The topos of Divine Testimony in Luke-Acts. James R. McConnell
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rel="nofollow" href="#ulink_16c4862e-0efa-5b3b-a5f2-0c01c7e01962">136. As noted above, the Greek here reads Τόπος; the Greek text is from Patillion and Bolognesi, Théon, 106.6.
137. Patillion and Bolognesi, Théon, 93.6.
138. Ibid., 93.8.
139. Notice that in Kennedy’s translation, he chooses the word “topics” rather than topoi as in the section on the preliminary exercise of commonplace. This same distinction is seen in Theon’s exercises concerning encomion and invective (Theon, Progymnasmata 111 [Kennedy, ed. and trans., 51]; cf. Patillion and Bolognesi, Théon, 111.11), prosopopoeia (Theon, Progymnasmata 117–18 [Kennedy, ed. and trans., 49]; cf. Patillion and Bolognesi, Théon, 118.1), and thesis (Theon, Progymnasmata 121 [Kennedy, ed. and trans., 56]; cf. Patillion and Bolognesi, Théon, 121.14–15, 24).
140. Kennedy bases this estimate on the sources that appear in the document; see Dilts and Kennedy, eds., Two Greek Rhetorical Treatises, xiii.
141. The author lists the following as examples of non-artistic proofs (which are generally defined as originating “from material at hand”: “witnesses, decrees, contracts, oracles.” These are summarized as being “such things, as many are written down” (Anonymous Seguerianus, Art of Political Speech 145, in Dilts and Kennedy, eds., Two Greek Rhetorical Treatises). The author does, however, qualify the use of these inartistic proofs through the following statement: “Overall, invention in the case of these proofs is non-artistic, but the use is artistic” (ibid., 145).
142. Kennedy notes that the treatise, in the form in which we now have it, shows evidence of having been edited by a later editor/redactor; see Dilts and Kennedy, eds., Two Greek Rhetorical Treatises, xvii.
143. Kennedy argues that θεώρημα in this section refers to “a topic from which an idea or argument can be drawn,” and notes that later in the treatise the term τόπος will be employed in referring to a similar concept (Dilts and Kennedy, eds., Two Greek Rhetorical Treatises, 77 n. 5). For Kennedy, this is evidence that the original treatise has been edited (cf. ibid., xvii).
144. Several headings are discussed, including what is legal [περὶ νόμου], customary [περὶ ἔθου], just [περὶ δικαίου], advantageous [περὶ συμφερόντος], possible [περὶ δυνατοῦ], and honorable [περὶ ἐνδόξου].
145. “The narration and the demonstration (apodeixis) are grouped under the pragmatic, the prooemium and the epilogue under the pathetical. How then, since we have said that the epilogue belongs to the pathetical aspect, do we say that reminder, being a topic of it, is part of the pragmatic? [τὴν ἀνάμνησιν τόπον οὖσαν αὐτοῦ μέρος πραγματικῆς εἶναί φάμεν;]” (Art of Rhetoric 10.2). And on pity, the author writes: “Whenever we are going to arouse pity (eleos), we shall prepare the judges ahead of time so this will be useful for us; for one ought not to enter on this topic suddenly, but after some preparation [οὐ γὰρ ἐξαίφνης ἐπιχειρεῖν δεῖ τούτῳ τόπῳ, ἀλλὰ μετὰ παρασκευῆς]” (Art of Rhetoric 10.15).
146. Although Quintilian does not specifically label these types of arguments as loci, he discusses them within a context of proofs used in a speech. Thus, his concept of inartificial proofs parallels that of Cicero, for whom the inartificial proofs are loci.
147. Cicero at this point adds the following comment: “[L]et us say a few words about these topics from without, although they bear no relation to your discussions of the law [etsi ea nihil omnino ad vestras disputationes pertinent]” (Top. 4.72). Cicero’s comment is not meant to infer that these loci are unnecessary for arguing forensic cases; rather, he is implying that Trebatius, a jurist, would normally be his own authority and would not normally require an outside authority to lend credibility to his case. See Reinhardt, Topica, 342.
Here I am confining the discussion to authoritative witnesses being invoked for the purpose of persuasion. There is, however, a second, very significant aspect to the concept of authority, namely the authority of the one speaking. For an interesting treatment of this topic, in which Cicero’s use of authority in his speech Pro Sulla is analyzed, see Goodwin, “Cicero’s Authority,” 38–60. Goodwin likens Cicero’s use of authority in this speech to an honor-shame transaction, in which the auditors are “blackmailed” into accepting Cicero’s authority (and therefore his position) rather than insult his dignity by disagreeing with him.
148. The statement “everything that is brought in from some external circumstance in order to win conviction [Testimonium autem nunc dicimus omne quo dab aliqua re externa sumitur ad faciendam fidem]” (Top. 4.73) certainly allows for other forms of evidence than simply testimony of witnesses. Cicero, however, chooses to focus his treatment on witnesses, both human and divine.
149. Cf. Pliny the Elder, Nat. 2.58.148: “We are told that during the wars with the Cimbri a noise of clanging armour and the sounding of a trumpet were heard from the sky, and that the same thing has happened frequently both before then and later.”
150. Seneca writes: “Hear what I think about those fires which the atmosphere drives across the sky.” In the same context he continues, “Also, we have more than once seen a flaming light in the shape of a huge ball which was then dissipated in mid-flight. We saw a similar prodigy about the time of the death of the deified Augustus” (Nat. 1.pref. 17.2–3). See also Nat. 1.15.5: “Among these you may also include a phenomenon which we read about frequently in history: the sky seems to be on fire.” He then goes on to give an example which occurred during the reign of Tiberius Caesar. Cf. Pliny the Elder, Nat. 2.58.148: “It has often been seen, and is not at all surprising, that the sky itself catches fire when the clouds have been set on fire by an exceptionally large flame.” Here, however, Pliny does not connect this to a specific event. He does, however, associate “a burning shield scattering sparks” which “ran across the sky at sunset from west to east” to the time of Lucius Valerius and Gaius Marius, albeit not to a particular incident during their rule (Nat. 2.34.100). Here one must include lightning, which is, according to the ancients, a form of fire in the heavens. See Seneca, Nat. 2.12.2; in his discussion of lightning (both “flashes” and “bolts”) and thunder, he writes: “It is further agreed that both lightning flashes and lightning bolts are either fiery or have the appearance of fire.” Later, he continues: “It is generally agreed that a lightning bolt is fire and so is a lightning flash, which is merely fire that would have become a lightning bolt if it had acquired more force” (Nat. 2.21.1). Seneca also argues that lightning, when rightly interpreted, foretells future events; see Nat. 2.32.1–51.1 for his discussion of interpreting lightning as well as other forms of augury. Especially pertinent to this study are his remarks concerning Jupiter and lightning (Nat. 2.41.1–46.1). Seneca first states the position of the Etruscans, namely that Jupiter sends lightning for three reasons: to warn; to do good (but this can also do damage); and for destruction. Seneca