immense wealth, amply sufficient, it was believed, to set the public finances right.
But such property could only be used if converted into money and that would be a slow process, running through years. The expedient was devised of issuing paper money, as the government needed it, against this property as security. This paper money bore the name of assignats. Persons receiving such assignats could not demand gold for them, as in the case of most of our paper money, but could use them in buying these lands. There was value, therefore, behind these paper emissions. The danger in the use of paper money, however, always is the inclination, so easy to yield to, to issue far more paper than the value of the property behind it. This proved a temptation which the revolutionary assemblies did not have strength of mind or will to resist. At first the assignats were issued in limited quantities as the state needed the money, and the public willingly accepted them. But later larger and larger emissions were made, far out of proportion to the value of the national domains. This depreciation meant the rapid depreciation of the paper. People would not accept it at its face value, as they had at first been willing to do. The value of the Church property was estimated in 1789 as 4,000,000,000 francs. Between 1789 and 1796 over 45,000,000,000 of assignats were issued. In 1789 an assignat of 100 francs was accepted for 100 francs in coin. But by 1791 it had sunk from par to 82, and by 1796 to less than a franc. This was neither an honest nor an effective solution of the perplexing financial problem. It was evasion, it was in its essence repudiation. The Constituent Assembly did nothing toward solving the problem that had occasioned its meeting. It left the national finances in a worse welter than it had found them in.
Another piece of legislation concerning the Church, much more serious in its effects upon the cause of reform, was the Civil Constitution of the Clergy. By act of the Assembly the number of dioceses was reduced from 134 to 83, one for each department. The bishops and priests were henceforth to be elected by the same persons who elected the departmental officials. Once elected, the bishops were to announce the fact to the Pope who was not to have the right to approve or disapprove but merely to confirm. He was, then, to recognize them. If he refused, the ordinary courts could be invoked. The clergy were to receive salaries from the state, were, in other words to become state officials. The income of most of the bishops would be greatly reduced, that of the parish priests, on the other hand, would be considerably increased.
This law was not acceptable to sincere Catholics, since it altered by act of politicians an organization that had hitherto been controlled absolutely from within. Bishops and priests were to be elected like other officials - that is Protestants, Jews, free thinkers might participate in choosing the religious functionaries of the Catholic Church. Judges, who might, perhaps, be infidels, might yet play a decisive part. The Pope was practically ignored. His nominal headship was not questioned. His real power was largely destroyed. He would be informed of what was happening; his approval would not be necessary.
The Assembly voted that all clergymen must take an oath to support this Civil Constitution of the Clergy. Only four of the 134 bishops consented to do so. Perhaps a third of the parish priests consented. Those who consented were called the juring, those who refused, the non-juring or refractory clergy. In due time elections were held as provided by the law and those elected were called the constitutional clergy. France witnessed the spectacle of two bodies of priests, one non- juring, chosen in the old way, the other elected by the voters indirectly. The scandal was great and the danger appalling, for religious discord was introduced into every city and hamlet. Faith supported the one body, the state supported the other and the state embarked upon a long, gloomy, and unsuccessful struggle to impose its will in a sphere where it did not belong.
Most fatal were the consequences. One was that it made the position of Louis XVI, a sincere Catholic, far more difficult and exposed him to the charge