The Wiley-Blackwell Handbook of Childhood Social Development. Группа авторов
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In this chapter we first revisit the philosophical foundation of developmental thinking and its application to understanding children. This brings the reader to the great German philosopher Kant, and to the founder of child development and education, Rousseau. In particular, Rousseau’s book on the boy Émile will be presented as the core publication of modern thoughts on childhood and education, followed by the reception of this book by historical founders of developmental psychology and pedagogy in Germany, Switzerland, and The Netherlands.
After the explanation of the role of Enlightenment thinking in terms of “progress” and development, it will be made clear that one essential feature of the Enlightenment philosophy is disputable: the unjustified belief in “progress.” This idea of “progress” is fully present in the original developmental ideas of Rousseau, and also of his later follower Piaget. It will be explained in this chapter that neo‐ and post‐neo‐Piagetian research essentially leads us back to the insight that children are serious interlocutors at a much younger age than we have been inclined to think since the Rousseau‐Piaget tradition (Koops, 2016).
Research on the tenability of Ariès’ hypothesis on infantilization will be presented to demonstrate that he was right in claiming that infantilization was increasing over the last few centuries. On the other hand, it will be demonstrated that since the 1950s the infantilization came to an end. This discussion will be connected to Neil Postman’s ideas on the disappearance of childhood.
Finally, it will be concluded that the study of the cultural history of childhood and child development makes clear that child development is less (biologically) continuous than has been the assumption since Rousseau. Post‐neo‐Piagetian research (for example about the Child’s Theory of Mind), makes clear that children are much more serious, if not adult, interlocutors. We may speak of a historical reframing of childhood, with numerous new possibilities for pedagogy and education.
Enlightenment
A scholar who wants to think, speak, and write about children has no choice but to come to terms with the Enlightenment. The Age of Enlightenment was an intellectual and philosophical movement that dominated the world of ideas in Europe during the 17th and 18th centuries; it emerged from Renaissance humanism and early aspects of the scientific revolution. The greatest Enlightenment philosopher of all, Immanuel Kant (1724–1804, Figure 5.1), said: “. . . autonomous thinking is finding the ultimate test of truth in oneself (i.e., in one’s own reason); and the fundamental principle of continuously autonomous thinking is Enlightenment.” It is highly recommended to read his pamphlet “Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung” (“An answer to the question: What is Enlightenment”) from 1784 (see Kant, 1799), containing the appeal: “Habe Mut, dich deines eigenen Verstandes zu bedienen!” (“Have the courage to use your own understanding!”) “Sapere aude!”(“Dare to know!”). Even, to make a contemporary addition, when reading claims made in “peer reviewed” “top” journals.
Figure 5.1 Statue of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804).
Modern scholars should open up their minds to the relevant Enlightenment literature. When their scientific work is mainly concerned with children, they can learn a lot about child development and upbringing by following the course of history from the 18th century onwards. Here, Kant’s admiration for Jean‐Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778, Figure 5.2) will serve as the basis of the description of this Western history. Rousseau’s “Émile, ou de l’éducation” from 1762 was called “the birth certificate of pedagogy” by Kant (see Prins, 1963, p. 139) and was later received with at least equal enthusiasm by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832) as “the natural gospel of education,” and by Johann Herder (1744–1803) and Gotthold Lessing (1729–1781) as a “divine work” (see Soëtard, 1989, p. 144). It is good to note that hardly any philosopher has been written about as much as Rousseau, including voluminous literature on the reception of Rousseau’s thinking as such (e.g., L’Aminot, 1992). Classical works on Rousseau include Cassirer (1932, 1955), Burgelin (1952), and Rang (1959). An accessible and abundantly illustrated biography is Soëtard (1989). Many works of Rousseau were originally printed and published in Amsterdam; in The Netherlands there has always been a profound and scholarly interest in Rousseau’s (pedagogical) ideas, as for example in Roland Holst (1918), Brugmans (1951), and Van der Velde (1967). Furthermore, there is a continuing series entitled “Annales de la Société Jean‐Jacques Rousseau” from Geneva (since 1905).
Figure 5.2 Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778).
Source: Allan Ramsay, Jean‐Jacques Rousseau, National Gallery of Scotland).
I have a strong conviction that no educationalist or developmental psychologist can bear this professional title with honor without having determined his or her own standpoint in relation to Rousseau’s Émile. Until some 50 years ago, many colleagues would have endorsed this without a doubt. I am afraid that now they may ironically shrug their shoulders, for what importance does history have, to modern empirical researchers? This chapter is meant as an answer to this question.
Rousseau’s Émile
What message did Rousseau wish to convey? He claimed that pedagogy should be child‐oriented; that there are age‐related stages, to which the approach towards the child, including the pedagogical and educational approach, must be tailored; and that children must only be offered knowledge when they display a need for it. Moreover, knowledge must spring from a child’s own explorations, from hands‐on experience, preferably not from books. A child should certainly not be exposed to wisdom from books before the age of 12! Despite much enthusiasm, from Kant among others, Rousseau’s book should in the first place be regarded as a revolutionary Enlightenment text, not as a pedagogical handbook. His book stemmed from the tradition which Israel (2001, 2005) named “radical Enlightenment.”
According to Israel, the key figure of this radical Enlightenment is Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677), the great Dutch philosopher. The “Epilogue” of Israel’s book is entitled: “Rousseau, radicalism, revolution.” Spinoza by way of Denis Diderot (1713–1784) led to Rousseau and the French revolution. The Émile was indeed radical. In the Émile the author pointed out that he did not only rebel against French society, but also and foremost against its reproduction (Soëtard, 1989, p. 97). Rousseau thought that children should be taken “back to nature” (however, this expression did not appear in his writings, but in those of his commentators). With “back to nature” Rousseau meant: as far away as possible from Parisian decadence. Children should learn to think autonomously, without being led astray by French culture, without following other people’s wisdom from books. This Enlightenment idea is the radical expression of the primacy of the autonomously thinking individual, which had great appeal to Kant. And this is the reason that Rousseau’s Émile is a book for philosophers, not for educationalists, fathers and mothers, as Rousseau emphasized (Bloom, 1979, p. 28). However, to no avail!
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