The History of Rome: Rise and Fall of the Empire. John Bagnell Bury
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before he arrived, the Othonians achieved another success, which might have decided the war in their favor, but for the ill-judgment or treachery of Suetonius Paulinus. This general and Marius Celsus had joined forces with Gallus at Betriacum. Caecina, disgusted with his failure at Placentia and anxious to gain a victory before the arrival of his colleague Valens, determined to bring on an action, and with this intent placed an ambush of picked auxiliaries in woods overhanging the Postumian Way, at a place called Locus Castorum (from a temple of Castor and Pollux), twelve miles from Cremona. Some cavalry were detached to advance along the road, and lure the enemy to the spot. But the Othonian generals got intelligence of this stratagem, and skillfully arranged a counter-stratagem. Callus had been hurt by a fall from his horse; accordingly Celsus and Paulinus divided the command, Paulinus taking the infantry, and Celsus the cavalry. They drew up their army on this wise: three praetorian cohorts were placed in columns on the road itself, and formed the centre of the array; on the left were posted the advance body (2000 strong) of the XIIIth legion from Pannonia, with five auxiliary cohorts and 500 cavalry; on the right stood I. Classica with two auxiliary cohorts and likewise 500 cavalry. A body of a thousand picked horsemen was placed in reserve. When the Vitellians, according to their plan, pretended to retreat in order to draw their opponents into the ambuscade, Celsus kept his men from advancing too far, and when the ambushed troops, sure of success, rushed out, he gradually retreated and drew them on into the snare which had been prepared for them. When Celsus and his cavalry, hotly pursued by the enemy, reached the three praetorian cohorts stationed on the Via Postumia, the legionary soldiers, who were right and left of the Via, advanced and closed up in front, so as to oppose a continuous line to the pursuers. At the same time the auxiliary cohorts on both sides were pushed forward, so as to take the Vitellians in the flanks. Finally the reserve body of cavalry was dispatched to ride round and come on them in the rear, so that they were completely enclosed in the well-contrived snare. But Suetonius, for whatever reason, did not act with sufficient promptitude. He wasted time in preliminaries, and did not give the signal to the infantry to attack, until many of the Vitellians had time to seek refuge in the vineyards adjacent to the road, where it was impossible to use the pila freely. But when the infantry of Suetonius at length attacked they carried all before them. Caecina brought up his cohorts one by one, and each by itself was too weak to withstand the assault of the Othonians. Caecina and his whole army, it was said, might have been annihilated, if Suetonius had not sounded a retreat, and hindered his troops from attempting to carry the enemy’s camp at Cremona. Some suspected him of treachery.
Valens had already arrived at Ticinum, and soon after this defeat pushed on to join forces with Caecina at Cremona. Meanwhile Otho came himself to Betriacum and held a council of war. Suetonius, Gallus, and Marius Celsus, were of opinion that a general engagement should not be risked until the arrival of the Illyric legions, which in discipline and valor were a match for the troops of the Rhine. But Otho could not endure to wait longer for the decision of his late; and Titianus and Proculus, who perhaps thought more of his wishes than his interests, voted for immediate action. Otho then retired to Brixellum (Bresello), and the army, which was now commanded nominally by Titianus, but really by Proculus, advanced westward from Betriacum and encamped four miles nearer Cremona. The ultimate strategical object seems to have been to reach the confluence of the Padus and the Addua, two hours west of Cremona, so as to sever the communication between that city and Ticinum. Yet it is hardly credible that even Titianus would have conceived anything so rash as a flank-march past the enemy stationed at Cremona. The messages of Otho, who was growing more and more impatient, induced his brother, notwithstanding the remonstrances of the more experienced generals, to advance further in the direction of the enemy.
Meanwhile the Vitellians had been occupied in building a bridge across the Padus, near the mouth of the Addua. Marcius Macer with his gladiators had endeavored to prevent them and a struggle had taken place for the possession of an island in midstream, in which the gladiators were worsted by Batavian troops. They blamed Macer for this discomfiture, and he was with difficulty rescued from their vengeance. Flavius Sabinus was appointed in his stead, with a general command over the Othonian forces south of the river.
On the 15th April, Caecina who had been hurrying on the building of the bridge, returned to Cremona, to find that the Othonian forces had arrived within four miles of the place, that a body of their cavalry had attacked the camp, and that Valens had given the signal to march forth to fight. The battle which ensued—generally called the battle of Betriacum, though more correctly the battle of Cremona—is far less interesting from a military point of view than that of Locus Castorum, although, as things turned out, it decided the war. A report was spread that the Vitellians had abandoned their cause, and the Othonians grounded their arms and hailed them as friends. But they were soon undeceived. The fighting took place on the highroad and in the groves and vineyards on either side. The contending parties were equally matched, and on Otho’s side thelegio classica displayed conspicuous bravery. But there was no general action. The battle consisted of a series of desultory conflicts. The result was undecided until Otho’s generals fled, and at the same moment reinforcements arrived for the Vitellians in the shape of the Batavian cohorts which had recently routed the gladiators. Their flank attack was decisive. The defeated army fled along the high-road to their camp and next morning capitulated.
Otho awaited the result at Brixellum, guarded by some divisions of the praetorians. The defeat at Cremona was not in itself necessarily decisive of the war. He had still every chance of retrieving his fortunes, with the help of the approaching legions from Illyricum. But he was weary of the uncertainty, and when the news of defeat came, he made up his mind to die. He did not think of his obligations to the troops which fought for him; perhaps he felt unable to trust his generals. In the evening he called for two daggers, of which he chose the sharper, and placed it beneath his pillow. Having slept for some hours, he drew forth the weapon at daybreak, and fell upon it. His dying groan was heard, and when his slaves rushed in, they found their master dead (April 17). If in the effeminacy of his life he was supposed to resemble Nero, the resolution which he displayed in his death contrasted with Nero’s ignoble end. His body was immediately placed on a pyre, and some of the praetorians slew themselves on the spot. The ashes were buried under a humble monument.
The praetorians at Brixellum then offered the Empire to Verginius Rufus, who was in attendance on Otho, and he declined their offer, as he had before refused that of the legions of Germany. No curse remained but submission to Vitellius. The victorious armies plundered and desolated the Italian cities, which had already been exhausted by the soldiers of Otho, and Valens and Caecina did not attempt to hinder the rapine. In Rome the news of Otho’s death was received with joy. The senate met and decreed to Vitellius all the imperial titles by a single act (April 19). Just as Otho had been regarded as the successor of Nero, Vitellius was considered the successor of Galba. The images of Galba were borne, crowned with flowers, to the spot in the Forum where he had fallen. Everything was done to conciliate the Germanic legions, to whose approach Rome looked forward with dread.
SECT. III. — VITELLIUS AND VESPASIAN
Vitellius himself meanwhile had been moving, with characteristic torpor, through Gaul. He had with him about 60,000. men, including the strength of the Germanic armies and some divisions which had been sent from Britain. The tidings of victory reached him at the same time as the announcement that the Mauretanian provinces had declared for him. Lucceius Albinus had been appointed procurator of Caesariensis by Nero, and the Tingitane province had been added to his sway by Galba. On Galba’s death he embraced the cause of Otho, and threatened Spain. But Cluvius Rufus, the legatus of Tarraconensis, on whom it devolved to provide for the military protection of Baetica, succeeded in slaying Albinus and his chief supporters. It was said that Albinus had some thought of reviving for himself the royal title which had expired with King Juba.
The Imperator descended the river Arar in a barge, and at Lugudunum was met by his victorious generals, Valens and Caecina. Here he conferred his own title of Germanicus upon his infant son. The vengeance of Vitellius chiefly fell upon subordinate officers, especially those of the Illyrian legions, which were sent back to their stations. His rival’s brother Titianus, Suetonius, Proculus, and Marius Celsus, were all spared. Vitellius, perhaps, did not forget that his own wife and children had been spared by Otho. The XIVth legion, which had been removed from Britain by