The topos of Divine Testimony in Luke-Acts. James R. McConnell
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from which an orator can draw in order to bring evidence in a forensic or deliberative speech. In the Latin rhetoricians, and particularly in Cicero, there is a strong emphasis on legal applications of topoi and the use of rhetoric in service to the State. My argument here is that this particular definition is underrepresented in NT studies involving rhetoric and topoi.
I then moved to a particular topos described in many rhetorical writings, the external topos of divine testimony, which receives its fullest explanation in Cicero’s Topica. Through many examples I demonstrated that the testimony of the gods, which occurs through various means, was widely applied in ancient speeches and treatises when arguing a case or seeking to persuade an audience. Specifically, orators often applied this form of testimony in order to praise one’s client, or, conversely, to denigrate an opponent. Likewise, the testimony of the gods was used to demonstrate the gods’ support or lack thereof for a potential course of action. Finally, I argued that ancient audiences would have perceived this particular form of evidence as extremely persuasive.
Given this position, the next task is to examine Luke-Acts and other similar extra-biblical works in order to investigate if and how the topos of divine testimony is applied in these more narrative genres. In the next four chapters of this study, I will attempt to demonstrate that the topos of divine testimony was used rhetorically by ancient authors of narratives, including histories and biographies, in order to praise and denigrate characters, and to convince readers of the validity or inconsistency of a particular course of action.
83. Locus in Latin. When referencing those ancients who wrote in Greek, the word topos will be used; when discussing the Latin rhetoricians, locus will be used. Ultimately, the two terms reference the same general concept.
84. A summary of how the term topos has been particularly understood in NT scholarship will introduce this analysis.
85. For short summaries of the concept of topos, see, e.g., Cope, Introduction to Aristotle’s Rhetoric, 124–33; J. Martin, Antike Rhetorik, 107–19.
86. Curtius, in his influential work, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, 79–105, argues that the ancient rhetoricians considered the topics a “stockroom” of universally applicable concepts, to be employed in the composition of speeches and other forms of literature. For example, he cites the use of the topos of “affected modesty” (ibid., 83–85), and maintains that as early as Cicero this topos was used to ingratiate the orator to the judge overseeing the case. This topos, however, is also found in other literature, including both early Christian and non-Christian.
87. Many of the articles and essays reviewed here are also engaged by Thom, “Defining the topos,” 555–73; Thom makes many of the same points as I in this review of previous scholarship.
88. Bradley, “The Topos,” 238–46. The connection of topos and form criticism is clear in Bradley’s work. He states, “For one such form . . . I have employed as a descriptive name the Greek word topos” (“The Topos,” 240).
89. Mullins, “Topos,” 541–47, esp. 547. Mullins basically takes Bradley’s definition and compares to it several ancient writings, including Greco-Roman, Jewish, and early Christian. Specifically, Mullins agrees with Bradley’s definition of the function of a topos (as seen in the NT), but disagrees with his treatment of the form of the topos.
90. More recently, see also von Lips, “Die Haustafel,” 261–80. Von Lips argues that rather than a Gattung, the familiar Haustafel passages in the NT should be considered a topos; in this he sympathetically cites Bradley’s work. A. Malherbe also argues for this particular view of the topos. He maintains that a topos is a “stock treatment of subjects of interest to the moralist, ” and his analysis concentrates on the topos of friendship as found in Seneca, Plutarch, Musonius, Epictetus, and Dio Chrysostom, as well as Paul in the NT; see Malherbe, “Hellenistic Moralists,” 267–333, esp. 320–25. An example of topoi being applied in the analysis of the New Testament is found in H. D. Betz’s commentary on Galatians (Galatians). In his introduction to the commentary, Betz refers to Paul’s argument in 4:12–20 as a “string of friendship topoi” (ibid., 32). In his comments on the passage in question, Betz restates this expression; he says that Paul is making his argument using “a string of topoi belonging to the theme of ‘friendship.’” He continues by claiming that the theme of friendship was quite well known in the ancient world, and cites several ancient documents as evidence (ibid., 221). See also L. Johnson, “James 3:13—4:10,” 327–47.
91. Brunt, “More on the Topos,” 495–500.
92. Ibid., 496. Brunt admits that the form discussed by Bradley and Mullins certainly exists in classical writings as well as the New Testament; he argues, however, that it is incorrect to call it a topos.
93. Ibid., 498. Brunt (ibid., 497) also explains that Aristotle connected the use of topoi to enthymemes, which are syllogistic in nature. However, while a syllogism is a complete argument, in an enthymeme one premise of the argument is missing. The topoi represent the source of the enthymemes.
94. Wuellner, “Toposforschung und Torahinterpretation,” 463–83.
95. Thom, “Defining the topos,” 555–73. He cautions that his work should not be considered the final word on the topic; rather, his essay represents “an exploratory survey,” and that “[A]t most [he] will attempt to indicate some of the lines of investigation that need to be developed further” (ibid., 557).
96. Ibid., 561.
97. Ibid. By “formal,” Thom is referring to topoi that are used as “strategies of argumentation,” while “substantive” topoi are those that represent topics for arguments.
98. Ibid., 566.
99. Ibid. He offers the example of an argument from the lesser to the greater, found in Matt 6:30.
100. Ibid., 566–67. An example, according to Thom, is the “younger-son motif in the Parable of the Prodigal Son.” This definition is also emphasized by J. McDonald, Kerygma and Didache, 70–72. Two examples noted by McDonald include:
Seneca, Ep. 34.19: “I remember one day you were handling the well-known commonplace [Memini te illum locum aliquando tractasse],—that we do not suddenly fall on death, but advance towards it by slight degrees; we die every day.”
Seneca the Elder, Suasoriae 1.7.9: “He then spoke the commonplace [Dixit deinde locum] on the variability of Fortune. He described how nothing is stable, everything fluid, now raised, now depressed in unpredictable change.”
101. Thom, “Defining