The History of Rome: Rise and Fall of the Empire. John Bagnell Bury
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favor of the “Flavians”, as the party of Flavius Vespasianus was called. On the news of this small success, the two Pannonic legions marched rapidly to Patavium, and it was decided to make Verona the basis of further operations. Vicetia (Vicenza) was taken on the march to Verona, which city they prepared to besiege. The IIIrd and VIIIth legions soon arrived from Moesia. Outside Verona the governor of Pannonia, Flavianus, and the governor of Moesia, Aponius, were set upon by the soldiers, who suspected them of treachery to the cause, and escaped with difficulty. Their flight left the conduct of the campaign entirely in the hands of Primus.
Meanwhile, Vitellius was ill-prepared to oppose the forces which had approached to wrest the Empire from his hands. The breaking up of the old legions for the sake of the reorganization of the praetorians had been, under the circumstances, a fatal mistake. They were weakened not only by the decrease of numbers, but by the relaxation of discipline in their Italian quarters, and there was no bond between the veterans and the new recruits, who were raised to fill up the maniples. Vitellius formed a new legion from the marines of the fleet of Misenum. He expected reinforcements from the provinces, but the governors of Germany, Britain, and Spain made excuses for delay. Africa alone, where Vitellius had formerly won popularity as proconsul, showed some alacrity. When the news of the approach of the enemy came, Caecina was sent on to defend the north of Italy; Valens was detained at Rome by illness. The army which Caecina led against the Illyric legions wore a very different appearance from that which it presented when it descended from the Alps to play the part which the Illyric legions were now about to play against it. The Germanic troops had lost their vigor and their enthusiasm. They were enervated by the climate; their arms were in bad order, their horses lazy. The vigor of Caecina himself had suffered from the pleasures of success, and perhaps he meditated treachery before he left the city, under the influence of Flavius Sabinus, the prefect of the city, Vespasian’s elder brother.
The plan of Caecina was to make the river Athesis the line of defence. Cavalry were sent in advance to occupy Cremona, which played an important part in this as in the former war. V. Alauda, and XXII. Primigenia, with the divisions of four other legions followed; last of all, XXI. Rapax, and I. Italica, with the divisions of the Britannic legions, which had been sent to support Vitellius against Otho, marched to the north. The two last-named legions were sent to Cremona, the other forces to Hostilia, a village still existing as Ostiglia, on the lower course of the Padus. Caecina himself turned aside to Ravenna, in order to concert with Lucilius Bassus, the commander of the fleet, a treacherous desertion of Vitellius. Bassus was discontented because he had not been appointed praetorian prefect. It was soon known that the fleet had gone over to the enemy; this was the first blow to the cause of Vitellius. Cascina’s army had encamped between Hostilia and the marshes of the river Tartarus, which flows into the Adriatic between the Padus and the Athesis. It was a good position; the camp was covered by the river on the rear and flanked by the marsh. If Caecina had been in earnest, he should have been able to crush the two Pannonic legions before the Moesian troops arrived. But he delayed action on various pretexts; allowed the five Flavian legions to assemble at Verona; and finally tried to persuade his soldiers to desert to Vespasian. But his attempts were vain. The troops restored the images of Vitellius, which he and a few officers, whom he beguiled, had thrown down; and bound Caecina himself. They elected as their leaders, Fabius Pabullus, legatus of the Vth legion, and Cassius Longus, prefect of the camp. Then they moved back to Hostilia, and proceeded to join the other legions at Cremona.
When Primus learned what had happened, he determined that it was the favorable moment for action. The plans of the Vitellians had been thrown out by the desertion of Caecina; they had no leader of authority until Fabius Valens should arrive from Rome. Primus hastened to anticipate his arrival, and led his army in two days from Verona to Betriacum, in order to intercept the legions coming from Hostilia. Encamping at Betriacum, he advanced himself with some cavalry and cohorts of auxiliary foot towards Cremona, and falling in with some Vitellian troops, defeated them. The two legions stationed at Cremona—Italica and Rapax—then came up, and were beaten back by the Flavian legionaries who had been summoned from Betriacum. In this conflict Primus left nothing undone that devolved upon a good general and a brave soldier. As the evening was falling, the whole body of the Flavian army came up, and the soldiers were eager to hurry on to Cremona and take it by assault. The efforts of Primus himself, who tried to expose the folly of such an attempt, would hardly have been sufficient to restrain them; but the news arrived that the six legions of Hostilia had reached Cremona. They had crossed to the right hank of the Padus, and marched to Cremona by Parma; and although they had accomplished thirty miles that day, they were so excited by the news of the defeat that they hastened to attack the Flavians the same night. Thus, in the same place where the struggle had been decided between Otho and Vitellius, was also to be decided the struggle between Vitellius and Vespasian. Primus made his dispositions for the battle as follows. He placed the XIIIth legion in the centre, on the Via Postumia. Next it, on the left, in the open plain, was stationed VII. Galbiana, and beyond it VII. Chiudiana; on the other side were placed, in corresponding positions, VIII. and III., of which the latter was protected by dense underwood. The praetorians, whom Vitellius hid disbanded, had joined Vespasian, and they stood near the IIIrd. The flanks and rear were fringed with cavalry. The Suevian auxiliaries were in front. About nine o'clock in the evening the Vitellian legions approached and drew up in disorder. Weary though they were with the long march, with hunger and cold, they pressed the Flavians hard, and the fierce and doubtful battle lasted the whole night through The VIIth Galbiana was especially hard pressed, but it was sustained by Primus, who sent the praetorians to assist it. The ballistae and engines of the Vitellians, which they planted on the causeway, wrought, great mischief among the Flavian ranks, till two brave soldiers lost their lives in curting the cords which impelled the missiles. Fortune began to declare for the Flavians when the moon rose in their rear at an advanced hour of the night, and rendered the aim of the enemy more difficult. Primus rallied his flagging troops. The IIIrd, which had been originally stationed in Syria, saluted the rising sun, and from this incident a report was spread that Mucianus had arrived with the eastern army. The Flavians, believing themselves reinforced, fought with confidence, and their foes, completely routed, fled to Cremona.
Primus led on his victorious troops, excited with the prospect of plunder, against Cremona. In the war with Otho, the German soldiers had made their camp round the walls of the city, and surrounded the camp with a rampart. The Flavians stormed the camp with much labor, and then the town capitulated. But the soldiers, who hated the place, which had been twice the headquarters of the Vitellians, and burned with the desire of plundering the wealthy colony, did not respect the capitulation. Primus had retired to refresh himself with a bath, and when he complained that the water was not warm enough, the attendant said, “It will soon be hotter”. The word was seized by some who heard it, and interpreted as a permission to burn the city. Forty thousand armed men, with crowds of camp-followers, burst into the place; and the inhabitants experienced all the horrors of military license. The “miserable Cremona” burned for four days, and no edifice was left in it, except the temple of Mentis, the deity of the marshes.
If Valens had hurried northward, he might have reached Cremona in time to change the course of history. But his movements were slow. He sent three praetorian cohorts which had followed him to Ariminum, went himself to Etruria, and having heard of the result of the battle of Cremona, took ship for Gaul, intending to rouse the northern provinces to retrieve the cause of Vitellius. But Valerius Paulinus, the procurator of Narbonensis, who had embraced his friend Vespasian’s cause, succeeded in capturing Valens. Then the legions of the western provinces, Spain, Gaul, and Britain, declared for Vespasian. Meanwhile Umbria was occupied by the Flavians, and the cohorts at Ariminum were blockaded by land and sea. Italy was divided by the Apennines between Vespasian and Vitellius. The contest was not yet over, for the praetorian guards, the pick of the Germanic army, had taken no part hitherto in the war, and were still to be dealt with; and Vitellius had still a strong natural defence in the Apennines. Primus, leaving most of his army at Verona, led a force consisting of auxiliary cohorts and chosen legionaries, along with the XIth legion from Dalmatia, to Fanum Fortunae. At this place, the present Fano, which lies between Ancona and Ariminum, the Flaminian road reaches the Adriatic Sea. Here Primus waited, expecting that the troops of Vitellius would desert the Emperor.
In the meantime Vitellius had been burying his cares in sensual gratifications.