Selections from Three Works. Francisco Suárez
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or Governed by That Law?
Certain acts regulated by eternal law, 161–162; Whether that law is the rule of immanent acts of God, 162; Whether it is the measure of free acts of God, 163–164; First proposition: eternal law as rule of moral conduct is not imposed on God, 165–168; Second proposition: eternal law applies to things governed but is not applicable to God Himself, 168; Whether irrational and inanimate creatures are subject to eternal law, 168–171; Whether all moral actions are subject to eternal law, 171–172; St. Augustine’s theory regarding the sway of eternal law, 172–173.
Whether eternal law is a free or necessary act of God, 174; Eternal law includes act of divine will, 174–176; Eternal law a free decree of the will of God as regards all the universe, 176–178; Eternal law considered as existing in divine intellect, 178–179; Distinction between eternal law of God and His Ideas, 179; Eternal law distinguished from
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providence, 180–181; Effects of eternal law, 181–183; Whether eternal law is one or manifold, 184; Conclusion of Suárez, 184.
Binding force of eternal law, 186–187; Whether other laws derive binding force from eternal law, 187; Its relation to divine law, 187–190; To human law, 190; Difference between eternal divine law and human law, 191; How eternal law is made known to man, 192; Eternal law binding through medium of divine or human law, 193.
V. Is the Natural Law Natural Right Reason Itself?
Nature of this question, 194; First opinion: natural law consists formally in rational nature itself, 194–195; Arguments in support of this opinion, 195–197; Arguments against this opinion; its rejection, 197–200; Second opinion: law of nature a natural force called natural reason, 200; Confirmation of this opinion, 201–204; Whether natural law consists in an act of judgment or a mental habit, 204–205; Natural law distinguished from conscience, 205.
VI. Is the Natural Law in Truth Preceptive Divine Law?
Doubt: whether natural law is true law, 206–207; Whether God is the legislator of natural law, 207–208; First opinion: natural law a demonstrative law, 208–209; Second opinion: natural law a divine and preceptive law, 209–210; Suárez’s first proposition: natural law indicates what is good or evil and contains prohibitions of evil and command of good, 210–211; Arguments in support of this theory, 211–217; Second proposition: the good or evil involved in the observance or transgression of natural law is not only due to the divine will but presupposes inherent qualities of good or evil in such acts, 217–220; Third proposition: natural law is truly and properly divine law of which God is author, 220–221; Discussion of the bearing of natural law on evil acts, 221–226; Whether the divine will itself prescribes or forbids those things which come under natural law, 226–230; The promulgation of natural law through right reason, 230–232.
VII. What Is the Subject-Matter Dealt with by Natural Law; or, What Are the Precepts of That Law?
Subject-matter of natural law, 232; Difference between natural law and other laws, 232; Whether or not every moral good and every contrary evil fall under natural law, 232; Contrary opinions, 233–234; Reply of
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Suárez: natural law includes all moral precepts characterized by goodness necessary to right conduct, 234–235; Confirmation of this assertion by reasoning, 235–237; Gratian’s statement regarding natural law, 237–239; Suárez’s reply to contrary opinion, 239–240; Whether all virtuous actions fall under natural law, 240–243.
VIII. Is the Natural Law One Unified Whole?
Three questions regarding unity of natural law, 243–244; Two phases of natural law: that of humanity, and that of grace, 244; As regards the individual there are many natural precepts, but all form one unified body of law, 244–245; Classification of these precepts, 245–246; Natural law a unified whole with respect to all men, 246–247; Whether ignorance of natural precepts is invincible, 248–249; Natural law a single law, with respect to all times and every condition of human nature, 249–250.
IX. Is the Natural Law Binding in Conscience?
Effects of natural law, 250; Natural law is binding in conscience, 251–253; Whether every natural obligation carries with it an obligation in conscience, 253–254; Moral obligation not necessarily an obligation in conscience, 255; Whether every obligation in conscience is an effect of natural law, 255–257; Difference between obligations arising under civil law and those arising under divine law, 257–260.
X. Is the Natural Law Binding Not Only with Respect to the Virtuous Act but Also with Respect to the Manner of Its Performance, in Such a Way That This Law Cannot Be Fulfilled, Save by an Act That Is Good in Every Particular?
St. Thomas’s discussion of precepts and virtuous action, 260; Difference between affirmative and negative precepts, 260–261; Difference between fulfilling a precept and refraining from the transgression thereof, 261; Conditions requisite to good moral action distinguished, 262; First proposition: the mode of voluntary action is requisite for the observance of the natural law, 263; various objections and answers thereto, 264–267; Second proposition: to act with knowledge is, in a sense, necessary for the fulfilment of a natural precept, 267–268; Extent and nature of this knowledge, 268–271; Third proposition: natural law imposes obligation as to mode of practising virtue, 271–273; Suárez deals with conflicting opinions and doubt, 273–274.
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XI. Does the Natural Law Impose as an Obligatory Mode of Action That Mode Which Springs from the [Natural] Love of God, or from Charity?
Nature of this question, 274; Natural law and the love of God as the Author of nature, 275–276; In what sense the assertion that the love of God is an obligation of the natural law should be understood, 276–277; The opinion of Gregory of Rimini is rejected, 277–279; Mode of action springing from infused charity not required for the observance of natural law, 279–280; Discussion of certain conflicting opinions and objections, 280–283; Explanation of passages from Scriptures and Augustine, 283–286.
XII. Does the Natural Law Not Only Forbid Certain Acts, but Also Invalidate Contrary Acts?
Permission and punishment do not properly come under natural law, 286; Whether natural law may invalidate an act done in contravention of an obligation imposed by that law, 287; Rules for determining when acts are invalid by natural law, 289–291; Some acts prohibited by natural law may be validated, 291.
XIII. Are the Precepts of the Natural Law Immutable of Themselves and Intrinsically?
How law may be changed, 291–293; No lapse or change possible in natural law, either in its entirety or in individual precepts, so long as rational nature endures, 293; Proofs of this principle, 296; Discussion of certain views of Aristotle and St. Thomas on this principle, 296–299; Suárez on adaptation of natural law to changing subject-matter, 299; Whether natural law can be eradicated from the minds of men, 300–301.
XIV. Does the Natural Law Admit of Change or Dispensation through Any Human Power?
First opinion: change of or dispensation from natural law possible through human agency in some cases according to certain Doctors, 301–302; First argument in behalf of this opinion supported by examples concerning division of common into private property, restraint of natural liberty,