The Whole Duty of Man, According to the Law of Nature. Samuel Pufendorf
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are set as it were beside themselves, and seem to have put on another Nature, than that which they were of, when sober. But as this does not always take away the whole Use of Reason; so, as far as the Person does willingly put himself in this State, it is apt to procure an Abhorrence rather than a favourable Interpretation of what is done by its Impulse.
XVI. Actions Involuntary, mixt. L. N. N. l. 1. c. 4. §11.
Now of Human Actions, as those are call’d Voluntary, which proceed from, and are directed by the Will; so if any thing be done wittingly, altogether against the Will, these are call’d Involuntary, taking the Word in the narrowest sense; for taking it in the largest, it comprehends even those which are done through Ignorance. But Involuntary in this place is to signifie the same as forc’d; that is, when by an external Power which is stronger, a Man is compell’d to use his Members in any Action, to which he yet signifies his Dissent and Aversion by Signs, and particularly by counterstriving with his Body. Less properly those Actions are also called Involuntary, which by the Imposition of a great Necessity are chosen to be done, as the lesser Evil; and for the Acting whereof the Person had the greatest Abomination, had he not been set under such Necessity. These Actions therefore are call’d Mixt. With Voluntary Actions they have this in common, that in the present State of Things the Will chuses them as the lesser Evil. With the Involuntary they are after a sort the same, as to the Effect, because they render the Agent either not at all, or not so heinously blameable, as if they had been done spontaneously.
XVII. Voluntary Actions imputable. L. N. N. l. 1. c. 5. §5.
Those Human Actions then which proceed from, and are directed by the Understanding and the Will, have particularly this natural Propriety, *that they may be imputed to the Doer; that is, that a Man may justly be said to be the Author of them, and be oblig’d to render an Account of such his Doing; and the Consequences thereof, whether good or bad, are chargeable upon him. For there can be no truer Reason why any Action should be imputable to a Man, than that he did it either mediately or immediately knowingly and willingly; or that it was in his Power to have done the same or to have let it alone. Hence it obtains as the prime Axiom in Matters of Morality which are liable to the Human Forum: That every Man is accountable for all such Actions, the Performance or Omission of which were in his own Choice. Or, which is tantamount, That every Action that lies within a Man’s Power to perform or omit, is chargeable upon him who might or might not have done it. So on the contrary, no Man can be reputed the Author of that Action, which neither in it self nor in its cause, was in his Power.
XVIII. Conclusions from the Premisses.
From these Premisses we shall deduce some particular Propositions, by which shall be ascertain’d, what every Man ought to be accountable for; or, in other Words, which are those Actions and Consequences of which any one is to be charged as Author.
The first Conclusion. L. N. N. l. 1. c. 5. §6.
None of those Actions which are done by another Man, nor any Operation of whatsoever other things; neither any Accident, can be imputable to any Person, but so far forth as it was in his Power, or as he was oblig’d to guide such Action. For nothing is more common in the World, than to subject the Doings of one Man to the Manage and Direction of another. Here then, if any thing be perpetrated by one, which had not been done, if the other had performed his Duty and exerted his Power; this Action shall not only be chargeable upon him who immediately did the Fact, but upon the other also who neglected to make use of his Authority and Power. And yet this is to be understood with some restriction; so as that Possibility may be taken morally, and in a large Sense. For no Subjection can be so strict, as to extinguish all manner of Liberty in the Person subjected; but so, that ’twill be in his Power to resist and act quite contrary to the Direction of his Superior; neither will the State of Human Nature bear, that any one should be perpetually affix’d to the side of another, so as to observe all his Motions. Therefore when a Superiour has done every thing that was requir’d by the Rules of his Directorship, and yet somewhat is acted amiss, this shall be laid only to the charge of him that did it. Thus, whereas Man exercises Dominion over other Animals, what is done by them to the detriment of another, shall be charged upon the Owner, as supposing him to have been wanting of due Care and Circumspection. So also all those Mischiefs which are brought upon another, may be imputed to that Person, who when he could and ought, yet did not take out of the way the Cause and Occasion thereof. Accordingly it being in the Power of Men to promote or suspend the Operations of many Natural Agents, whatsoever Advantage or Damage is wrought by these, they shall be accountable for, by whose application or neglect the same was occasion’d. Beside, sometimes there are extraordinary Cases, when a Man shall be charged with such Events as are above human Direction, as when God shall do particular Works with regard to some single Person. [So the Pestilence in Israel may be charg’d upon David for numbring the People; 2 Sam. xxiv. or the three Year’s Drought to the Prayers of Elijah, 1 Kings xvii. and the like.] These and such Cases being excepted, no Man is responsible but for his own Actions.
XIX. The second Conclusion. L. N. N. l. 1. c. 5. §7.
WHATSOEVER Qualifications a Man has or has not, which it is not in his Power to exert or not to exert, must not be imputed to him, unless so far as he is wanting in Industry to supply such Natural Defect, or does not rouse up his native Faculties. So, because no man can give himself an Acuteness of Judgment and Strength of Body; therefore no one is to be blam’d for Want of either, or commended for having them, except so far as he improv’d, or neglected the cultivating thereof. Thus Clownishness is not blameable in a Rustic, but in a Courtier or Citizen. And hence it is, that those Reproaches are to be judg’d extremely absurd, which are grounded upon Qualities, the Causes of which are not in our Power, as, Short Stature, a deform’d Countenance, and the like.
XX. The Third Conclusion. L. N. N. l. 1. c. 5. §10.
Farther, We are not chargeable for those Things, which we do thro’ Invincible Ignorance. Because we have nothing but the Light of our Understanding to direct our Actions by; and in this case it is supposed that the Agent neither had, nor possibly could have, this Light for his Direction at that time, and that it was not his own Fault that made it not possible for him then to come at proper Knowledge. When we say not possible for him to know, we must be understood in a Moral not a Physical Sense; that is, it was not possible to come to this Knowledge by the usual and common Means, by using his best Care and Attention, and by giving such Diligence, Precaution, and Circumspection, as in all reason may be thought sufficient for the attaining such Knowledge.
XXI. The fourth Conclusion.
Ignorance of a Man’s Duty, or of those Laws from whence his Duty arises, or Error about either of them, does not excuse from blame. For whosoever imposes Laws and Services, is wont and ought to take care that the Subject have notice thereof. And these Laws and Rules of Duty generally are and should be order’d to the Capacity of such Subject, if they are such as he is obliged to know and remember. Hence, he who is the Cause of the Ignorance shall be bound to answer for those Actions which are the Effects thereof.
XXII. The fifth Conclusion.
He who, not by his own fault, wants an Opportunity of doing his Duty, shall not be accountable, because he has not done it. An Opportunity of doing our Duty comprehends these four requisite Conditions: 1. That an Object of Action be ready: 2. That a proper Place be had, where we may not be hindred by others, nor receive any Mischief: 3. That we have a fit Time, when Business of greater Necessity is not to be done, and which is equally seasonable for those Persons who are to concur with us in the Action: and 4. Lastly, That we have natural Force sufficient for the performancer. For since an Action cannot be atchiev’d without these, ’twould be absurd to blame a Man for not acting, when he had not an Opportunity so to do. Thus, a Physician cannot be accus’d of Sloth, when no body is sick to employ him. Thus, no Man can be liberal, who wants himself. Thus he cannot be reprov’d for burying his Talent who having taken a due care to set himself in an useful Station, has yet miss’d of it: tho’ it be said,* To whom much is given, from him much shall be requir’d.†Thus we cannot blow and suck all at once.
XXIII. The sixth Conclusion. L. N. N. l. 1. c. 5. §8.
No Man is accountable for not doing that which exceeded his Power, and