An Essay Concerning Human Understanding / Ein Versuch über den menschlichen Verstand. Auswahlausgabe. John Locke
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what the Elephant rested on; to which his answer was, a great Tortoise: But being again pressed to know what gave support to the broad-back’d Tortoise, replied, something, he knew not what. And thus here, as in all other cases, where we use Words without having clear and distinct Ideas, we talk like Children; who, being questioned, what such a thing is, which they know not, readily give this satisfactory answer, That it is something; which in truth signifies no more, when so used, either by Children or Men, but that they know not what; and that the thing they pretend to know, and talk of, is what they have no distinct Idea of at all, and so are perfectly ignorant of it, and in the dark. The Idea then we have, to which we give the general name Substance, being nothing, but the supposed, but unknown [284]support of those Qualities, we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist, sine re substante, without something to support them, we call that Support Substantia; which, according to the true import of the Word, is in plain English, standing under, or upholding.
§ 3. An obscure and relative Idea of Substance in general being thus made, we come to have the Ideas of particular sorts of Substances, by collecting such Combinations of simple Ideas, as are by Experience and Observation of Men’s Senses taken notice of to exist together, and are therefore supposed to flow from the particular internal Constitution, or unknown Essence of that Substance. Thus we come to have the Ideas of a Man, Horse, Gold, Water, etc. of which Substances, whether any one has any other clear Idea, farther than of certain simple Ideas coexisting together, I appeal to every one’s own Experience. ’Tis the ordinary Qualities, observable in Iron, or a Diamond, put together, that make the true complex Idea of those Substances, which a Smith, or a Jeweller, commonly knows better than a Philosopher; who, whatever substantial forms he may talk of, has no other Idea of those Substances, than what is framed by a collection of those simple Ideas which are to be found in them; only we must take notice, that our complex Ideas of Substances, besides all those simple Ideas they are made up of, have always the confused Idea of something to which they belong, and in which they subsist: and therefore when we speak of any sort of Substance, we say it is a thing having such or such Qualities, as Body is a thing that is [286]extended, figured, and capable of Motion; a Spirit a thing capable of thinking; and so Hardness, Friability, and Power to draw Iron, we say, are Qualities to be found in a Loadstone. These, and the like fashions of speaking intimate, that the Substance is supposed always something besides the Extension, Figure, Solidity, Motion, Thinking, or other observable Ideas, though we know not what it is.
§ 4. Hence when we talk or think of any particular sort of corporeal Substances, as Horse, Stone, etc. though the Idea, we have of either of them, be but the Complication, or Collection of those several simple Ideas of sensible Qualities, which we used to find united in the thing called Horse or Stone, yet because we cannot conceive, how they should subsist alone, nor one in another, we suppose them existing in, and supported by some common subject; which Support we denote by the name Substance, though it be certain, we have no clear, or distinct Idea of that thing we suppose a Support.
§ 5. The same thing happens concerning the Operations of the Mind, viz. Thinking, Reasoning, Fearing, etc. which we concluding not to subsist of themselves, nor apprehending how they can belong to Body, or be produced by it, we are apt to think these the Actions of some other Substance, which we call Spirit; whereby yet it is evident, that having no other Idea or Notion, of matter, but something wherein those many sensible Qualities, which affect our Senses, do subsist; by supposing a Substance, wherein Thinking, Knowing, Doubting, and a [288]power of Moving, etc. do subsist, We have as clear a Notion of the Substance of Spirit, as we have of Body; the one being supposed to be (without knowing what it is) the Substratum to those simple Ideas we have from without; and the other supposed (with a like ignorance of what it is) to be the Substratum to those Operations, which we experiment in our selves within. ’Tis plain then, that the Idea of corporeal Substance in Matter is as remote from our Conceptions, and Apprehensions, as that of Spiritual Substance, or Spirit; and therefore from our not having any notion of the Substance of Spirit, we can no more conclude its non-Existence, than we can, for the same reason, deny the Existence of Body: It being as rational to affirm, there is no Body, because we have no clear and distinct Idea of the Substance of Matter; as to say, there is no Spirit, because we have no clear and distinct Idea of the Substance of a Spirit.
§ 6. Whatever therefore be the secret abstract Nature of Substance in general, all the Ideas we have of particular distinct sorts of Substances, are nothing but several Combinations of simple Ideas, coexisting in such, though unknown, Cause of their Union, as makes the whole subsist of itself. […]
§ 7. For he has the perfectest Idea of any of the particular sorts of Substance, who has gathered and put together, most of those simple Ideas which do exist in it, among which are to be reckoned its active Powers, and passive Capacities; which though not simple Ideas, yet, in this respect, for brevity’s sake, may conveniently enough be reckoned amongst them. Thus the power of drawing Iron, is one of the Ideas of the Complex [290]one of that substance we call a Load-stone, and a Power to be so drawn is a part of the Complex one we call Iron […].
§ 8. Nor are we to wonder, that Powers make a great part of our complex Ideas of Substances; since their secondary Qualities are those, which in most of them serve principally to distinguish Substances one from another, and commonly make a considerable part of the complex Idea of the several sorts of them. For our Senses failing us, in the discovery of the Bulk, Texture, and Figure of the minute parts of Bodies, on which their real Constitutions and Differences depend, we are fain to make use of their secondary Qualities, as the characteristical Notes and Marks, whereby to frame Ideas of them in our Minds, and distinguish them one from another. All which secondary Qualities, as has been shewn, are nothing but bare Powers. […]
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§ 11. Had we Senses acute enough to discern the minute particles of Bodies, and the real Constitution on which their sensible Qualities depend, I doubt not but they would produce quite different Ideas in us; and that which is now the yellow Colour of Gold, would then disappear, and instead of it we should see an admirable Texture of parts of a certain Size and Figure. This Microscopes plainly discover to us: for what to our naked Eyes produces a certain Colour, is, by thus augmenting the acuteness of our Senses, discovered to be quite a different thing; and the thus altering, as it were, the proportion of the Bulk of the minute parts of a coloured Object to our usual Sight, produces different Ideas, from what it did before. […]
[292]§ 12. The infinite wise Contriver of us, and all things about us, hath fitted our Senses, Faculties, and Organs, to the conveniences of Life, and the Business we have to do here. We are able, by our Senses, to know, and distinguish things; and to examine them so far, as to apply them to our Uses, and several ways to accommodate the Exigencies of this Life. […] But it appears not, that God intended, we should have a perfect, clear, and adequate Knowledge of them: that perhaps is not in the Comprehension of any finite Being. We are furnished with Faculties (dull and weak as they are) to discover enough in the Creatures, to lead us to the Knowledge of the Creator, and the Knowledge of our Duty […].
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§ 15. […] putting together the Ideas of Thinking and Willing, or the Power of moving or quieting corporeal Motion, joined to Substance, of which we have no distinct Idea, we have the Idea of an immaterial Spirit; and by putting together the Ideas of coherent solid parts, and a power of being moved, joined with Substance, of which likewise we have no positive Idea, we have the Idea of Matter. The one is as clear and distinct an Idea, as the other: The Idea of Thinking, and moving a Body, being as clear and distinct Ideas, as the Ideas of Extension, Solidity, and being moved. For our Idea of Substance, is equally obscure, or none at all, in both; it is but a supposed, I know not what, to support those Ideas, we call Accidents. It is for want of reflection, that we are apt to think, that our Senses shew us [294]nothing but material