The Whole Duty of Man, According to the Law of Nature. Samuel Pufendorf
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of our Superior is founded; by which we are convinced, that had we nothing to fear from him, yet we ought to conform our Actions to his Will. For he that can give me no other Reason for putting me under an Obligation against my Will, beside this, that he’s too strong for me, he truly may so terrifie me, that I may think it better to obey him for a while than suffer a greater Evil: but when this Fear is over, nothing any longer hinders, but that I may act after my own Choice and not his. On the contrary, he that has nothing but Arguments to prove that I should obey him, but wants Power to do me any Mischief, if I deny: I may with Impunity slight his Commands, except one more potent take upon him to make good his despis’d Authority. Now the Reasons upon which one Man may justly exact Subjection from another, are two:6 First, if he have been to the other the Original of some extraordinary Good; and if it be plain, that he designs the others Welfare, and is able to provide better for him than ’tis possible for himself to do; and on the same Account does actually lay claim to the Government of him: Secondly, if any one does voluntarily surrender his Liberty to another, and subject himself to his Direction.
VI. The Legislator and the true meaning of the Law to be known. L. N. N. l. 1. c. 6. §14.
Farthermore, that a Law may exert its Force in the Minds of those to whom it is promulged, it is requir’d, that both the Legislator and the Law also be known. For no Man can pay Obedience, if he know not whom he is to obey, and what he is to perform. Now the Knowledge of the Legislator is very easy; because from the Light of Reason ’tis certain the same must be the Author of all the Laws of Nature, who was the Creator of the Universe: Nor can any Man in Civil Society be ignorant who it is that has Power over him.7 Then for the Laws of Nature, it shall be hereafter declar’d how we come to the Knowledge of them. And as to the Laws of a Man’s Country or City, the Subject has notice given of them by a Publication plainly and openly made. In which these two Things ought to be ascertain’d, that the Author of the Law is he, who hath the Supreme Authority in the Community; and that this or that is the true Meaning of the Law. The First of these is known, if he shall promulge the Law with his own Mouth, or deliver it under his own Hand; or else if the same be done by such as are delegated to that purpose by him, whose Authority there is no Reason to call in question, if it be manifest, that such their acting belongs to that Office they bear in the Publick, and that they are regularly placed in the Administration thereof; if these Laws are brought in use at judicial Proceedings, and if they contain nothing derogatory to the Sovereign’s Power. That the Latter, that is, the true Sense of the Law may be known, it is the Duty of those who promulge it, in so doing to use the greatest Perspicuity and Plainness; and if any thing obscure do occur therein, an Explanation is to be sought of the Legislator, or of those who are publickly constituted to give judgment according to the Laws.
VII. Two parts of a perfect Law. L. N. N. l. 1. c. 6. §14.
Of every perfect Law there are two Parts: One, [Precept] whereby it is directed what is to be done or omitted: the other, [the Sanction] wherein is declared what Punishment he shall incur, who neglects to do what is commanded, or attempts that which is prohibited. For as through the Pravity of Human Nature ever inclining to things forbidden, it is to no purpose to say, Do this, if no Punishment shall be undergone by him who disobeys; so it were absurd to say, You shall be punish’d, except some Cause preceeded, by which a Punishment was deserv’d. Thus then all the force of a Law consists in signifying what the Superior requires or forbids to be done, and what Punishment shall be inflicted upon the Violators. But the Power of obliging, that is, of imposing an intrinsick Necessity; and the Power of forcing, or, by the proposal of Punishments compelling the Observation of Laws, is properly in the Legislator, and in him to whom the Guardianship and Execution of the Laws is committed.
VIII. It ought to command things possible and beneficial.
Whatsoever is enjoyn’d by any Law, ought not only to be in the Power of him to perform on whom the Injunction is laid, but it ought to contain somewhat advantagious either to him or others. For as it would be absurd and cruel to exact the doing of any thing from another, under a Penalty, which it is and always was beyond his Power to perform; so it would be silly and to no purpose to put a Restraint upon the natural Liberty of the Will of any man, if no one shall receive any Benefit therefrom.
IX. Power of Dispensing. L. N. N. l. 1. c. 6 §17.
But though a Law does strictly include all the Subjects of the Legislator who are concern’d in the Matter of the same, and whom the same Legislator at first intended not to be exempted: yet sometimes it happens that particular persons may be clear’d of any obligation to such Law: and this is call’d Dispensing. But as he only may dispense, in whose Power it is to make and abrogate the Law; *so great Care is to be taken, lest by too frequent Dispensations, and such as are granted without very weighty Reasons, the Authority of the Law be shaken, and occasion be given of Envy and Animosities among Subjects.
X. Equity. L. N. N. l. 5. c. 2. §21.
Yet there is a great Difference between Equity and Dispensing: Equity being a Correction of that in which the Law, by reason of its General Comprehension, was deficient: or an apt Interpretation of the Law, by which it is demonstrated, that there may be some peculiar Case which is not compriz’d in the Universal Law, because if it were, some Absurdity would follow. For it being impossible that all Cases, by Reason of their infinite Variety, should be either foreseen or explicitly provided for; therefore the Judges, whose Office it is to apply the general Rules of the Laws to special Cases, ought to except such from the Influence of them, *as the Lawgiver himself would have excepted if he were present, or had foreseen such Cases.
XI. Actions allowable, good and bad. L. N. N. l. 1. c. 7. §1.
Now the Actions of Men obtain certain Qualities and Denominations from their relation to and agreement with the Law of Morality. And all those Actions, concerning which the Law has determin’d nothing on either side, are call’d allowable, [indifferent] or permitted. Here we may observe, that in Civil Life, where it is impossible to come to perfect Exactness in all points, even †those things are said to be allowable, upon which the Law has not assign’d some Punishment, though they are in themselves repugnant to Natural Honesty. We call those Actions which are consonant to the Law good, and those that are contrary to it bad: But that any Action should be good, ’tis requisite, that it be exactly agreeable in every ‡point to the Law; whereas it may be evil if it be deficient in one Point only.
XII. Justice of Persons. L. N. N. l. 1. c. 7. §6.
As for Justice, it is sometimes the Attribute of Actions, sometimes of Persons. When it is attributed to Persons, ’tis usually defin’d to be, A constant and perpetual Desire of giving every one their own.8 For he is called a just Man, who is delighted in doing righteous Things, who studies Justice, and in all his Actions endeavours to do that which is right. On the other side, the unjust Man is he that neglects the giving every Man his own, or, if he does, ’tis not because ’tis due, but from expectation of Advantage to himself. So that a just Man may sometimes do unjust Things, and an unjust Man that which is just. But the Just does that which is right, because he is so commanded by the Law; and never commits any unjust Acts but only through Infirmity; whereas the wicked Man does a just Thing for fear of the Punishment which is the Sanction of the Command, but such unjust Acts as he commits proceed from the Naughtiness of his Heart.
XIII. Of Actions. L. N. N. l. 1. c. 7. §7.
But the Justice of Actions not only consists in their due Conformity to Law, but it includes in it likewise a right Application of them to those Persons to whom the Action is perform’d: So that we apprehend that Action to be just, which, with full Design and Intention, is apply’d to the Person to whom it is due. Herein therefore, the Justice of Actions differs from their Goodness chiefly, that the latter simply denotes an Agreement with the Law; whereas Justice also includes the Regard they have to those *Persons upon whom they are exercised. Upon which Account Justice is call’d a Relative Virtue.
XIV. Division of Justice. L. N. N. l. 1. c. 7. §8.
Men do not generally agree about the Division of Justice. The most receiv’d Distinction is, into Universal and Particular. The first is, when every Duty is practised and all right done to others, *even that