The History of Rome: Rise and Fall of the Empire. John Bagnell Bury
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rather than with expedition, for he would rather have war on hand than prosecute it”. He himself prepared to cross the Euphrates, and meet Vologeses. But the Parthian monarch, again, as so often before, shrank from war at the last moment. The attack of his general upon Tigranocerta had been completely unsuccessful. He opened negotiations, and declared himself ready to fulfill the conditions of the treaty which had been proposed in 55 A.D., and let his brother hold Armenia as vassal of the Roman Emperor. Corbulo accepted the proposal, withdrew his legions from Armenia, gave up the cause of Tigranes (61 A.D.), and permitted Tiridates to resume his possession of the land. It was said, by some, and it is not improbable, that there was a secret understanding between Corbulo and Vologeses. In any case these proceedings of Corbulo cannot be justified. He may have honestly thought that the arrangement which he twice attempted to make with Vologeses was the best solution of the Armenian question; but, once the Roman government had set up Tigranes, he had no right to give up the results which had been won by his own campaigns. Moreover he was at this time only a temporary commander, and Lucius Caesennius Paetus was already on his way to assume the government of Cappadocia, to which he had been appointed. It is possible that Corbulo was jealous of his successor, and wished to deprive him of the honor of the final subjugation of Armenia. In any case Corbulo did not act in accordance with the views of the government, and when the ambassadors of Vologeses presented themselves at Rome, the treaty was not confirmed. There is some ground for believing that at this moment it was actually contemplated to make Armenia a Roman province, and this certainly was the view of the new governor of Cappadocia.
Thus Armenia had to be conquered again. The two legions which were stationed in Cappadocia were to be reinforced by a legion from Moesia, and Paetus, as soon as he arrived in his province, lost no time in setting out. He crossed the Euphrates at Melitene, and marched through Sophene, capturing forts and booty on his way. His first object was the recovery of Tigranocerta, but it was late in the year (62 A.D.), and he was obliged to defer this enterprise until next season, especially as the Moesian legion had not yet arrived. He established the winter-quarters of the IVth legion at Randeia, a place on the borders of Sophene, close to the Taurus range, and situated on the north bank of the Arsanias (Murad). In the meantime, Corbulo had taken up a position on the banks of the Euphrates, near Zeugma, to prevent the forces of Vologeses from invading Syria. The Parthian king, learning that the two legions of Paetus were not together, that the camp at Randeia was badly supplied with provisions, and that Paetus was granting furloughs indiscriminately to all the soldiers who applied for them, suddenly determined to invade Armenia, notwithstanding the lateness of the season, and surprise the Roman camp before reinforcements could arrive. Corbulo did nothing to hinder the march of the Parthians into Armenia; perhaps he was secretly pleased at the prospect of the other commander getting into difficulties. When Paetus heard that Vologeses was approaching with a large force, he summoned the XItth legion to his head-quarters, and then fully realized the numerical weakness of his forces. The whole army advanced in the direction from which the Parthians were approaching, but when a centurion and some soldiers, who had been sent on to reconnoiter, were killed in a collision with an advanced party of the enemy, it retreated to the camp. Vologeses did not press on immediately, and Paetus posted a body of 3000 chosen infantry in the pass of Mount Taurus, which the Parthians had yet to pass before they reached Randeia, and also placed the best of his cavalry in the plain to support the legionaries. But these forces were utterly insufficient, find were swept away before the advance of the Parthian army. The unwounded fled to distant wilds; the disabled returned to the camp. Thus Paetus was left, having lost the best part of his army through his ill-considered dispositions; and his forces were still further weakened by the withdrawal of a cohort to the defence of the neighboring fort of Arsamosata, whither his wife and son had been removed for safety. His only chance of escape lay in speedy succor from Corbulo, to whom he had already sent a pressing message. But Corbulo did not hurry; he was willing to let the peril increase, in order that the glory of rescuing the army might be enhanced. But he ordered 1000 men from each of his three legions, along with 800 cavalry and about 4000 auxiliary infantry, to be in instant readiness to march. When, however, another message arrived from Paetus, with news of the defeat, and earnestly entreating him to come to save the eagles, he set out, leaving half his army to defend the forts on the Euphrates. He marched straight north from Zeugma, through Commagene and Cappadocia—the route which was shortest and most convenient for obtaining supplies. His army was attended by a large number of camels laden with corn. When he met stragglers from the defeated army, and they alleged various excuses for their flight, he advised them to return to their standards, and throw themselves on the mercy of Paetus. “I”, he said, “have no pardon but for the victorious”.
In the meantime Vologeses pressed both the fortress of Arsamosata and the camp at Randeia. He tried to lure the legions from their entrenchments, and bring on an engagement. But the Roman soldiers were demoralized, and had no intention of fighting; they only thought of escaping with their lives. They are said to have quoted the historical disasters of Rome, such as the Caudine Forks and the capitulation of Mancinus at Numantia; aud urged that if Romans had yielded to Samnites, it would be no disgrace to capitulate to the greater power of Parthia. The general was forced by this attitude of his troops into treating with the enemy. Yet if he had held out for three days longer his colleague would have arrived with succor. The terms of the capitulation were that the legions should quit Armenia, that the forts and supplies should be surrendered to the Parthians, and a bridge thrown across the river Arsanias to enable them to carry off the booty. The Romans had to submit to much ignominy. The Parthians and Armenians insulted them as they prepared to retire, and their flight was precipitate. Paetus traversed forty miles in a single day, leaving his wounded all along the route. The fugitives met the army of Corbulo on the banks of the Euphrates, near Melitene. “Corbulo made no exhibition of standards and arms, so as to taunt them by the contrast. His maniples, in their grief for the lot of their comrades, could not even refrain from tears; the mutual salutation was hardly interchanged for weeping. Rivalry and desire of glory, emotions which men feel in success, had died away; pity alone prevailed, and was more deeply felt in the lower ranks”.
A short conversation took place between Corbulo and Paetus. The defeated general urged that everything might still be retrieved if the whole army were at once to invade Armenia, from which Vologeses had already departed. Corbulo declined, on the ground that his commission from the Emperor strictly confined him to the limits of Syria, which he had only left on account of the peril of the legions. Paetus then retired to Cappadocia, and Corbulo to Syria, where messages passed between him and Vologeses, and it was agreed that the Roman fortresses on the Parthian bank of the Euphrates were to be abandoned, while on the other hand the Parthian garrisons were to be removed from Armenia.
When Paetus first established his quarters at Randeia, he had sent bragging dispatches to Rome, as if he were in possession of the whole country; and trophies and arches were erected at Rome in honor of his supposed successes. The arrival of the envoys of Vologeses early in 63 A.D. exposed the falseness of these pretensions. The letter of the king was moderate, but its tone was that of one who need not condescend to ask for terms. He professed that his brother Tiridates was ready to receive the crown of Armenia as a Roman vassal. Being a Magian priest, Tiridates had a scruple against crossing the sea; otherwise he would have been ready to appear at Rome and receive the diadem from the Emperor’s hand. But he would willingly go to one of the neighboring camps, and do homage to the standards and the image of the Emperor. The council of Nero rejected this proposal, and sent the envoys back without a formal answer, refusing to accept the terms which were arranged between Corbulo and Vologeses. But they seem to have intimated at the same time that if Tiridates presented himself at Rome in person, an understanding might be effected. But for the present the war was to continue, and preparations were made for it on an unusually large scale.
Paetus was recalled; and Corbulo, who, though his recent behavior was certainly open to criticism, was justly recognized to be the most capable general, undertook once more the command in Cappadocia, while C. Cestius Gallus replaced him in Syria. He was now entrusted with larger powers than before—perhaps with an imperium proconsulare. All the governors and dependent princes of the East were instructed to obey his commands, and his position resembled that which had been formerly held by Germanicus and Vitellius. The army was increased by the XVth legion (Apollinaris) taken from Pannonia. The whole strength of Corbulo’s army, taking into account the troops