Institutes of Divine Jurisprudence, with Selections from Foundations of the Law of Nature and Nations. Christian Thomasius
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in another sense than I do and refuses to explain his meaning of the term by offering an unambiguous description, nobody can blame me if I abstain from a struggle that would be inglorious, like that of blindfolded gladiators who make the audience laugh but are useless at finding the truth, which should be the purpose of all disputation. He may tell me that hypothetical propositions could not be used against him; for example, that in the trite inference “if an ass flies, he has feathers,” the logician does not pretend that the ass flies or has feathers, but only shows the consequence, by which one follows from the other. He may repeat this a hundred times, but I will still uphold my definition of a fiction until he has supplied me with another and better one. Indeed, thinking further on this matter, I can see no way how anybody can deny that in this proposition the prior part if an ass flies is a fiction, unless it is that the term fiction was not expressly used here. Yet the principles of determining
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equally strong arguments show clearly that it is one and the same whether you say, “If an ass flies, he has feathers,” or you explain your intention thus: “Imagine that an ass flies, then he will have feathers”; just as, again, it does not matter whether you say: “Imagine a person; no matter by what means he has been set in this world, he is nevertheless a social being,” or: “If a person is placed in this world, no matter by what means this comes about, he is nevertheless a social being.” The arguments that are derived from the definitions of things are normally apodictic, and the description I have provided of the fiction shows that it is not contrary to religion, even if we invent something that has been revealed to be otherwise in Scripture or invent whatever pleases us. It is clear from this that it is a gross violation of the rules of learned debate to accept my definition of the term fiction but at the same time criticize the use of fictions and hypothetical propositions, which I used only for the sake of explanation, wishing to show that the reason for the difference is that nothing was to be invented in an argument if the contrary has been revealed by Scripture. For nowhere have I used an argument from analogy, against which otherwise the proof of a disparity would carry a lot of weight. Thus I do not infer that if the fiction “if an ass flies” is valid, then it must also be all right to come up with the fiction that man has been placed in this world, by whatever means, or that there are two kinds of humans in this world, which is a fiction I put forward in §31. So that you do not think I need an argument from analogy, I ask: Do you believe it to be a sin against orthodox religion, if an arithmetician speaks thus: “Let us pretend that there were twelve pots in Canaan in Galilee, of which each held three measures; it follows then necessarily that they were filled with thirty-six measures in total.” But here something is invented which Scripture revealed to us differently, namely, that there were only six pots. And I am convinced everybody will say that this fiction of the arithmetician is close to being a lie, because he invented something contrary to revealed truth. And if that is not said, this will not protect him against the accusation that his argument is absurd, even if he put forward as a proof that truth, especially divine truth, is simple, and that therefore what is contrary to it is a lie. Apart from the fact that here a moral lie is confused with a logical error, how is it possible to say that if our definition of a fiction is assumed and holds up, a fiction which neither
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affirms nor denies anything is contrary to truth? I believe that all remaining doubts concerning my opinion and its orthodoxy will now have been lifted from your minds. I will add a few comments on its novelty. I do not fear being accused of that, because I am convinced that fictions are accepted by scholars in all faculties. I would even be prepared to bet that, even in their dreams when fantasy strays more widely, none of our people would have thought of asserting that a Christian cannot invent something that is contrary to scriptural revelation. Rather, if someone wanted to examine the writings of the theologians more closely, he would undoubtedly be able to collect several examples of such fictions. So far I have not had the leisure to do so carefully, but I will offer you one, which is very clear and based on the authority of a theologian who is absolutely orthodox, that is, our venerable Mr. Alberti. For I read in part 2 of his Compendium of Natural Law Conforming to Orthodox Theology,95 chapter 7, §21, page 139: “Imagine the following impossible situation: that there existed at that time [when Adam distributed a part of his goods among Cain and Abel, so that the former owned all immovables, that is, the fields, the latter the movable possessions, that is, the cattle] so great a number of humans as would have been required to possess the entire globe; then Adam would have had to grant each individual some part of it, because he had received some for each person.”
§53. In the same chapter 4, §64, I conclude that sociality is the foundation of the law of nature. I do not want to put forward any new argument to prove this assertion, but will refer to a passage from the illustrious Seckendorff, which will, so to speak, make it obvious to you that our opinion already flourished before the birth of Christ, and that it is therefore older than the doctrine of the Scholastics, who derive natural laws from divine sanctity, and older than the very recent opinion of those who look for it in the state of innocence, and that this illustrious man proved our conception of human sociality. This is contained in the Entwurff oder Versuch von dem allgemeinen oder natuerlichen Recht, which is added to his German speeches, pages 442ff., §§10 and 11:96
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It is not difficult to see what the real characteristic and formal nature of this right is, namely, that it instructs the nature and reason of man and regulates his sociability with other human beings, or rather presupposes it. For because all humans have a creator and are the descendants of one man (a fact which the pagans suspected, but we know as a certain truth from God’s word), and have been created by God in such a way, both in their body and soul, that one human being cannot live without another, so the entire nature of man is such that he forms societies with others, not only in the conjunction of man and woman (for this is characteristic also of animals) and not out of a pure instinct, the way herds gather, but with deliberation and rational thought. Therefore, it must be posited that not just need, but the nature and reason of man, which are derived from the divine order, demand sociality and a form and just manner of dealing with each other in such a society. This is evident from, among other things, the fact that if it occurred from mere need, a man who had everything he required for his sustenance and comfort would not desire the company of other humans. He desires it zealously, however, unless he is deprived of natural reason or corrupted by deeply rooted sinful habits or bad education. So, like others, Cicero the learned Roman proves that such a desire is inborn, general, and a work of nature. Thus he says: “Humans are born for the sake of other humans, so that they can be useful to each other and help each other.” 1. Off.97 “Next to God it is man who can be most useful to man.” 2. Off.98 “Nature requires that one human being advise and help another, whoever he may be, for no other reason than that he is human.” 3. Off.99 “Nature drives us to want to help many people, especially in order to instruct them and make them wise. For this reason it is not easy to find someone who would not happily teach another what he knows. Thus we are not only eager to learn, but to teach others.” 2. De finib.100 We differ from animals mainly in that we speak with each other and can communicate our opinion to each other. In another passage he provides a parable by an old philosopher and says:
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If it were possible that a man were elevated to heaven and there saw the glories of the stars and other beautiful things, and then returned to earth, this would no longer give him any pleasure and joy, if he did not find or meet anybody with whom he could talk of the things he had seen and heard.
It can easily be concluded from this that if God had not commanded this sociality, humans would not require any other right in this life than what we see in animals, who have an instinct for self-preservation and seek to satisfy their lust.
And although some favor the opinion that this means of demonstrating sociality achieves little among pagan nations and barbarians, we nevertheless oppose to this the words of the illustrious author, ibidem, page 440, §6:101
The fact that we who are Christians and have specific and detailed civil laws speak about, teach, and inquire after this general divine or natural law has this