Fateful Triangle. Tanvi Madan
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There was an outcry in India against the inclusion of Pakistan in the US strategic script.81 Nehru called it an “intrusion of a new and dangerous element in the politics of Asia,” one that required an Indian policy rethink.82 Nehru told the home minister that the US would likely play a restraining role on Pakistan vis-à-vis India because “such a conflict would upset their larger plans in Asia.” But he was extremely anxious about Pakistan’s increased access to military equipment and the implications for Indian defense expenditures.83
Had India’s China policy affected the US decision to ally with Pakistan? Robert J. McMahon has argued that “American disillusionment with and devaluation of India” was definitely “a necessary precondition” for it.84 That devaluation had partly stemmed from India’s lack of willingness to play the role vis-à-vis China that Washington had hoped it would. The role it had played had not been helpful. The disillusionment, too, partly flowed from what US policymakers saw as India’s lack of understanding of the China threat and the American approach toward China. Beyond Delhi’s willingness, questions about India’s ability to stand up to China also contributed to the decision to go the collective security route. The idea of alliances and partnerships in the region itself partly stemmed from the belief that while India and Japan were potentially considerably strong, at that point, as the NSC statement of policy on China noted, they lacked the ability to resist the communists effectively. Thus noncommunist Asia needed “protection against Communist attack.”85
Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai: Peaceful Coexistence or Naïve Nurturing? (1953–1955)
Most Indian policymakers disagreed that India needed such protection and objected even more vociferously to the way the Eisenhower administration envisioned protecting Asia. Indeed, in mid-1953, US intelligence analysts had noted that the American anticommunist efforts that made India the most apprehensive were those directed against China.86
The approach Eisenhower and Dulles took focused on pressuring China. They had concluded that there were few near-term feasible options to get rid of the communist government in Beijing. Pressure, on the other hand, could facilitate internal instability. Isolating China would also strain Sino-Soviet relations since Beijing would depend more on and demand more of Moscow. Thus their strategy envisioned trade embargos, covert action, and psychological warfare, as well as refusing to recognize Mao’s regime or support its bid to take the Chinese seat at the UN.87
Nehru told Indian heads of mission that this American approach to China was “unrealistic and fallacious.”88 He remained frustrated about the US reluctance to recognize the regime in Beijing.89 Washington was leaving a “major factor out of reckoning. It is bound to upset the cart.”90 Nehru also worried about the consequences of the “obviously wrong” American effort to keep Taipei in and Beijing out of the UN Security Council, noting, “a whole castle is sought to be built on an artificial foundation; and then, if something goes wrong afterwards, complaint is made.”91 Furthermore, isolating rather than engaging Beijing only kept it more connected to Moscow.92
Asked during a congressional hearing in 1953 if he and Nehru agreed at all on China, Dulles had said no.93 He had told the South Korean president that their key difference was on tactics—India believed “the methods of appeasement rather than strength would weaken the communist world.”94 There was little expectation that Delhi would change its approach. Nehru had told Dulles what he had told Truman: that India had to deal with China for reasons of geography and pragmatism—their countries shared a 2,000-mile boundary. And he did not want “trouble for the indefinite future,” especially since the Indian leadership needed peace for nation-building.95
In the post-Stalin era, American analysts saw Beijing’s willingness to come to the table for talks on Korea as only reinforcing Indian views that China did not intend to behave aggressively.96 US policymakers knew that India wanted to establish a modus vivendi with the regime in Beijing. For that reason, an NSC assessment had predicted in early 1954, “India will go to great lengths to win Red China’s friendship.”97 Indeed, India was doing just that at the time, with negotiations that would culminate in the signing of a Sino-Indian agreement that included the five principles of peaceful coexistence (or Panchsheel).
Did US military aid to Pakistan cause Delhi to seek a peace agreement with Beijing? Allen believed it did.98 And Indian foreign secretary R. K. Nehru did argue for “nonaggression pacts with the Soviet and Chinese” governments as one of the ways to maintain the balance with Pakistan.99 However, while the announcement of American aid to Pakistan might have contributed, India’s desire to deepen its relations with China had preceded it. In March 1953, Burmese prime minister U Nu had first suggested that Burma, China, and India sign a fifty-year friendship and nonaggression agreement. Nehru had been unsure of the Chinese reaction given Beijing’s adverse response to the Indian resolution on Korea at the UN in late 1952 and the resultant “coolness” toward India. Nonetheless, Nehru had welcomed the idea, but only if it was not “anti” any country. He also thought the duration too long, recommending instead a decade-long agreement with the possibility of renewal. He had suggested that rather than a trilateral agreement, the countries aim for bilateral ones. Nehru had wanted to be careful, telling the Indian ambassador in Beijing that any such agreements would have a powerful impact, especially on the US. Moreover, Beijing should not think Delhi wanted this more—China “did not respect those who show weakness,” so India should be “both friendly and firm.”100
From Nehru’s perspective, continuing global and regional tension in fall 1953, despite Stalin’s death and the end of the Korean War, had made it even more important for India to seek peace with China. But, thanks to India’s NNRC role, Sino-Indian relations were not “not quite happy,” as the Indian embassy in Beijing put it.101 Therefore, Nehru had sought to avoid steps that China would see as unfriendly.102 Subsequently, he had moved to settle issues that could cause tension between the two countries, announcing in September 1953 that his government had reached out to Beijing seeking talks.103
China and India began discussing the status of Tibet at the end of December 1953. In March 1954, Pillai told Allen to expect “some kind of statement of mutual desire … to maintain peace between [the] two countries” if the negotiations were successful.104 What emerged was the Sino-Indian agreement, signed in April 1954, through which India implicitly recognized Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. Explicitly, it laid out rights for trade and pilgrimages between India and Tibet, as well as Indian promises to withdraw its military missions and reduce its overall footprint in Tibet. Finally, it contained the five principles of peaceful coexistence, or Panchsheel, including clauses on mutual respect for territorial integrity and noninterference in each other’s internal affairs.
An NSC assessment saw the Indian desire for an accommodation with China through a cultural prism and thought it stemmed from “legendary bonds of friendship and culture” and “psychological ties arising from the fact that the Chinese as a colored race and as Asians have asserted themselves against the West.”105 But, for Nehru, there was a more important reason. While he did not think there was any “immediate likelihood,” it was not inconceivable that India’s relations with China would deteriorate. He told senior foreign ministry officials that there could be a new phase of Chinese expansionism in the future, and the only feasible solution for India was to “fashion our policy to prevent [China] coming in the way of our interests or other interests that we consider important.” The agreement might not be “a permanent guarantee,” but it was a useful insurance policy at that stage.106 Beijing could change its mind, he acknowledged to Burmese leader U Nu, but he wanted to take advantage of that moment when it sought Delhi’s friendship.107 This approach was especially desirable for a leadership that did not want to enter an alliance to ensure the country’s security. Moreover, Nehru believed that India’s importance increased because of its “intimate relations” with China since Delhi could “say things [to Beijing] which many other nations could not.”108
The Sino-Indian agreement did not help