The Radical Right During Crisis. Группа авторов
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5 Daniel Dombey, “Spain’s Parliament Votes to Extend Lockdown Powers,” Financial Times, May 6, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/f4586bf4-3cf5-4272-a472-eee985bc3e34.
6 Rassemblement national, Le Livre noir du Coronavirus, (Paris, 2020), https://rassemblement-national15.fr/2020/07/telechargez-le-livre-noir-du-coronavirus.
7 “Italy: Police Halt Forza Nuova Members for Defying Lockdown in Rome,” Ruptly TV, April 20, 2020, https://www.ruptly.tv/en/videos/20200412-018-Italy-Police-halt-Forza-Nuova-members-for-defying-lockdown-in-Romehttps://www.ruptly.tv/en/videos/20200412-018-Italy-Police-halt-Forza-Nuova-members-for-defying-lockdown-in-Rome.
8 Koloman Brenner, “Jobbik Stands for Freedom of the Press,” Press release https://www.jobbik.com/jobbik_stands_for_the_freedom_of_the_press.
9 “Leader of French Far-Right Says Government Lied, Concealed COVID Railures,” Radio France Internationale, July 29, 2020, https://www.rfi.fr/en/france/20200729-leader-of-french-far-right-says-government-lied-concealed-covid-failures-marine-le-pen-macron.
10 Hannah Roberts, “Salvini Occupies Italian Parliament in Lockdown Protest,” Politico, April 30, 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/matteo-salvini-coronavirus-occupies-italian-parliament-in-lockdown-protest/.
11 Hans-Georg Betz, “COVID-19 is a Wake-Up Call on the Shortcomings of Globalization,” Fair Observer, April 23, 2020, https://www.fairobserver.com/business/hans-georg-betz-covid-19-wake-up-call-globalization-supply-chains-disruption-trade-news-15141/.
12 Thierry Baudet, “The nation-state is the future, not the EU empire. The borders of nation states should be defined by referenda,” Twitter, October 1, 2017, 1:26 p.m., https://twiter.com/thierrybaudet/status/914451426159529985.
Quo Vadis, Europe? Coping with Old and New Crises
Ruth Wodak
Displeasure with “the EU” is increasing, clearly audible among acquaintances, friends, in the media, commentators as well as among some politicians. Where is the EU in the so-called “refugee question”, i.e. “migration-crisis”?1 Why doesn’t the EU quickly help the countries particularly affected by the COVID-19 crisis? Why doesn’t the EU intervene when fundamental rights are violated, for example in Hungary or Poland?2 And so on, and so forth. We read and hear many questions. A lot of anger, rage and dissatisfaction are coming to light. And far too few differentiated and fact-based answers.
Without a doubt, Commission President Ursula van der Leyen could have spoken out louder and faster on some acute problems in respect to the global pandemic, immediately in February/March 2020. After all, the COVID-19 crisis is not the first—and certainly won’t be the last—crisis faced by the EU.3 However, if one analyses in detail the discourses on earlier national, European or global crises since the EU or EEC came into existence—such as during the Cold War (Hungary 1956, CSSR 1968, Poland 1981) or in relation to the consequences of 9/11, the bank crash and the financial crisis of 2008 or the global refugee movement in 2015/16—it becomes clear that the perspectives of individual nation states dominate,4 and that even traditional ideological conflicts (between left and right, for example) have been marginalized. ‘Has the corona virus brought back the nation state?’ asks political scientist Jan Zielonka5 in a contribution to the platform Social Europe.
In most cases, the situation was similar as in the elections to the European Parliament—incidentally, this is the only possibility of formal political participation left to us as European citizens. Characteristically, these elections are used as a battleground for political conflicts inside individual members states, rather than an opportunity for choosing specific programmes or directions in which to develop the European Union and which the European Parliament would actually be able to influence. National interests have therefore not just begun to determine the possibilities of the EU; rather, the contradiction between transnational institutions and nation states has always been inherent in the conception of the EU.
Obviously, few people really know about the highly complex network of institutions and decision-making bodies/processes.6 Few also seem to be aware that the heads of government have the final say in European Council decisions and that—in some cases—a single veto can block decisions at any time, be it on the budget, on sanctions against a member state that has violated a treaty, or on the coordination of the distribution of refugees. And even if and when, as we have learned, decisions are finally taken (such as on the distribution of refugees by quota), the EU is powerless to force member states to implement them. In the spring of 2020, we again had to witness massive populist agitation against fugitives and the fixation of related debates on “borders and walls”, where desperate people are to be stopped at all costs.7 This distracts attention away from the causes of such tragedies, from the human rights violations of refusing asylum, and from the European Union’s inability to deal with a problem that is small in relation to its size and wealth.
For example, it was only during the COVID-19 crisis that many EU citizens realized that health is a national agenda.8 Asylum and migration policies are also the responsibility of nation states. The responsibility for the success or failure of the respective health and migration policies9 therefore lies with the member states, not with the Commission, which can only make recommendations. Moreover, in April 2020, we were able to observe that initiatives such as the new “Marshall Plan” proposed by the Commission—being an important and effective measure to protect the economy, especially of increasingly indebted states, from collapse due to the COVID-19 crisis—are welcomed in solidarity by some states and rejected by others (especially Austria, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands). In addition, the letter expressing outrage at Viktor Orbán’s abrogation10 of the Hungarian Parliament was not supported by all EU member states; among those who did not support this important initiative, incidentally, we also find Austria!
This confirms a view held by political scientist Jan-Werner Müller:11 that in no country in Western Europe or North America has a right-wing populist/far-right populist12 leader managed to get into office without help. This always required conservative collaborators from the establishment. Similarly, political scientist Cas Mudde13 notes that mainstream conservative parties are now openly discussing ‘immigration and multiculturalism as a threat to national identity and security’. It is thus legitimate to state that the “political centre” has moved to the right. In other words, right-wing populist agendas have been normalized.