An Essay Concerning Human Understanding / Ein Versuch über den menschlichen Verstand. Auswahlausgabe. John Locke
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I shall not now enter into that Enquiry, my present Business being not to search into the original of Power, but how we come by the Idea of it. […]
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§ 4. We are abundantly furnished with the Idea of passive Power, by almost all sorts of sensible things. In most of them we cannot avoid observing their sensible Qualities, nay their very Substances to be in a continual flux: And therefore with reason we look on them as liable still to the same Change. Nor have we of active Power (which is the more proper signification of the word Power) fewer instances. Since whatever Change is observed, the Mind must collect a Power somewhere, able to make that Change, as well as a possibility in the thing it self to receive it. But yet, if we will consider it attentively, Bodies, by our Senses, do not afford us so clear and distinct an Idea of active Power, as we have from reflection on the Operations of our Minds. For all Power relating to Action, and there being but two sorts of Action, whereof we have an Idea, viz. Thinking and Motion, let us consider whence we have the clearest Ideas of the Powers, which produce these Actions. 1. Of Thinking, Body affords us no Idea at all, it is only from Reflection that we have that: 2. Neither have we from Body any Idea of the beginning of Motion. A Body at rest affords us no Idea of [240]any active Power to move; and when it is set in motion it self, that Motion is rather a Passion, than an Action in it. […] The Idea of the beginning of motion, we have only from reflection on what passes in our selves, where we find by Experience, that barely by willing it, barely by a thought of the Mind, we can move the parts of our Bodies, which were before at rest. […]
§ 5. […] we find in our selves a Power to begin or forbear, continue or end several actions of our minds, and motions of our Bodies, barely by a thought or preference of the mind ordering, or as it were commanding the doing or not doing such or such a particular action. This Power which the mind has, thus to order the consideration of any Idea, or the forbearing to consider it; or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest, and vice versâ in any particular instance is that which we call the Will. The actual exercise of that power, by directing any particular action, or its forbearance is that which we call Volition or Willing. The forbearance of that action, consequent to such order or command of the mind is called Voluntary. And whatsoever action is performed without such a thought of the mind is called Involuntary. […]
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§ 7. Every one, I think, finds in himself a Power to begin or forbear, continue or put an end to several Actions in himself. From the consideration of the extent of this power of the mind over the actions of the Man, which every one finds in himself, arise the Ideas of Liberty and Necessity.
§ 8. […] so far as a man has a power to think, or not to think; to move, or not to move, according to the preference or [242]direction of his own mind, so far is a Man free. Where-ever any performance or forbearance are not equally in a Man’s power; where-ever doing or not doing, will not equally follow upon the preference of his mind directing it, there he is not Free, though perhaps the Action may be voluntary. So that the Idea of Liberty, is the Idea of a Power in any Agent to do or forbear any particular Action, according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is preferr’d to the other; where either of them is not in the Power of the Agent to be produced by him according to his Volition, there he is not at Liberty, that Agent is under Necessity. So that Liberty cannot be, where there is no Thought, no Volition, no Will; but there may be Thought, there may be Will, there may be Volition, where there is no Liberty. A little Consideration of an obvious instance or two may make this clear.
§ 9. A Tennis-ball, whether in motion by the stroke of a Racket, or lying still at rest, is not by any one taken to be a free Agent. If we enquire into the Reason, we shall find it is, because we conceive not a Tennis-ball to think, and consequently not to have any Volition, or preference of Motion to rest, or vice versâ; and therefore has not Liberty, is not a free Agent; but all its both Motion and Rest, come under our Idea of Necessary, and are so call’d. Likewise a Man falling into the Water, (a Bridge breaking under him,) has not herein liberty, is not a free Agent. For though he has Volition, though he prefers his not falling to falling; yet the forbearance of that Motion not being in his Power, the Stop or Cessation of that Motion follows not upon his Volition; and therefore therein he is not free. So a Man [244]striking himself, or his Friend, by a Convulsive motion of his Arm, which it is not in his Power, by Volition or the direction of his Mind to stop, or forbear; no Body thinks he has in this Liberty; every one pities him, as acting by Necessity and Constraint.
§ 10. Again, suppose a Man be carried, whilst fast asleep, into a Room, where is a Person he longs to see and speak with; and be there locked fast in, beyond his Power to get out: he awakes, and is glad to find himself in so desirable Company, which he stays willingly in, i. e. preferrs his stay to going away. I ask, Is not this stay voluntary? I think, no Body will doubt it: and yet being locked fast in, ’tis evident he is not at liberty not to stay, he has not freedom to be gone. […]
§ 11. […] Voluntary then is not opposed to Necessary; but to Involuntary. For a Man may preferr what he can do, to what he cannot do; the State he is in, to its absence or change, though Necessity has made it in it self unalterable.
§ 12. As it is in the motions of the Body, so it is in the Thoughts of our Minds: where any one is such, that we have power to take it up, or lay it by, according to the preference of the Mind, there we are at liberty. A waking Man being under the necessity of having some Ideas constantly in his Mind, is not at liberty to think, or not to think; no more than he is at liberty, whether his Body shall touch any other, or no: But whether he will remove his Contemplation from one Idea to another, is many times in his choice; and then he is in respect of his Ideas, as much at liberty, as he is in respect of Bodies he rests on: He can at pleasure remove himself from one to another. […]
[246]§ 13. Where-ever Thought is wholly wanting, or the power to act or forbear according to the direction of Thought, there Necessity takes place. This in an Agent capable of Volition, when the beginning or continuation of any Action is contrary to that preference of his Mind, is called Compulsion; when the hind’ring or stopping any Action is contrary to his Volition, it is called Restraint. […]
§ 14. If this be so, (as I imagine it is,) I leave it to be considered, whether it may not help to put an end to that long agitated, and, I think, unreasonable, because unintelligible, Question, viz. Whether Man’s Will be free, or no. For if I mistake not, it follows, from what I have said, that the Question it self is altogether improper; and it is as insignificant to ask, whether Man’s Will be free, as to ask, whether his Sleep be Swift, or his Vertue square: Liberty being as little applicable to the Will, as swiftness of Motion is to Sleep, or squareness to Vertue. Every one would laugh at the absurdity of such a Question, as either of these: because it is obvious, that the modifications of motion belong not to sleep, nor the difference of Figure to Vertue: and when any one well considers it, I think he will as plainly perceive, that Liberty, which is but a power, belongs only to Agents, and cannot be an attribute or modification of the Will, which is also but a Power.
§ 15. Such is the difficulty of explaining, and giving clear notions of internal Actions by sounds, that I must here warn my Reader that Ordering, Directing, Chusing, Preferring, etc. [248]which I have made use of, will not distinctly enough express Volition, unless he will reflect on what he himself does, when he wills. For example, Preferring which seems perhaps best to express the Act of Volition, does it not precisely. For though a Man would preferr flying to walking, yet who can say he ever wills it? Volition, ’tis plain, is an Act of the Mind knowingly exerting that Dominion it takes it self to have over any part of the Man, by employing it in, or witholding it from any particular Action. And what is the Will, but the Faculty to do this? […]
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§ 21. To return then to the Enquiry about Liberty, I think the Question is