Organización industrial. Martin Peitz
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36 La única excepción fue el modelo de capacidad-después-precio.
37 Ver los capítulos 18 y 19 para un análisis más completo de las patentes y la industria farmacéutica.
38 Amir y Grilo (1999) muestran que la concavidad-log de la función de demanda (inversa) (esto es, independientemente de la función de costos) conduce por sí sola al ranking (4.2). Se necesitaría una demanda convexa-log y que la producción no tuviera costos para que al menos una empresa tuviera
39 Aquí consideramos productos sustituibles, para los cuales las funciones de mejor respuesta tienen pendientes descendentes bajo competencia en cantidades (sustituibilidad estratégica) y ascendentes bajo competencia en precios (complementariedad