Selections from Three Works. Francisco Suárez
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PREFACE. Setting Forth the Subject and Plan of the Whole Work
Study of laws a division of theology, 11; God the Universal Lawgiver, 13; Civil jurisprudence as the application of moral philosophy to political conduct of the commonwealth, 14; Aims of canon law, 14–15; scope of theology with respect to law, 15–16.
BOOK I: CONCERNING LAW IN GENERAL; AND CONCERNING ITS NATURE, CAUSES, AND EFFECTS
I. The Meaning of the Term ‘Law’ (Lex)
Discussion of St. Thomas’s definition of law, 17; Divisions of law according to Plato, 18; Relation of natural law to natural inclination, 19–20; Lex fomitis, 20; True meaning of law, 22; Difference between law and counsel, 23–24; Etymology of term ‘law’, 24–25.
II. What Ius Means and How It Is to Be Compared with Lex
Etymology of term ius, 26–28; meanings of term ius, 28–33; ius distinguished from the equitable and the good, 33–35; distinction between ius and fas, 35–36.
III. The Extent of the Necessity for Laws, and of Their Variety
Law not necessary in absolute sense, 37–38; Necessary for rational creatures, 38–39; Utility of law, 39; Categories of law, 39; Divine or
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eternal law, 40–41; Natural and positive law, 41–42; Conceptions of natural law, 42; Law in strict sense not attributable to irrational things, 42; Discussion of natural law in strict sense, 43; Human Law, 44; Natural and supernatural aspects of natural law, 45–47; Positive law defined, 47; Division of positive law into divine and human, 47; Necessity of divine positive law, 48–49; Definition of positive human law, 50–51; Necessity for human law, 51–53; Civil and ecclesiastical law, 53–54; Other divisions of law, 54.
IV. What Acts in the Mind of the Lawmaker Are Necessary for the Making of a Law?
Relation of law to the mind, 55; Law based on concrete act, 56; Threefold classification of law with respect to its state or subject, 56; An act of the mind of the subject necessary for existence of law, 57; Acts of intellect and will necessary for lawmaking, 58–60; A will to bind subjects is required, 60–61; Notification of lawmaker’s will to subjects, 61–64.
V. Is Law an Act of the Intellect or of the Will? And What Is the Nature of This Act?
First opinion: law an act of the intellect, 64–65; Authorities and arguments in support of this opinion, 65–70; Second opinion: law an act of lawmaker’s will, 70; Discussion of this opinion, 70–72; Its confirmation in characteristic properties of law, 72–73; In certain characteristic conditions requisite for law, 73–75; Discussion of Bartholomew Medina’s doctrine, 75–76; Incompatible manifestations of will, 76–78; Third opinion: act of intellect and of will necessary for law, 78–80; Conclusions regarding these opinions, 80–82.
VI. Is It Inherent in the Nature of Law That It Should Be Instituted for Some Community?
It is inherent in the nature of law to be instituted for human beings, 83; Whether it is also inherent in its nature to be instituted for a community—conflicting opinions discussed, 83–89; Affirmative opinion preferred, 89; Inductive proof of this affirmative contention, 89–91; Further confirmation drawn from certain properties of law, 91–93; Refutation of arguments in favour of negative opinion, 93–95; Difference between law and precept, 95; Kinds of community, 96–98; Perfect and
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imperfect communities, 98–99; Human laws should be framed for perfect communities, 99–102.
VII. Is It Inherent in the Nature of Law That It Be Enacted for the Sake of the Common Good?
Inherent in nature of law to be enacted for common good, 102–104; Divine laws work for common good, 104–105; Human laws should be enacted for common good, 105; Common good the final end of law, 105–107; Discussion of this theory, 107–108; Necessary that subject-matter of law itself be adapted to common good, 108–111; Privilege, 111; Relation of privilege to law, 112; Taxes relate to common good, 113; Laws to be in absolute form for common good, 113–115; Whether a general law established to harm an individual is unjust, 115–116.
[Chapter VIII omitted from these Selections.]
Suárez’s first assertion: inherent in nature of law to prescribe just things, 116–117; Two interpretations of justice of law, 117; Just things prescribed by divine law, 118–119; Human law prescribing unjust things not binding, 119–120; Formerly indifferent or optional acts may be rendered obligatory by law, 120–122; How a law permitting certain evils may be just, 122; Righteousness inherent in nature of law—the several conditions laid down by Isidore, 123–126; Law devoid of righteousness not binding, 127; Suárez’s second assertion: inherent in nature of law that it be justly established, 128–129; Three phases of justice necessary to enactment of law, 129–133; Suárez’s third assertion: inherent in nature of law that it be practicable, 133; Confirmation of this doctrine, 133–137; Difference between injustice in a law as regards subject-matter and mode, 137.
[Chapters X and XI omitted from these Selections.]
XII. What Definition of Law (Lex) Is Derived from the Conditions of Law Above Set Forth?
Various definitions of law, 138–140; St. Thomas’s definition, 140; Discussion of his definition, 140–142; Suárez’s definition, 142.
[Chapters XIII–XVII omitted from these Selections.]
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XVIII. Are All Men in This Life Subject to Law and Bound by It?
The question as defined by Suárez, 143; Heretical theory that just men are exempt from binding force of law, 143–145; All men subject to law, according to Catholic Faith, 145–146; Wicked Christians bound by law of Gospel, 146; How just Christians are bound by law, 147–149; Refutation of arguments of heretics, 149–150.
[Chapters XIX and XX omitted from these Selections.]
BOOK II: ON THE ETERNAL LAW, THE NATURAL LAW, AND THE IUS GENTIUM
I. Is There Any Eternal Law; and, What Necessity Is There for the Same?
Four arguments denying the existence of eternal law, 152; Its existence proclaimed by various theologians, 153–155; Two phases of law, 155–156; Replies to first and second arguments, 156; Answer of certain writers to third argument regarding promulgation of eternal law, 157–160; Promulgation not required for eternal law, 160–161.