An Essay Concerning Human Understanding / Ein Versuch über den menschlichen Verstand. Auswahlausgabe. John Locke
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1. That so far as any one can, by the direction or choice of his Mind, preferring the existence of any Action, to the non-existence of that Action, and, vice versâ, make it to exist, or not exist, so far he is free. […] For such a preferring of Action to its absence, is the willing of it: and we can scarce tell how to imagine any Being freer, than to be able to do what he wills. […]
§ 22. […] Concerning a Man’s Liberty there yet […] is raised this farther Question, Whether a Man be free to will; which, I think, is what is meant, when it is disputed, Whether the will be free. And as to that I imagine,
§ 23. 2. That Willing, or Volition being an Action, and Freedom consisting in a power of acting, or not acting, a Man in respect of willing, or the Act of Volition, when any Action in his [250]power is once proposed to his Thoughts, as presently to be done, cannot be free. […] For it is unavoidably necessary to prefer the doing, or forbearance, of an Action in a Man’s power, which is once so proposed to his thoughts: a Man must necessarily will the one, or the other of them, […].
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§ 29. […] To the Question, what is it determines the Will? The true and proper Answer is, The mind. For that which determines the general power of directing, to this or that particular direction, is nothing but the Agent it self Exercising the power it has, that particular way. If this Answer satisfies not, ’tis plain the meaning of the Question, what determines the Will? is this, What moves the mind, in every particular instance, to determine its general power of directing, to this or that particular Motion or Rest? And to this I answer, The motive, for continuing in the same State or Action, is only the present satisfaction in it; The motive to change, is always some uneasiness: nothing setting us upon the change of State, or upon any new Action, but some uneasiness. This is the great motive that works on the Mind to put it upon Action, which for shortness sake we will call determining of the Will, which I shall more at large explain.
§ 30. But in the way to it, it will be necessary to premise, that […] the will or power of Volition is conversant about nothing, but our own Actions; terminates there; and reaches no farther; and that Volition is nothing, but that particular determination of the mind, whereby, barely by a thought, the mind endeavours to give rise, continuation, or stop to any Action, [252]which it takes to be in its power. This well considered plainly shews, that the Will is perfectly distinguished from Desire, which in the very same Action may have a quite contrary tendency from that which our Wills sets us upon. […]
§ 31. To return then to the Enquiry, what is it that determines the Will in regard to our Actions? And that […] is not, as is generally supposed, the greater good in view: But some (and for the most part the most pressing) uneasiness a Man is at present under. […]
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§ 33. Good and Evil, present and absent, ’tis true, work upon the mind: But that which immediately determines the Will, from time to time, to every voluntary Action, is the uneasiness of desire, fixed on some absent good, either negative, as indolency to one in pain; or positive, as enjoyment of pleasure. […]
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§ 35. […] that good, the greater good, though apprehended and acknowledged to be so, does not determine the will, until our desire, raised proportionably to it, makes us uneasy in the want of it. […] Let a man be ever so well perswaded of the advantages of virtue, that it is as necessary to a Man, who has any great aims in this World, or hopes in the next, as food to life: yet till he hungers and thirsts after righteousness; till he feels an uneasiness in the want of it, his will will not be determin’d to any action in pursuit of this confessed greater good; but any other uneasiness he feels in himself, shall take place, and carry [254]his will to other actions. On the other side, let a Drunkard see, that his Health decays, his Estate wastes; Discredit and Diseases, and the want of all things, even of his beloved Drink, attends him in the course he follows: yet the returns of uneasiness to miss his Companions; the habitual thirst after his Cups, at the usual time, drives him to the Tavern, though he has in his view the loss of health and plenty, and perhaps of the joys of another life: the least of which is no inconsiderable good, but such as he confesses, is far greater, than the tickling of his palate with a glass of Wine, or the idle chat of a soaking Club. ’Tis not for want of viewing the greater good: for he sees, and acknowledges it, and in the intervals of his drinking hours, will take resolutions to pursue the greater good; but when the uneasiness to miss his accustomed delight returns, the greater acknowledged good loses its hold, and the present uneasiness determines the will to the accustomed action […].
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§ 41. If it be farther asked, what ’tis moves desire? I answer happiness and that alone. Happiness and Misery are the names of two extremes, the utmost bounds whereof we know not. […] But of some degrees of both, we have very lively impressions, made by several instances of Delight and Joy on the one side; and Torment and Sorrow on the other; which, for shortness sake, I shall comprehend under the names of Pleasure and Pain […].
§ 42. […] Now because Pleasure and Pain are produced in us, by the operation of certain Objects, either on our Minds or [256]our Bodies; and in different degrees: therefore what has an aptness to produce Pleasure in us, is that we call Good, and what is apt to produce Pain in us, we call Evil, for no other reason, but for its aptness to produce Pleasure and Pain in us, wherein consists our Happiness and Misery. […]
§ 43. Though this be that, which is called good and evil; and all good be the proper object of Desire in general; yet all good, even seen, and confessed to be so, does not necessarily move every particular Man’s desire; but only that part, or so much of it, as is consider’d, and taken to make a necessary part of his happiness. […]
§ 44. This, I think, any one may observe in himself, and others, that the greater visible good does not always raise Men’s desires in proportion to the greatness, it appears, and is acknowledged to have: Though every little trouble moves us, and sets us on work to get rid of it. The reason whereof is evident from the nature of our happiness and misery it self. All present pain, whatever it be, makes a part of our present misery: But all absent good does not at any time make a necessary part of our present happiness, nor the absence of it make a part of our misery. If it did, we should be constantly and infinitely miserable; there being infinite degrees of happiness, which are not in our possession. All uneasiness therefore being removed, a moderate portion of good serves at present to content Men; and a few degrees of Pleasure in a succession of ordinary Enjoyments make up a happiness, wherein they can be satisfied. […]
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§ 46. […] by a due consideration and examining any good proposed, it is in our power, to raise our desires, in a due proportion to the value of that good, whereby in its turn, and place, it may come to work upon the will, and be pursued. […]
§ 47. […] the mind having in most cases, as is evident in Experience, a power to suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires, and so all, one after another, is at liberty to consider the objects of them; examine them on all sides, and weigh them with others. In this lies the liberty Man has; and from the not using of it right comes all that variety of mistakes, errors, and faults which we run into, in the conduct of our lives, and our endeavours after happiness; whilst we precipitate the determination of our wills, and engage too soon before due Examination. […]
§ 48. […] were we determined by any thing but the last result of our own Minds, judging of the good or evil of any action, we were not free, the very end of our Freedom being, that we might attain the good we chuse. […]
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§ 51. As therefore the highest perfection of intellectual nature, lies in a careful and constant pursuit of true and solid happiness; so the care of our selves, that we mistake not imaginary for real happiness, is the necessary