An Essay Concerning Human Understanding / Ein Versuch über den menschlichen Verstand. Auswahlausgabe. John Locke
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of happiness in general, which is our greatest good, and which as such our desires always follow, the more are we free from any [260]necessary determination of our will to any particular action, and from a necessary compliance with our desire, set upon any particular, and then appearing preferable good, till we have duly examin’d, whether it has a tendency to, or be inconsistent with our real happiness; and therefore till we are as much inform’d upon this enquiry, as the weight of the matter, and the nature of the case demands, we are by the necessity of prefering and pursuing true happiness as our greatest good, obliged to suspend the satisfaction of our desire in particular cases.
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53. […] the forbearance of a too hasty compliance with our desires, the moderation and restraint of our Passions, so that our Understandings may be free to examine, and reason unbiassed give its judgment, being that, whereon a right direction of our conduct to true Happiness depends; ’tis in this we should employ our chief care and endeavours. In this we should take pains to suit the relish of our Minds to the true intrinsick good or ill, that is in things; and not permit an allow’d or supposed possible great and weighty good to slip out of our thoughts, without leaving any relish, any desire of it self there, till, by a due consideration of its true worth, we have formed appetites in our Minds suitable to it, and made our selves uneasie in the want of it, or in the fear of losing it. […]
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§ 55. […] I think, that the Philosophers of old did in vain enquire, whether Summum bonum consisted in Riches, or [262]bodily Delights, or Virtue, or Contemplation: And they might have as reasonably disputed, whether the best Relish were to be found in Apples, Plumbs, or Nuts; and have divided themselves into Sects upon it. For as pleasant Tastes depend not on the things themselves, but on their agreeableness to this or that particular Palate, wherein there is great variety: So the greatest Happiness consists, in the having those things, which produce the greatest Pleasure; and in the absence of those, which cause any disturbance, any pain. Now these, to different Men, are very different things. […]
§ 56. These things duly weigh’d, will give us, as I think, a clear view into the state of humane Liberty. Liberty ’tis plain consists in a Power to do, or not to do; to do, or forbear doing as we will. This cannot be deny’d. But this seeming to comprehend only the actions of a Man consecutive to volition, it is farther enquired, whether he be at Liberty to will, or no? and to this it has been answered, that in most cases a Man is not at Liberty to forbear the act of volition; he must exert an act of his will, whereby the action proposed, is made to exist, or not to exist. But yet there is a case wherein a Man is at Liberty in respect of willing, and that is the chusing of a remote Good as an end to be pursued. Here a Man may suspend the act of his choice from being determined for or against the thing proposed, till he has examined, whether it be really of a nature in it self and consequences to make him happy, or no. For when he has once chosen it, and thereby it is become a part of his [264]Happiness, it raises desire, and that proportionably gives him uneasiness, which determines his will, and sets him at work in pursuit of his choice on all occasions that offer. And here we may see how it comes to pass, that a Man may justly incur punishment, though it be certain that in all the particular actions that he wills, he does, and necessarily does will that, which he then judges to be good. For though his will be always determined by that, which is judg’d good by his Understanding, yet it excuses him not: Because, by a too hasty choice of his own making, he has imposed on himself wrong measures of good and evil; which however false and fallacious, have the same influence on all his future conduct, as if they were true and right. He has vitiated his own Palate, and must be answerable to himself for the sickness and death that follows from it. The eternal Law and Nature of things must not be alter’d to comply with his ill-order’d choice. If the neglect or abuse of the Liberty he had, to examine what would really and truly make for his Happiness, misleads him, the miscarriages that follow on it, must be imputed to his own election. He had a Power to suspend his determination: It was given him, that he might examine, and take care of his own Happiness, and look that he were not deceived. […]
What has been said, may also discover to us the Reason, why Men in this World prefer different things, and pursue Happiness by contrary Courses. But yet since Men are always constant, and in earnest, in matter of Happiness and Misery, the Question still remains, How Men come often to prefer the [266]worse to the better; and to chuse that, which, by their own Confession, has made them miserable.
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§ 58. […] as to present Happiness and Misery, when that alone comes into consideration, and the consequences are quite removed, a Man never chuses amiss; he knows what best pleases him, and that, he actually prefers. Things in their present enjoyment are what they seem; the apparent and real good are, in this case, always the same. For the Pain or Pleasure being just so great, and no greater, than it is felt, the present Good or Evil is really so much as it appears. And therefore were every Action of ours concluded within it self, and drew no Consequences after it, we should undoubtedly never err in our choice of good; we should always infallibly prefer the best. […]
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§ 61. […] But because not only present Pleasure and Pain, but that also which is apt by its efficacy, or consequences, to bring it upon us at a distance, is a proper Object of our desires, and apt to move a Creature, that has foresight; therefore things also that draw after them Pleasure and Pain, are considered as Good and Evil.
§ 62. The wrong Judgment that misleads us, and makes the Will often fasten on the worse side, lies in misreporting upon the various Comparisons of these. […]
§ 63. […] when we compare present Pleasure or Pain with future, (which is usually the case in most important [268]determinations of the Will) we often make wrong Judgments of them, taking our measures of them in different positions of distance. Objects, near our view, are apt to be thought greater, than those of a larger size, that are more remote: And so it is with Pleasures and Pains, the present is apt to carry it, and those at a distance have the disadvantage in the Comparison. […] The future loses its just proportion, and what is present, obtains the preference as the greater. […]
§ 64. The cause of our judging amiss, when we compare our present Pleasure or Pain with future, seems to me to be the weak and narrow Constitution of our Minds. We cannot well enjoy two Pleasures at once, much less any Pleasure almost, whilst Pain possesses us. […] at any rate, we desire to be rid of the present Evil, which we are apt to think nothing absent can equal; because under the present Pain we find not our selves capable of any the least degree of Happiness. […] our whole Endeavours and Thoughts are intent, to get rid of the present Evil, before all things, as the first necessary condition to our Happiness, let what will follow. Nothing, as we passionately think, can exceed, or almost equal, the uneasiness that sits so heavy upon us. And because the abstinence from a present Pleasure, that offers it self, is a Pain, nay, oftentimes a very great one, the desire being inflamed by a near and tempting Object; ’tis no wonder that that operates after the same manner Pain does, [270]and lessens in our Thoughts, what is future; and so forces us, as it were, blindfold into its embraces.
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§ 68. […] But, which way ever it be, either by placing it where really it is not, or by neglecting the means, as not necessary to it, when a Man misses his great end Happiness, he will acknowledge he judg’d not right. That which contributes to this mistake is the real or suppos’d unpleasantness of the actions, which are the way to this end; it seeming so preposterous a thing to Men, to make themselves unhappy in order to Happiness, that they do not easily bring themselves to it.
§ 69. The last enquiry therefore concerning this matter is, Whether it be in a Man’s power to change the pleasantness, and unpleasantness, that accompanies any sort of action? and to that, it is plain in many cases he can. Men may and should correct their palates, and give relish to what either has, or they suppose has none. The relish of the mind is as various as that of the Body, and like that too may be alter’d; and ’tis a mistake to think, that Men cannot change the displeasingness, or indifferency, that is in actions, into pleasure and desire, if they will do but what is in their power. A due consideration will do it in