The True Military Power of North Korea. Donald Trump
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over the East Sea — approximately 130 NM from the DPRK coast. The four aircraft shadowed the RC-135s for approximately 20 minutes, during which they signaled for the aircraft to follow them and land in the DPRK, frequently maneuvering within 20 meters of its wings. The RC135S aborted its mission and returned to its base at Kadena Air Base, Japan.
While politically motivated, the interception of the RC-135S is noteworthy in that the mission showed a considerable degree of pre-mission intelligence collection and planning on the part of the KPAF, as the aircraft were staged from their west coast bases through air bases on the east coast. The MiG-29As came from the 55th Air Regiment based at Sunchon, while the MiG-23s came from the 60th Air Regiment based at Pukchang. It appears that the pilots chosen to perform this mission were among the best available to the KPAF, and it also is likely that, given the potential fallout of the mission, it was expressly approved by Kim Jong Il.
One of the KPAF SOF insertion aircraft reflects the KPA’s use of unsophisticated and dated design features to accommodate limitations in their technology. The AN-2/COLTis a slow-flying biplane that serves well in the role of insertion and extraction of special operations forces. It is rugged and easy to maintain, and can operate within all ranges of Korean climate. It has a cruising speed of 120 knots, but can fly as slow as 35 knots in some cases and is well-suited to flying low, using valleys to hide from radar. Its large wing area and engine allows it to take off from dirt strips in 2,130 feet or from paved surfaces (such as roads or airfields) in just over 1,300 feet. Maximum range for a stock AN2 with a full load is 186 miles, and they normally carry 10 soldiers. Reportedly, KPAF has over 300 AN-2’s and over 300 helicopters in its inventory.
The DPRK’s air defense network is arguably one of the densest in the world today, relying on surfaceto-air missiles (SAMs) systems and massive numbers of mobile and fixed anti-aircraft artillery weapons. The KPAF is responsible for ground air defense of the nation and the ground forces (however, the KPA ground forces maintain tactical air defense weapons to include man portable air defense missiles [MANPADs]. The DPRK’s air defense network is based on obsolete weapons, missiles, and radars; and is most effective at lower altitudes where masses of AAA fire can be brought to bear on an intruder. Medium and high altitude SA-2/3/5 surface-to-air missiles are ineffective in a modern EW environment.
The KPAF is assessed to possess only limited offensive and defensive wartime capabilities. This is based upon the KPAF’s inflexible and unsophisticated command and control system, large numbers of obsolete aircraft, low flight hours, limited access to spare parts for its few modern aircraft, and fuel shortages.
The KPAF is judged to be capable of conducting a surge of offensive operations only during the initial phase of any new war on the Korean Peninsula. It is judged to have only a limited capability of guarding DPRK airspace during peacetime. While the KPAF is numerically superior to the ROK Air Force (ROKAF) and U.S. air components deployed within the Republic of Korea (ROK), it is qualitatively inferior in all aspects.
North Korea has far greater air defense capability on paper than it does in practice. It has not fought in any kind of meaningful air action since the Korean War. North Korean efforts to transfer technology, organization, and training methods from other nations on a patchwork basis often leaves critical gaps in national capability, even where other capabilities are effective.
It is unknown why North Korea has not modernized its air forces. Whether a lack of hard currency (no country will tender credit to North Korea to buy military hardware) or lack of doctrinal emphasis, the KPAF remains a low-tier priority. North Korea probably will rely on the successful operations of its SOF to destroy ROK and U.S. aircraft on the ground. The KPN and SOF will attempt to delay coalition resupply and reinforcement until such time that North Korea has gained its military objectives.
One last reason for the KPAF atrophy may be the reliance on North Korea’s new missiles and WMD capabilities. The KPA may have determined that their growing surface-to-surface missile inventory (800+), as well as their chemical and nuclear capabilities, would be sufficient to counter any enemy air threat.
Paramilitary and Reserve Forces. The establishment of paramilitary and reserve type units within the DPRK dates to the 1950s, although it was not until the early 1960s and the formulation of the Four Military Lines that the DPRK undertook concerted efforts to increase the size, number, and capabilities of such units. The DPRK’s paramilitary reserve forces total almost 7 1/2 million personnel, with approximately 30 percent of the population between the ages of 15 and 60. This sizable force is organized into four primary components: Workers’-Peasants’ Red Guard (WPRG) (more than 4 million personnel); Red Youth Guard (RYG) (more than 1 million high school and college male and female students); Paramilitary Training Unit (PTU) (almost 2 million personnel); and the People’s Guard troops (approximately 400,000 personnel). These reserve forces are estimated to be organized into 40 infantry divisions and 18 infantry brigades.
The PTUs (a.k.a., Reserve Military Training Units, Pacification Units, Guidance Units, Instructional Units, Instruction Guidance Units, or Reserve Units) are the primary ready reserve force of the MPAF and are capable of being immediately mobilized and incorporated into the KPA in times of war or national emergency. The PTUs have the capability, training, and equipment to execute the following peacetime missions: (1) maintain a trained military force of KPA veterans who can be immediately mobilized and incorporated into the KPA, and (2) provision the security force for large government buildings, facilities, and property.
The WPRG, People’s Guard, and the RYG would take longer to achieve combat readiness and probably would be employed as rear area security units or as reinforcements or replacements for regular KPA units rather then as new combat units.
Beginning during the 1980s, the KPA initiated a series of force improvements to reorganize and revitalize its paramilitary and reserve forces in line with newly developing concepts of wartime operations. These improvements included PTUs acquiring additional artillery. They also were restructured and exercised to facilitate out-of-area operations in support of regular KPA ground forces. Finally, at the MPAF-level (probably now at the NDC-level), a new command structure was created for the wartime mission of rear area defense.
The entire lifecycle of the average North Korean citizen is centered on some sort of military service that begins as a young adult (15 to 17) where they usually serve in the RYG and finish in the WPRG at the age of 60. The net result of this lifelong process is that North Korea is one of the most militarized nations in the world and is a country possessing a trained reserve manpower pool that allows it to expand the size of its active armed forces rapidly in times of national emergency or war.
A secondary effect of this lifelong military service is that it provides an indoctrination that would improve a North Korean insurgency effort significantly, if required. Additionally, the North Korean people may not be as receptive to an “invading” force whose intent is to liberate them from tyranny.
Combat Readiness. Before examining North Korea’s military readiness and capabilities, the definitions of the terms should be clarified. A common analytical mistake occurs when the same metrics used to review U.S. military readiness and capabilities are applied to an adversary.
The objective of the U.S. Army’s readiness reporting system is to measure an organization’s readiness to accomplish its assigned mission — in other words, to measure how ready it is to go to war today, and how effectively it could prosecute the war. These metrics are used to satisfy the U.S. Army’s objectives as they relate to U.S. National Military Strategy and the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review — usually dealing with issues of a global nature. North Korea’s strategic objectives are regional and do not require the same scope of readiness that the U.S. military requires. At one point, the Pentagon considered readiness as only one of four elements or pillars on which military capability rests:
Force Structure: The number, size, and composition of military units;
Modernization: The technical sophistication of the forces, weapon systems, and equipment;
Sustainability: The “staying power” of the forces measured in days; and,
Readiness: The immediate ability to execute a designated combat mission.