Fateful Triangle. Tanvi Madan
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the “first step toward the communization of India.”110 Allen tried to explain that the “favorable Indian attitude toward China is not because China is Communist, but in spite of the fact that it is Communist.” He acknowledged that the agreement might not be a good deal but said Indian policymakers accepted it as “the best deal they could get.”111
Nehru traced the criticism to lack of awareness of the bigger picture—that the agreement was an effort to “encircle and contain China in a ring of pledges,” as one scholar put it.112 Indians generally approved of it, but there were voices of dissent from China critics in the Praja Socialist Party on the left and the Hindu Mahasabha on the right, and even from some in the Congress Party.113 But for the prime minister, an alternate approach was neither feasible nor desirable. What India lost—rights in Tibet—it could not have held on to; moreover, what India gained outweighed any loss: “a friendly frontier and an implicit acceptance of that frontier.”114 India did not have the ability to act within Tibet. It could merely tolerate, without encouraging, the Tibetan movement in India—which he assumed the US was supporting—if it was “peaceful and unobtrusive.”115 Finally, Nehru contended that “assum[ing] an aggressive role” would only lead to trouble.116
After the treaty was signed, Zhou Enlai suddenly accepted a pending invitation to visit India, pleasantly surprising Nehru.117 In the US, a New York Times editorial reflected American disapproval, noting with chagrin that Zhou’s visit was taking place on the fourth anniversary of the Chinese-“aided and abetted” North Korean invasion of South Korea.118 In India, Zhou was well received. Nehru and the premier did not discuss potentially contentious issues like the Sino-Indian border—Nehru indeed thought that the very act of bringing the subject up might suggest doubt about India’s frontiers, which he asserted were settled.119 Sarvepalli (S.) Radhakrishnan, the Indian vice president, told Allen that Zhou was reasonable about every subject, except one—the US.120
US policy toward China was a key subject in the Sino-Indian discussions, and their different perceptions of and policies toward the US were evident. The Chinese premier wanted China and India to use the Panchsheel principles jointly to help stop the spread of the US military bloc in Asia. But, while highly critical of US policy toward China in internal correspondence, Nehru was more circumspect in conversations with Zhou. He admitted that US-India relations were “not good,” but declined Zhou’s suggestion that China and India try to corner or isolate the US. Furthermore, Nehru tried to explain the motivation behind US policy toward China, stating that it partly stemmed from domestic politics. He noted, moreover, “the vicious circle of fear”—acting out of fear, the US was encircling and, in turn, creating fear in China and the Soviet Union.121
In order not to exacerbate American anxieties or further harm US-India relations, Nehru ensured that the Sino-Indian joint statement emerging from the visit did not condemn the US or any other country. Furthermore, as in the case of a US-sponsored Pacific Pact and SEATO, he emphasized his lack of interest in what he interpreted as Zhou’s suggestion for a grouping of Southeast Asian countries; instead, he urged the premier to pursue bilateral understandings with Southeast Asian countries to reassure them.122 Nehru would later also resist visiting Beijing at the same time as Burmese prime minister U Nu, in case that was misconstrued as the beginnings of an anti-SEATO alliance.123
US intelligence analysts saw Zhou’s visits to India and Burma as part of a Chinese effort to split the noncommunist countries, “dull the[ir] vigilance,” and buy time. Simultaneously, they believed Beijing would continue to subvert noncommunist regimes and build up Chinese military capability.124 After the visit, Allen and his Canadian counterpart worried that Nehru had bought China’s “peaceful intentions” line. The American ambassador lamented that as long as Nehru had “blind faith” in China’s good intentions, he would not even help guarantee Burma’s security—let alone do more.125 There was also concern about the impact on the Indian public’s perceptions of China and the US. In India, Zhou had publicly offered reassurances about China’s intentions, while explaining Chinese concern about American encirclement and regime change efforts, “thus endeavoring to avert [a] picture of China as aggressor to [a] picture of China as [a] victim of United States aggressive designs.”126
Pillai, in turn, assessed that Zhou’s trip had been designed to reassure India, and also to show Beijing’s independence from Moscow.127 After the visit, Nehru admitted that Zhou’s assurances could have been part of a “clever strategy looking to the distant future.”128 Nonetheless, at that point he was convinced that Chinese leaders did not want war because it would disrupt their efforts to improve conditions within China. The only thing, he believed, that would provoke them was fear of attack. He was impressed by Zhou’s questions about what might reassure Southeast Asian countries. He perceived the lack of an attack on Burma—even though Guomindang (GMD) operations from there gave Beijing an excuse—as evidence of China’s desire for peace.129 Asked by an American correspondent about Zhou’s continued insistence that China had the right to use force to take Taiwan, Nehru said he disagreed with that contention, but dismissed it as directed toward a domestic audience.130
Assured about China’s near-term intentions, Nehru seemed even more convinced that Washington’s China policy was obstructive. He pointed out to U Nu that he was not alone in thinking that US nonrecognition of the regime in Beijing was unhelpful. He pointed to statements by the Australian and New Zealand foreign ministers. Furthermore, he saw US behavior at Geneva at the time—and, later, the formation of SEATO—as only exacerbating the situation.131
Some Indian policymakers believed that the state of Sino-Indian relations proved that the Indian approach was better than that of the US. The Indian embassy in China noted that the Sino-Indian agreement showed that Beijing was willing to be a “reasonable negotiator.”132 Nehru told Eden that it suggested a better way than military alliances to “restrain and resolve conflicts.”133 Writing to Indian chief ministers, he outlined his disagreement with the American attitude that communists would never stick to their agreements so it was better to use force rather than diplomacy, pressure rather than persuasion. Moreover, US policy had not been effective and represented a “record of repeated failure.”134
Nehru subsequently traveled to China in October 1954. The US was again discussed in the Sino-Indian meetings, especially since the visit took place as the first Taiwan Strait crisis was unfolding. Once again, there were differences; once again, Nehru tried to inject moderation into Beijing’s attitude toward the US. He noted that the US position was not as monolithic and hostile as China believed. But Zhou questioned American intentions, asserting that Washington—unlike Delhi or Beijing—did not want to ease global tensions. The US was not just out to protect its interests, as Nehru insisted, but wanted to enlarge them through hostilities. Trying to convince Nehru, Zhou argued that the US was encouraging Pakistan to be expansionist. He drew a contrast with China’s willingness to reassure countries in the neighborhood, noting that the US was doing the opposite. The discussion left Nehru commenting that Zhou’s approach toward the US—with its insistence on preventing American expansion, isolating Washington, and not appeasing the US—mirrored what Washington said about Beijing.135
In their first meeting, Mao reiterated to Nehru that the US was a threat. When Nehru tried to explain that fear influenced US policies, the chairman retorted that he could not understand what a country like the US had to fear.136 Nehru disagreed with Mao that war should be welcomed if it came. Responding to the chairman, Nehru asserted that, while the Defense Department’s growing influence was problematic, most Americans, including many in government, did not want war. He included Eisenhower in the latter category, explaining that any inconsistency in the president’s position was thanks to his “third-rate advisers.”137
Publicly, Nehru denied reports that China and India had sharp differences, noting that, while in some cases their basic approaches were different, there were no disagreements during the talks.138 He insisted that following different paths did not inevitably lead to conflict.139 Privately, Nehru told Zhou that he hoped that any differences