The True Military Power of North Korea. Donald Trump
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of the military, such as factory, farming, or construction to meet statedictated quotas, in addition to their various military exercises, to earn foreign currency and supplement their shortage in food. Morale and discipline problems cannot help but increase, training has decreased, and some units would have difficulty maintaining operational readiness.
Navy. The Korean People’s Navy (KPN) maintains approximately 46,000 personnel, and its combat ship approximately 46,000 personnel, and its combat ship 800 ships, which rank the KPN as one of the world’s largest navies. The KPN’s world rating is only a qualitative number. The ROKN may have a lower figure of ships in its inventory (approximately 260 ships, including submarines), but it maintains superiority on total tonnage and weapon and sensor technology. For example, the largest ships in the KPN inventory are the SOHO-class (1,845 tons) and two NAJIN-class Light Frigates (FFLs) (1,500 tons each). Compare these ships with the newest ROKN ships, such as the Kwangaeto-class DDHs which are 3,900 tons each (three units). South Korea has begun initial production of a KDX-III destroyer which will incorporate phased array radar technology and state-of-the art weapons.
North Korea is assessed to have approximately 88 submarines, the world’s largest submarine fleet, which is capable of slowing force generation through naval mine laying, anti-ship torpedoes, and SOF interdiction. Production of a coastal submarine, the SANG-0 (meaning shark) class reportedly continues.
The majority of the KPN’s fleet is comprised of torpedo boat-size hulls which are from 60 to 200 tons. Other small surface combatants include patrol boats, patrol craft, and fast attack craft (which have a variety of ground weapons mounted on them such as 85/100mm tank turrets or 122 mm rocket launchers) — actually designed as sea-going artillery.
The navy’s most capable weapons systems are their guided-missile patrol boats (over 30) equipped with the SS-N-2A Styx anti-ship missile. Though their small size limits operations to coastal waters and calm seas, they have the capability to respond quickly to ships approaching the coast.
Since 2000, the KPN has continued to modify existing vessels and construct small numbers of patrol boats, coastal submarines, hovercraft, and specialized infiltration craft. Details concerning these developments are not currently available.
The peacetime missions of the KPN include:
Defense of DPRK territorial waters and coasts;
Seaborne insertion of intelligence agents and special operations forces;
North Korean coastal surveillance; and,
Protection and control of coastal shipping and fishing operations.
During wartime, the KPN would be tasked with amphibious lift and fire-support operations, support to KPA ground force units, naval mine warfare (both offensive and defensive), interdiction of enemy shipping in waters adjacent to the Korean peninsula, and rear area security.
The KPN is divided into two fleets, the Yellow Sea Fleet (west coast fleet) and the East Sea Fleet (east coast fleet). The Supreme Naval Headquarters is located in Pyongyang and controls both. These fleets have not been detected exchanging ships, probably because of geographical limitations which make mutual support almost impossible.
The KPN maintains a significant coastal amphibious capability in which there are three types of amphibious operations: (1) strategic — a multi-battalion operation; (2) operational — at battalion, company, or platoon strength; and (3) tactical (Sniper/ Special Operations) — from company down to squad or team. The KPN has a variety of amphibious lift craft to include approximately 135 Kong Bang (literally meaning “air bag”) class hovercrafts which can carry approximately 40 troops (no vehicles) and travel at speeds of 40 knots, as well as over 100 other types of amphibious ships. The KPA has the capability to transport approximately 15,000 troops by sea at one time, but doctrinally probably would use a handful of hovercrafts for small unit amphibious raids.
The KPN has a credible mine warfare capability which was first developed in the Korean War. Numerous surface ships and submarines are capable of delivering mines within both the navy and civilian sectors (merchant ships, fishing boats). Mines will be used to defend against amphibious assaults, defend strategic ports, and provide seaward flank protection for land forces. The KPN has a large inventory of outdated technological mines; although the total number of mines is unknown, it is assessed that North Korea has enough to satisfy their military objectives. Despite economic crises engulfing the country, limited access to modern technical equipment from abroad and fuel shortages which have restricted training and operations, the KPN still maintains the capability to conduct limited offensive and defensive wartime operations.
The KPN’s experiences with operating an inventory of both midget and coastal submarines and amphibious hovercraft provide it with the wartime ability to interdict commercial shipping to and from the ROK, particularly in the East Sea (Sea of Japan), and to conduct sub- stantial amphibious lift and limited mine laying operations. The KPN’s limited abilities to operate at night and in bad weather, as well as technical weaknesses in EW, SIGINT, ASW, and shipborne air defense capabilities, portend that the advanced weaponry and combined operations capabilities of the USN and ROKN, together with coalition air supremacy, would render the vast majority of the KPN’s surface combatants ineffective. However, the total numbers of KPN craft probably would create an allied logistic ordnance nightmare in providing the munitions needed to engage all of these ships.
KPN midget and coastal submarine operations undoubtedly would prove more problematic for the USN and ROKN and would likely survive for a considerable time. The KPN is primarily a capable coastal defense force when coupled with land-based coastal defense assets (artillery, surface-to-surface coastal cruise missiles, defensive mining).
The KPA, to include KPN forces, has taken on the U.S. Navy successfully with the capture of the USS Pueblo and the tragic shoot down of a USN EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft, with no measured U.S. military reaction against the KPN forces. Undoubtedly, the KPN uses this as a morale booster.
Air Force. The missions of the Korean People’s Air Force (KPAF) include:
Air and air defense of the homeland,
Tactical air support to the army and the navy,
Transportation and logistical support, and
Airborne insertion of special operations forces.
The KPAF has been reported to have over 100,000 personnel and an inventory of as many as 1-200-1,700 aircraft, and it controls and operates all aircraft (including the national airline — Air Koryo; there are no NK civilian aircraft), airfields, and airports within the DPRK. The KPAF retains a numerically significant inventory of Soviet and Chinese designed aircraft that date back to the 1950s and 1960s. However, in the late 1980s, Russia supplied a limited number of modern allweather air defense and ground-attack aircraft (MiG29’s).
Interceptor aircraft are an integral part of the DPRK’s air-defense network. Interceptors routinely fly combat air patrol missions to protect DPRK coastlines, military installations, and key urban areas. Although the KPAF employs dated Soviet and Chinese ground attack aircraft such as the IL-28/Beagle, Su-7/Fitter and MiG-19/Farmer, these aircraft can only operate in daylight and good weather. They only carry small bomb loads for relatively short distances, except for the IL-28 which can carry an air-launched version of the Styx anti-ship cruise missile. As previously discussed, the KPA appears to have replaced the longrange strike capability of its air force with long-range artillery and surface-to-surface missiles.
The KPAF has been successful in intercepting nonNorth Korean aircraft operating near its coastlines. In 1965, two North Korean MiG jet fighters “attacked and damaged” a U.S. RB-47 reconnaissance plane over the East Sea, about 50 miles east of the nearest North Korean coast. In 1969, KPAF North Korean MiG jet fighters shot down an unarmed U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance plane over the East Sea, about 90 miles off the North Korean coast, resulting in the loss of 31 lives.
On March 2, 2003, four KPAF aircraft — two MiG23MLs and two MiG-29As — intercepted a U.S. Air Force RC-135S COBRA BALL reconnaissance