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      Why So Wary? (1953–1956)

       We did not come to an agreement about anything. I don’t mean to say we disagreed about everything. We didn’t try to come to an agreement.

      —John Foster Dulles, US secretary of state, on his meeting with Jawaharlal Nehru in May 1953¹

       It was obvious that we did not feel in the same way as the American Government about communism and the way to combat it … We felt that [the] American reaction to the communist countries was not only exaggerated and dangerous but actually was likely to produce the very opposite results than those aimed at, more especially in Asia.… American policy has led the United States to side with colonial and reactionary elements in Asia, and as a result of that, had almost presented to the communist countries an ideal opportunity to pose as liberating agencies. Mere force and threats of war might frighten people for a while, but would never succeed in convincing people.

      —Jawaharlal Nehru, prime minister of India, to George Allen, April 24, 1954²

      During his 1949 visit to the United States, Nehru had received an honorary doctorate from Columbia University. In 1953, the man who had handed him that degree, former university president and retired general Dwight D. Eisenhower, became president of the United States. Despite their different backgrounds, Nehru and Eisenhower shared some views, including the need for balance between defense and development when thinking about national security. The Indian prime minister agreed with Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’s view that military strength alone was not important; economic stability was essential as well. Furthermore, Eisenhower—like Nehru—believed that thinking in terms of unlimited means was not helpful; the resources to secure the country’s interests were limited, rather than expandable.

      Between 1953 and 1956, however, shared concepts did not mean similar visions of how they should be put into practice. Nehru’s idea of containment-on-the-cheap, for example, envisioned engagement and negotiations. Eisenhower, on his part, believed that limited means necessitated burden sharing through alliances, and the use of more cost-effective instruments, such as nuclear weapons and covert action. Furthermore, while Eisenhower approved of the idea of negotiations, he left the details to Dulles, who saw negotiations as desirable only from a position of strength. In addition, Eisenhower and Dulles saw saber rattling—even of the nuclear kind—as acceptable instruments to demonstrate strength and deter adversaries. Nehru, however, thought it was provocative and counterproductive.

      There were also areas where US-India perceptions continued to differ. For one, Eisenhower and Dulles asserted that the free world could afford no more losses to the communist world, that the battlefield was global, and that any loss would decrease American credibility and security. Moreover, unlike Indian officials, they saw communism as monolithic and incompatible with nationalism, and believed Beijing to be just an affiliate of Moscow. The administration also saw decolonization, which Nehru welcomed, as creating vulnerabilities that the communists could exploit. Furthermore, there was disapproval of neutral countries, which muddied the waters and created rifts in the free world that the communist world would manipulate.³

      In most of Eisenhower’s first term, which this chapter covers, these differences contributed to or manifested themselves in persistent US-India disagreement on China. The two countries’ different attitudes and approaches toward that country were evident in the final stages and the aftermath of the Korean War, as well as in their debates over Indochina, American prisoners in China, and the Taiwan Strait crisis. And these developments took place as India’s partnership with China and the Soviet Union—and that of the US with Pakistan—evolved. Delhi’s and Washington’s differences on China had adverse consequences for the relationship—they deepened the rift between the US and India or, at the very least, prevented them from bridging the gap. This chapter examines those differences and their impact on the relationship. In a final section, it also considers why those disagreements did not lead to disengagement.

      Interacting in the East (1953–1954)

      In the early years of the Eisenhower administration, American and Indian officials engaged on East Asian and Southeast Asian issues. They frequently found themselves at odds, often over means more than ends.

      Korea: Mediating Once More (1953–1954)

      The Korean War was the most urgent problem facing Eisenhower when he came to office.⁴ The president and Dulles wanted to end the war that was consuming American resources and concerning US allies. At the start of the administration, to bring Beijing to the negotiating table on US terms, they increased the pressure on China and North Korea. Policymakers even considered the use of nuclear weapons to end the war. Then, suddenly, in the aftermath of Stalin’s death in March 1953, China offered to exchange sick and wounded prisoners—as Delhi had proposed in 1952 and Washington had suggested the month before—and to move toward a settlement.

      Eisenhower and Dulles debated whether the offer was a genuine attempt toward peace or a stalling tactic,⁵ but Nehru believed the new Soviet leadership wanted to ease global tension.⁶ While he often demurred from assessing the extent of Soviet sway over Chinese decisionmaking⁷ and sometimes even rejected that Moscow had any influence, Nehru believed that the Chinese offer had to have had Soviet approval.⁸ He did not know the precise reasons behind the change in Beijing’s and Moscow’s attitudes, but he welcomed it. He also appreciated Eisenhower’s Chance for Peace speech in April. Nehru thought it was “a great improvement” from the first few months of the administration, when escalation seemed to be the chosen US approach in East Asia—an approach he had publicly criticized. But he feared that continuing American suspicion of the communist countries would prevent a settlement.⁹ And, as he told Dulles that May in Delhi, the likely alternative was war on a “much wider and more intensive scale”—as the secretary of state had himself indicated.¹⁰

      While Nehru thought the US was too suspicious, the administration thought he was not suspicious enough of China and the Soviet Union. This shaped its attitude on aid for India. Dulles told Congress that the Indian prime minister was “quite naïve” and not “fully grounded as to facts” on certain matters.¹¹ It was worth supporting India to ensure it did not lose the China-India race, but only on a limited basis—and not to the extent of $200 million, as the Truman administration had recommended for FY1954.¹² Still, Cold War logic meant a $110 million request, of which $90 million was authorized amid grumbling in Congress that India was not on the US side and Nehru had not been “playing fair with [the US] all along.”¹³

      Nehru’s attitude also contributed to the Eisenhower administration’s doubts about India’s involvement as an intermediary between China and the US. Washington used India as a channel to China—Dulles, for example, sought to warn Beijing through Delhi that, if necessary, the US would “extend the area of conflict.”¹⁴ But, more often than not, the administration tried to eliminate or limit Indian involvement as a mediator—during the Korean crisis and after. Most of these efforts failed, however, and American attempts to exclude India only exacerbated the strain between the two countries.

      In the waning stages of the Korean War, as settlement proposals flew back and forth, the US unsuccessfully tried to prevent India from being chosen as the neutral state in charge of postwar prisoner of war (POW) repatriation. U. Alexis Johnson, in the State Department Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (FEA), outlined the reason: India seemed to be “‘more neutral’ toward the Chinese Communists than toward the UN.”¹⁵ For General